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PROGRESS AS A SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORY*:

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A MAN of science ought to know how to mind his own business. If he chooses to play the philosopher in a leisure hour, as he has no less a right to do than any other man, he should at least make it perfectly plain to himself whenever he is straying beyond the limits of his official task. This caution applies with equal force to his use of categories or supreme heads of classification. If they exactly coincide with the full extent of that particular subject, then well and good; they are clearly his, to be employed as he pleases. If, however, he is importing wider generalizations into the investigation than are strictly necessary for its independent conduct, he is inevitably begging certain questions of the philosophic order. Whereas his constitutive categories are his very own, these wider categories, which may be called regulative, are borrowed. It is in the capacity of a more or less amateur philosopher that he has recourse to their help. Even if he adopts them uncriticised and ready-made, as probably happens, he must shoulder the responsibility none the less if they turn out to be misleading rather than helpful within his proper field of research. The least that he can do, then, is to use the several kinds of principles with discrimination. He must be able to distinguish clearly between the string that ties up his private bundle of facts and the stouter rope needed to fasten it together in a bale with a number of other such parcels.

It may be worth while, then, in what follows to consider from the sociological point of view two categories that are rather easily confused, namely Evolution and Progress; the former being of the regulative and the latter of the constitutive type. Progress is an idea applying to men only; whereas Evolution applies to men and to fleas, and, some would say, to stones as well. How far, if at all, mankind is progressive is a question which it is entirely within the province of the sociologist to answer. On the other hand, whether mankind is evolving can only be settled in committee with the representatives of other sciences, who would do well to have a trained philosopher for chairman.

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To consider the wider issue first, why does the sociologist normally proclaim himself an adherent of the evolutionary principle? There are at least good historical grounds for this attitude. Sociology owes, if not its very existence, at any rate the secret of its scientific inspiration to its association with Darwinism; and Darwin called himself an evolutionist. Wisely or not, he was prepared to avail himself of the category of Evolution, although for him it was regulative rather than constitutive in function—in other words, covered more than his special purpose. For it was Herbert Spencer, not Darwin, who invented the term, having a great deal more than biology in his eye when he did so. Spencer was, in fact, trying to formulate a law embracing mind and matter alike as twin constituents of the universe. Thus as a biologist Darwin might well have hesitated to borrow another man's phrase from such a philosophic context. Biologically speaking, there was no need to postulate more than was strictly required to explain life as such by summing up its processes under one supreme formula. Literary convenience is hardly an excuse for overstepping the limits of a purely biological argument in this way. Whether increased complexity of structure in an animal or plant is on wider grounds comparable with the change that occurs when condensation in a nebula gives rise to a star is a consideration wholly beside the point when the origin of species is being discussed on its own merits. There is all the difference in the world between Spencer's Evolution as used technically with a cosmic reference and Darwin's Evolution in so far as it stands loosely for a way in which living things behave. Whatever personal reasons Darwin may have had for admiring the Spencerian philosophy, it is very doubtful if he seriously meant his biological theory to depend on this framework. In view of his characteristic modesty one cannot suppose that the father of modern biology claimed to be more than a man of one science working in full accordance with such methods as are strictly appropriate thereto.

THE fact remains, however, that by borrowing the term Evolution from Spencer, Darwinism seems to be fraternising with physics or, it would perhaps be more accurate to say, with a physical brand of metaphysics. In science all such borrowing of categories stands for a friendly act as between allies. By calling itself 'evolutionary,' biology acknowledges affinities that might well cause it to be regarded as a kind of bio-physics. It may indeed be that certain biologists of the behavioristic or anti-vitalistic school would frankly have it so. Living matter, they would suppose, is just matter that behaves in a peculiar way. Now they have a perfect right to make this guess so long as they do not forget that the peculiarity in question constitutes the only aspect of the case on which they themselves are entitled to give an expert opinion. The properties of matter as such are not, in the last resort, their affair. Hence, if they whittle down organic process until nothing but physical

process is left, their subordinate services are no longer required. The patient having been duly persuaded to succumb, the doctor's job is over as undertaker's jackal. Thus the formula that evolution is change from simple to complex, if supposed to sum up the life-process, can represent it merely as a certain complication of matter subject to further complications on its own account. The remarkable fact that it has to be credited with an account of its own has to go by the board in order that this intrusion of a physical category shall pass unobserved. To grow more organised cannot mean, off hand and on the face of it, the same thing as to grow more complicated. However mysterious and awkward it may be for the investigator, there is a factor in the problem which happens to be the distinctively biological factor; and what is wanted is a formula comprehensive of that. Darwin may have simply meant development when he spoke of evolution; but, if so, he unfortunately used a borrowed phrase, a metaphor, such as suggests an unholy alliance between biology and physics, with downright materialism somewhere in the offing.

At the same time there is no need to treat matter as a bogey. Such a conception is quite useful in its place. Matter is in fact the democratic category *par excellence*, because it appeals to the commonest, if not necessarily the best, kind of experience that human beings enjoy. The surface-view of things afforded by the senses, and more especially by those of touch and sight, commands a fuller publicity than any other. What usually goes by the name of common sense consists in just this tissue of communicable externalities. No doubt the physical and quasi-physical sciences do much to reshape it. But they have no power to alter the essential character of the stuff on which they work. Sense-experience remains the current coin of human intercourse, whether it bears the official stamp of science, or consists of baser metal that nevertheless manages to pass with innocent folk. The practical man, then, will look on matter exactly as he looks on money—namely, as a convenience for the wise, however easily turned by fools into a fetish. By compounding our sense-impressions, and attending simply to what may be called the mathematical qualities that they yield for the construction of objects, we can create a system of cash-values whereby all the rest of our experiences can, however roughly, be compared and equated for purposes of universal exchange. What is known to the natural sciences as verification, or making a thing true, is the result of bringing that thing as directly as possible within the range of touch and sight, so that it can thereupon be established firmly within the daily experience of the multitude.

If, then, there is an aristocratic type of soul with experiences of its own not so readily shared, so much the worse for average humanity, which just in so far as it is sense-bound will tend to regard matter as the only

touchstone of truth. Thus catholicity is a pretension of religion which in practice it by no means succeeds in making good ; whereas science of the physical or naturalistic type has everything to expect and nothing to fear from vulgarisation. The beliefs precipitated out of the spiritual strivings of the genius in religion, philosophy, or art are not often imparted without distortion even to the most intelligent of his disciples. On the other hand natural science, if it fails to make its meaning clear to all, has only itself to blame for using a verbal shorthand ; or else for slipping unawares into metaphysics, and admitting non-sensuous symbols at the point where actual sense-experience breaks off and exhibits a ragged edge. There are doubtless excellent historical reasons why a materialistic outlook should prevail. The most refined of the human faculties are relatively late-born, whereas the routine of the senses was organised a long way back in time. Our first ancestor started his career with a sense-apparatus which in most respects, even if smell was a weak point, must have been on a par with that of any of the higher mammals ; while he had the extra advantage of being able to help out his eye by means of a very mobile hand. Common sense and handiness between them are thus the earliest assets of our race. Man could specialise from the first on matter and machines. By bringing our own bodies, mainly by way of the hand, to bear on other bodies, we have discovered how to modify their working to our advantage in all manner of ways ; and that without treating them as anything more than bodies. What is known as our material culture consists entirely in the sum-total of these exterior manipulations ; and it is to be noted that it is such material culture which is most eagerly adopted, and hence most easily diffused, as between different portions of mankind. In this communicability, then, alike for purposes of knowledge and of use, is a claim for recognition on the part of the material aspect of the universe which it would be very short-sighted to belittle.

THOSE, then, who would champion the spiritualities in face of this world-wide and age-long appeal of matter must be careful not to set about it in the wrong way. If they try to kick matter out of their path they will simply stub their toes. Matter is a solid reality, at any rate in the pragmatic sense that it has the solid consent of the crowd behind it. If votes are to count, there is not the slightest chance of obtaining a resolution to the effect that the whole realm of sensible experience is one vast illusion. A counter-motion maintaining that everything without a sense-backing was empty dream-stuff would be much more likely to be carried by general acclaim.

INDEED, if such a false issue were to be raised, it is hardly doubtful on which side the psychologists themselves, who ought to be the professed defenders of the soul and of the things of the soul, might be

inclined to enlist; for many of them would wholeheartedly make common cause with the public. After all, it is a very crude psychology that treats soul or mind as something completely alien to body. To discard matter one must, in order to be consistent, likewise discard the body, together with the senses so far as they depend on the body. If after these rather impracticable eliminations were accomplished aught were to remain, it would certainly be an ineffable kind of experience, since all possibility of speech would have been thrown overboard with the rest. In fact, there is but one *experimentum crucis* possible in the circumstances, namely, dying; and even *revenants* show a suspicious predilection for the use of a corporeal medium. It is quite another matter, however, to agree, as the modern psychologist would do, that there are degrees of what he would probably label introversion to which the average sensual man seems incapable of attaining. A sort of spiritual levitation marks the genius, whereas the majority must cleave to *terra firma*. Thus, though the realism of the groundlings may well suffice for them, there is room also within the mind of the more enlightened for a high-grade consciousness, which, without rejecting the realistic point of view, nevertheless transcends it; that which is superadded being essentially an idealistic, reflective, inward-seeking power. As sight is to insight, so are the materially-minded to the spiritually-minded, the many to the few.

How, then, is biology going to do justice to the psychological element which life includes, more especially when this element seems inclined to take charge of body and to use it for its own purposes rather than to conform passively to the ways of body as such? The biologist who is not likewise a sociologist deserves all our sympathies, because with the best will in the world he cannot make much use of psychological aids in the study of our dumb companions, whether animals, insects, plants, or something between the three. He is working backwards from human analogies when he attributes consciousness, intelligence, and so forth to lower and ever lower organisms. These nevertheless one and all exhibit a certain purposiveness in their bodily reactions to other bodies, live or unalive. Hence he is tempted to treat life as coextensive with mind, though in some minimal sense of the term life need connote no more than pure instinct. At this point he hardly knows which way to turn. Shall it be towards mind? But mental activity becomes ambiguous in proportion as it departs from the type of which we have introspective evidence in ourselves. As we read back consciousness through the hardly conscious into the quite unconscious we are at last faced with what Lewis Carroll would call "the grin without the cat." Shall he then turn towards matter? But organism is something more than mechanism. In appearance it is a self-determining unity rather than merely the joint effect of certain convergent forces. No system of external compulsions is likely to prove an

attractive assumption when it is so much simpler to suppose that every creature with a tail is itself responsible for wagging it. At the same time, even when it takes the form of bare instinct, life cannot be set apart by itself as something neither mental nor material but simply neutral. It cannot be neither, so it probably is both. Body is obviously involved, and mind, though less obviously, cannot but be involved too. We are in fact at a half-way house : yet, once there, surely the impetus of the search for a higher principle will lead us to go forward rather than to go back.

FOR, alone among biologists, the student of the life of Man has the chance of making full use of mind as a principle of explanation at least as valuable as body. Whatever may be the case with his less fortunate brethren, he has access to a master-clue. No fox without a tail is going to persuade him to dispense with an appendage at once so ornamental and so useful. It would be absurd to insist on levelling down the man to the bacillus for the simple reason that the introspective instrument is lacking for levelling up the bacillus to the man. We must surely be ready to embrace with due gratitude the single chance presented in our own case of getting an inside view of reality, as at any rate represented by that part of reality which we in our own persons not merely embody but likewise ensoul. Primarily the sociologist needs mind or soul as a constitutive category to be used for working purposes as at least on a par with body, whatever predominance the latter principle may enjoy in less favoured departments of biological science. As for using mind as a regulative category based on some estimate of the part played by it in experience as a whole, this would be definitely to shift over to the higher and more perilous ground of philosophy ; and such a step must not be taken unawares. It is, however, plain that the natural affinities of sociology, with its unique command over the psychological factor in the life-process, will be with such a metaphysic as attaches due importance to the mental side of reality. The inferior court of sociology is competent to try the case of human soul *versus* human body. Its decision, however, which is likely to be something in the way of a compromise, can count at most but as a sort of precedent in that supreme court which, in the rough and ready style of the law, would settle the more far-reaching dispute between mind and matter. As for the possibility of obtaining an impartial verdict—that is, literally something *veredictum*, or said with the finality that belongs to truth alone—it cannot be denied that mind, and in some sense, the mind of man, must act as judge in its own cause in both inquiries alike. The choice, however, would seem to lie between a living judge and a mere lay figure, some dumb idol counterfeiting truth and justice, and man-made at that. If matter wins, mind will have endowed its own figment with the power of silencing all opposition by its grand incapacity for saying anything at all.

To address ourselves, then, to the simpler question whether any progress in respect to body and mind alike can be made out on a broad view of human history, there seems little doubt that the answer will be in the affirmative, if we treat body throughout as the subordinate factor in the problem. If we make what the biologist knows as dominance the test of progress, without for the moment considering the inward condition of a richer experience that goes with it, who would venture to deny that, compared with his far-off or even his recent predecessors, the modern man has increased his numbers, and therewith his grip on the surface of this planet? Continuous observation from Mars or Venus assisted by reasonably powerful telescopes could not have failed to observe modifications of the whole terrestrial bioplasm for which Man and the weather between them can take most of the credit, and perhaps Man even chiefly. Now this gain in effectiveness is not very visibly connected with change of body as such, though it must be remembered that we have great difficulty in observing the finer alterations undergone by the brain, the directive centre of our energies. Indeed, there are some who would, on grounds of pure physique, contrast the man of to-day more or less unfavourably with earlier types of *Homo sapiens*, such as the stalwart Cro-Magnon; while even the latter might have been worsted in a wrestling match with that Neanderthal man whom nevertheless he managed to outwit or at any rate to outlive. In sheer muscle, then, we may have actually degenerated, even while securing in other ways a handsome balance of advantage. Nay, it is certain that we abuse this advantage by gratuitously permitting non-selective breeding to fill our ranks with weaklings, who cannot but impede the onward march of the race.

YET this lamentable neglect of eugenics may be taken as affording a negative proof of the fact that the chief source of our strength lies in the soul rather than in the body. We tolerate dysgenic customs because the development of social sympathy has hitherto proved incompatible with public regulation of the individual right to marry, and to have children regardless of their physical or even their mental quality. The undoubted drawback of supporting a crowd of defectives on a permanent dole can be ignored only on the excuse that to curtail our charity would be the graver risk. Certain it is that the truest measure of human progress as revealed in history is the growth of culture in what may be broadly termed its moral aspect. A superficial reading of the human record will doubtless tend to emphasise the materialistic aspect. The more important technological inventions, by bringing about far-reaching changes in the economic life, have obviously acted as powerful levers in their way. But it should not be overlooked that every society can only acquire the degree of civilisation that it deserves. Savages have been known to wash down a cannibal feast with draughts of trade-champagne; and so too there are more

aspiring peoples who cannot altogether match their manners with the style of the goods which they are able to buy or to copy. The present age has in fact seen a vast diffusion of material improvements, unaccompanied by any propagation of higher moral principles on a corresponding scale. The tide of human progress, however, is subject to alternating phases of reflux and advance ; and it may be that after a great war, which was essentially a struggle for markets, the exhausted nations have taken to heart the lesson that competition is not always beneficence in disguise, and will bring themselves to try whether good faith and good will do not offer firmer foundations for a lasting civilisation. This is a crisis in human history when our educators and our statesmen—those of them at least who are lofty-minded, and have the courage to make public opinion rather than to follow it—must preach the gospel of universal amity, with that sublime contempt for the practicable which is always the mark of inspiration in ethics and religion alike. "Though we cannot, we must" is the paradoxical declaration of will that preconditions all high adventure. History shows that the merely existent will always submit to transformation under the magic spell of the ideal.

COMMON sense, then, is by no means the saving virtue of the true leader of society. The crowd after all has it in plenty : and its inveterate materialism acts as a drag on moral progress, which in any case is collar work for all concerned. The seer for the very reason that he denies the actualities of current experience, and offers visionary possibilities in their place, must always be by common standards something of a madman. Judging by those same standards one might even say that, if he is wholly sane, he must be a charlatan. Just as no genuine artist can create to the order of the philistine, so in ethics and religion the pioneer who has "hitched his waggon to a star" is incapable of reining in to suit the pace of the average laggard. Fortunately, the impatience with genius ever manifested by the less enlightened is normally accompanied by a certain awe. So long, then, as this feeling happens to be uppermost, a contagious faith in the personality of the prophet will be apt to gain a like credence for his message. It is common to all the hero types which Carlyle tried to distinguish that they should alike be deemed worthy of worship by the multitude of their adherents. One and all they are felt and believed to have *mana*. They are acknowledged wonder-workers—not manipulators of matter, but dealers in the unseen, men who summon latent things into manifest being by the power of a master-word. The source of this dynamism of theirs remains for most men a mystery, not so much because the possessors of the secret would guard it for themselves—since on the contrary they would have their inward light be likewise a light for the whole world—but rather because they openly bear the stigmata of a painful initiation, such as is to be avoided by those who prize their

creature comforts. Among the host of lesser men who fill the pages of so-called history with their clatter it is often hard to distinguish the authentic heralds of a new moral order, apart at all events from a few outstanding founders of religions or quasi-religious philosophies. Nevertheless, in any commemoration of the benefactors of our race such rare spirits deserve chief mention; and any account of human progress, not cast on vulgar lines and blatantly satisfied with triumphs over matter yielding ponderable results, must lay stress rather on the imponderable increment derived from moral and religious education, whereby human life has gained so much more in the way of deepened experience, and hence of positive reality.

THAT progress in the direction of the spiritual is implicit in normal human endeavour would seem to be the moral of history, even when carried back to Glacial times. Man was always ready to turn aside, as it were, from the business of mere living in order to cultivate methods of living well; and counted it no loss of time, since he thereby found himself. For example, the fine art of the Upper Paleolithic cave-man belongs, as no fine art can altogether cease to do, to the level of sense-experience; and its naturalistic character indeed reveals the closest association with the keen eye of the hunter in search of a meal. Nevertheless, beauty is something perceptible only to the eye of the soul—to a faculty of inward vision, which clothes the outward object with an *aura* invisible to the man who can only see his reindeer or bison as prospective meat. The mind of the artist is already at one remove from that surface-view of things which calls itself realism and is actually a shallow phenomenalism. So too at a later stage Babylonian and Egyptian star-lore, despite its astrological tendencies, must have generated a disinterested interest in the movements of the heavens; though it was left to Greek science to glorify this as an ecstasy of pure "theory," that is, contemplation. Thus an intelligence free to pursue its own ends for their own sake was gradually liberated from its enslavement to the workshop. Nay, the previous astrology with its magico-religious purpose was always divided in its allegiance as between the practical and the transcendental; and, in regard to sciences of the physical type in general, it might plausibly be argued that they originate in moral attitudes towards super-physical agencies, and acquire their reference to the sense-world mostly later and by the way. For Man, however primitive he may be, sets such a high value on his moral relations as developed within the home-circle, however narrow, of family, kin and tribe that he all too naively expects a like sympathy from a personified nature; and makes overtures of friendship to the universe at large on what might be termed a pan-ethical basis. Alas, sad experience in the long run convinces him that, whereas some of the hard facts of existence—the men of the next tribe, for instance—do eventually respond to such treatment, others do not. Indeed, the

problem whether the weather may be affected by prayer may even now be regarded as in the experimental stage. A cocksure materialism is, in fact, a disease of thought that has attained to epidemic proportions only in quite recent times; though religion is partly to blame for having driven common sense into opposition by seeking for the spiritual in the wrong direction, namely, without instead of within.

TAKING the auspices, then, with the help of the long-range telescope of history, one can discern a future for humanity consistent with a progress in spirituality along lines for which its natural impulses and aptitudes have designed it from the first. Such progress may be conceived in terms of the greatest self-realisation of the greatest number. Not happiness, which is too closely bound up with sensual pleasure, but rather a kind of blessedness, an inbreathing of a diviner air, is the only true object of moral education, which in turn can be identified with progress, so far as such a striving after perfection can be treated as means and end in one. For the reward consists in the effort itself, when it is an effort to turn becoming into being—to identify the self with certain timeless values which it can desire, know, and will, without impediment to its continuous activity. We can enter well enough into the experience of the saints and sages who testify to the reality of these abiding satisfactions to be sure that human nature can touch these heights. The trouble is to discover how far these same heights are accessible to less hardy and resolute pilgrims.

Now, whatever one's bias in favour of political equality, souls are not to be confounded with statistical items. At most it might be urged that all are equally capable of further self-cultivation, though by no means after the same manner or to a like degree. Thus, while sense-capacity offers the best example of a racial constant, no known tests will bring out a standard reaction to beauty, even when reinforced by the universal appeal of sex. Thus it may be doubted how far the most intensive education in the fine arts can effectively popularise what might be likened to a veritable gift of second sight, wherein whole nations, at any rate during long periods of their history, are liable to be defective. Again, intellectual ability varies considerably as between individuals, not to introduce debatable questions concerning race or sex; and not every climber can leap the gulf that separates a pass from a class in philosophy or in the higher mathematics. It must be added, however, that there are so many fields of inquiry within which thinking, both analytic and synthetic, can find free and noble exercise that in this direction there may be greater scope for interesting the wider public; the more so because team-work is here far more possible than where fine art is concerned. There remains, meanwhile, a third and greatest sphere of education, from which none but the morally infirm are constitutionally debarred. For all the

other refinements of the soul can be brought to bear on the dissemination of love among mankind. The seed exists, but has hitherto been grown in small patches ; and it will need a scientific agriculture, of which the very rudiments are barely understood, if a love-starved world is to have its fill of this life-sustaining food.

ADOPTING, then, a slightly altered version of the Platonic demand for the philosopher-king, let us say that moral progress will be not only possible but inevitable as soon as our statesmen become educators and our educators statesmen. Long ago Mill based his defence of representative government on the ground that its educative value outweighed any failure on the administrative side. The same should surely hold of every kind of government worthy of the name ; and its educational policy should be ever to the fore in the deliberations of the ruling body. Nor is it enough that a nation should be indoctrinated with the science of political economy, which has always tended to ignore its duty to subserve the supreme art of politics, preferring to model its methods on those of the naturalistic or unethical sciences. Everything should be done to encourage all higher studies, and all fine arts ; while the planning of noble monuments, and the preservation of natural amenities, should be made a further means of elevating taste and promoting travel and intercourse. By such peaceful paths a spiritual advancement, individually initiated it may be, but even so capable of being collectively shared, can be confidently predicted for mankind ; so that in the end war will be rated at its true value, namely as a means of finding work for the morally unemployed. As for religion, which claims by divine right to preside over these higher activities and to crown them with a super-humanitarian sanction, it must put its house, or rather its many houses, in order. If it would effectively govern instead of nominally reign, it must seek in a broader charity the remedy for its long-standing and almost constitutional malady, which consists in sectarian exclusiveness conjoined with a mania for persecution. No marriage between church and state is likely to have happy results so long as the better half remains a mixture of snob and shrew. Nevertheless, there is nothing that offends either moral aspiration or historical probability in the prospect of a future world religiously governed, in which the gentler elements will prevail, sublimating the crude energy of the fighting male into forms of virtue more directly subservient to the upbringing of the human family. For, if the present argument be at all sound, here are the facts. Real progress is progress in charity, all other advance being secondary thereto. The true function of religion, on the other hand, is to enlarge charity, and therein is summed up its duty both to God and to man. Because the religions of mankind, like their languages, remain irreconcilably plural, the sciences and arts, being more catholic in their appeal, have at present taken charge of those spiritual interests

that alone can knit the nations together. No central organ exists to bring these nobler tendencies to a head. Yet neither politics nor ethics can supply this, apart from a common religious faith that, in helping ourselves to become more perfect, we help the ultimate perfection itself to be justified.

HAVING done our best to find a reasonable use for the category of Progress as a key to the movement of history, it remains to ask ourselves whether Evolution, in either its Darwinian or its wider Spencerian connotation, can invest this purely human tendency with a more general applicability, and hence a better claim to explanatory value. The position would seem to be this: that we are in possession of a good thing, known at first hand and inwardly by Man the supreme judge to be good not only on the surface but all through; and that we are not going to give it up because apparently the rest of the universe, organic or inorganic, either has got less of it or has not got it at all. Progress, in short, cannot be declared null and void merely because it pertains to spirit, and spirit is forsooth an aristocrat, whereas matter is democratically all on one dead-level. Remove spirit from the universe, and you remove all meaning whatever, even the meaning attaching to the difference between simple and complex, or to any other version of the evolutionary formula. On the other hand, if spirit is to provide the sole possible criterion consisting in the triple test of intellectual meaning, moral value, and metaphysical reality, it can only do so out of the fullness of our experience which ultimately classifies all things in terms of their relative goodness; the most comprehensive kind of goodness, in other words the richest in meaning, value and reality taken together, being self-evidently the best.

A PHILOSOPHICAL interpretation of first principles, then, will allow each science to determine its constitutive categories as it pleases, but will reserve the right to arrange these categories, and consequently the sciences that use them, in a hierarchical order according to their relative comprehensiveness. Thus any one of them is regulative only in regard to some lower member of the ascending series. It turns out, therefore, that it is not Evolution that is regulative in relation to Progress, but on the contrary that Progress, being Evolution and something more, has the right to impose on Evolution such interpretative limitations as may be philosophically necessary. It can say, for instance, to the biologist who tries to explain life-process in terms of natural selection that, as his very choice of analogy suggests, conscious selection, which is a constitutive principle of sociology, is a fact of fuller significance; and hence that natural selection is at best but an unconscious kind of selection, so far indeed as we dare read into it any true selectiveness at all. So, too, again, if at this point the physicist begs to take over the burden of explaining a remainder that grows thinner and

thinner—as difficulties are cleared out of the way by the convenient device known as abstraction, philosophic criticism is obliged to insist that matter is, regulatively speaking, a sheer negation of life; though constitutively regarded it may suffice to provide a groundwork for mapping out certain residual relations of the time-and-space order.

In short, Evolution, in whatever sense it is used, is from the sociological point of view, a useful servant but a bad master, being the inferior category as compared with Progress, that distinctively human attribute which history proves to be a real thing, when its spiritual nature is duly taken into account. As a category of ordinary biology, Evolution is subordinate, because by its inclusiveness it relates to things that are largely below the human level. Hence it cannot be regulative in a sense that would enable it to rule out what occurs at the human level, as if that were only a superfluous demonstration on the part of the universe, and one which its best friends think it only proper to ignore. If on the other hand, the idea of Evolution is extended so as to cover man's continuous gain in what his intelligence assures him to be spiritual worth, then we must read backwards into the beginnings of life, and perhaps even into the prior labourings of so-called lifeless matter, a certain gradual awakening of a force instinct with those magnificent possibilities that are already within the reach, if hardly the grasp, of Man, the most godlike of earth's creatures. Evolution must in that case be conceived as the liberation of spirit, by means of its own activity, from a sort of sleep spent at first almost dreamlessly within the womb of time, and even now yielding but slowly to the efforts of the mind to assemble its faculties and be itself. Such a view of life, instead of treating it as an accident of a time-process itself unsubstantial since without meaning of its own, makes it the expression, through the mechanism of the body, of an immanent intelligence and will; of whose ultimate purpose we as social beings can at least judge well enough to say that we are most in sympathy with it when we are most in sympathy with one another.

NOTES ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: I. THE AGE
OF YOUNG DELINQUENTS IN EAST LONDON:
by M. Fortes, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION. Juvenile crime has recently been receiving more public attention than usual. The press¹ has been perturbed over the serious increase in juvenile crime revealed by the criminal statistics of England and Wales in 1929 and 1930.² Juveniles under 16 committed nearly 50 per cent. more crime in 1929 than in 1907, and in 1930 there was a further increase of 1,900 in the number of juvenile offences.² That the practical task of dealing with this grave problem depends upon scientific knowledge of its causes and concomitants has been appreciated in the debates in the House of Commons on the Children's Bill introduced by the Home Secretary this year. Such knowledge as we have is not so definitive as to enable us to dispense with further inquiry, as yet.

THE PRESENT PROBLEM AND DATA. The present note is concerned in particular with a question which arises at the very outset of any scientific consideration of juvenile crime: What is the differential age incidence of delinquency among boys and girls under 16, and what significance has this age incidence?

THE information available in official publications, such as CRIMINAL STATISTICS, is not amenable to an analysis which would answer this question adequately. The figures given refer to the whole country, or to those parts of the country South and North of the Trent, and the age groupings are too broad. As a consequence only very general deductions can be drawn, e.g., of the sort drawn by Mr. Locke when he attributes the large increase in juvenile crime in the North to industrial depression.³ My purpose is to attempt a more detailed analysis of the figures for a fairly homogeneous area thus controlling some, at least, of the highly variable social factors. Other writers who have dealt with this matter will be referred to in the sequel.

My data were obtained in the course of an investigation which necessitated the examination of a large number of records kept by Juvenile Probation Officers working in East London.⁴ These records refer to young delinquents who passed through the Toynbee Hall Juvenile Court in London between January, 1926, and December, 1930. This

¹Cf. *inter alia*, NEW STATESMAN AND NATION, 16/5/31; TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT, 16/5/31 and 9/4/32; MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, 31/4/32.

²CRIMINAL STATISTICS FOR 1929, and *id.* for 1930. Published by H.M. Stationery Office, both with introductions by Mr. A. Locke.

³CRIMINAL STATISTICS FOR 1929, p. xv. ff.

⁴Placed at my disposal through the good offices of the late Sir W. Clarke Hall and his probation officers, to whom I am greatly indebted.

Court operates on a territorial basis, serving the area comprised, roughly, by the boroughs of Shoreditch, Stepney, and Bethnal Green, in London. Each probation officer is in charge of a defined district and keeps a record of all charges preferred at this court against juveniles in her district.⁵

ANALYSIS OF CHARGES. From the point of view of the social and psychological problems involved, the records of charges may be divided into three categories :

(a) The major category, comprising those charges in which the child is the actual culprit, and may be designated truly delinquent—e.g., larceny, being beyond parental control, assault, &c.

(b) A category of cases in which the true culprit is a parent, or the parents, of the child, although the charge is technically preferred against the latter. Such are a great many cases where the charge is "found wandering," cases charged with living in immoral circumstances, and so forth. The purpose of the charge generally appears to be to set in motion legal machinery for the removal of the child from a vicious or negligent home, or to ensure some sort of supervision of such a home.

(c) A category of cases in which the charge is purely technical—e.g., playing football in the street, gaming, &c. The fact that charges of this sort are almost always dismissed with a warning seems to indicate that the magistrates do not ascribe moral turpitude to the children concerned of a degree which would require severer action.

IN terms of psychological and sociological, rather than legal, orientation, categories (a) and (b) obviously present totally different problems. If we are concerned with the anti-social, or aberrant social behaviour of children which qualifies them for description as juvenile delinquents, we must confine our attention to category (a), as I propose doing. Category (b) cases could more accurately be described as neglected children ; and category (c) may safely be left out of consideration as a purely legal category.

SUCH a socio-psychological orientation has prompted me, also, to include those charges recorded as dismissed or adjourned in my tables. As is indicated in footnote 5 above, they constitute only a small proportion of the total volume of charges—presumably owing to the vigilance of the officials concerned, who are careful to permit only well-founded charges to reach the court. In most of these cases included in my tables, internal evidence makes it clear that the individuals concerned were actually delinquent. Dismissal of a case may be due either to

⁵For an account of the rôle and function of the juvenile court, see the *REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S BRANCH* of the Home Office for 1927 (obtainable from H.M. Stationery Office). This report shows that the charges were proved in 95 per cent. of juvenile cases occurring in the Metropolitan Police area, in 1927, and that in 60 per cent. of these proven charges the children were placed on probation. Recently, I am inclined to believe from my own experience, the tendency has been to make even greater use of probation as a means of dealing with juvenile crime.

insufficient legally admissible evidence, or to the magistrate's belief that it is in the best interests of the child.

My sample of cases numbers 809 boys and 59 girls, charged between January, 1926, and December, 1930, at Toynbee Hall with offences under my category (a). These offences were distributed as follows:

Offences against property—mainly larceny, and including, e.g., breaking and entering, embezzlement, and one case of arson, 80.5 per cent.

Being beyond parental control 15 per cent.

Offences against the person, such as common assault and wounding, 2.2 per cent.

Sexual offences 2.3 per cent.

THE large preponderance of offences against property is the rule in juvenile crime. CRIMINAL STATISTICS FOR 1929 shows that about 81 per cent. of indictable and 40 per cent. of non-indictable juvenile offences were against property.⁶ Burt,⁷ whose sample of young delinquents had more in common with mine, found that about 90 per cent. of his boys and 43 per cent. of his girls had committed offences against property. American experience has been similar. Healy and Bronner,⁸ for example, found that offences against property account for about 71 per cent. of male, and 30-40 per cent. of female juvenile delinquency in Boston and Chicago. Like figures are reported by the United States Department of Labour,⁹ namely, that 71 per cent. of the charges against boys in 1929 were for larceny and damage to property. German data also agree with these findings (cf. Gruhle's work, cited hereafter).

It deserves to be noted that juvenile delinquency, in particular, crime against property, has a far greater incidence among boys than among girls. This is evident from my sample where boys are 13 times as numerous as girls, and is confirmed in all the literature referred to above.

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG DELINQUENTS.

OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY. A number of interesting considerations emerge from an analysis of the age¹⁰ and sex distribution of the delinquents constituting my sample. Taking first the offences against property we get the following age and sex distribution:

⁶Op. cit. pp. 76-8. ⁷C. Burt, *THE YOUNG DELINQUENT*, p. 16.

⁸W. Healy and A. Bronner, *DELINQUENTS AND CRIMINALS, THEIR MAKING AND UNMAKING*, pp. 166-75.

⁹JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS FOR 1929. U.S.A. Dept. of Labour, Children's Bureau. Publication No. 207. p. 12.

¹⁰I am considering only the age at first appearance in court. It is well known that delinquents sometimes have a previous history of misdemeanours, which have either gone undetected or been too trivial to call for legal action when they are charged for the first time. The occasion of his first charge must, therefore, in some cases, be looked upon as marking the time when the delinquent's misdeeds become sufficiently serious to demand social action.

NOTES ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

TABLE I.

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF DELINQUENTS charged with offences against property.

Age	Under 8	8-9	9-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17	Total
Boys											
No.	..	5	19	39	68	69	88	146	114	114	3 665
Per cent.	..	.75	2.9	5.9	10.2	10.4	13.2	21.9	17.1	17.1	.5 100
Girls											
No.	..	—	—	1	2	4	2	2	10	13	— 34
Per cent.	..	—	—	2.9	5.9	11.8	5.9	5.9	29.4	38.2	— 100

(The cases in the 16-17 year group may be discarded as odd cases, which are bound to occur from time to time in the juvenile court, but ought legally to go to the adult court.)

THE boys' distribution curve has a significant peak at the age of 13-14 years. These figures show how broad age groupings of the kind employed in official statistics may obscure important facts. Like the figures given in, e.g., CRIMINAL STATISTICS, mine, too, indicate an absolute incidence of crimes against property in the age group 14-16 years, nearly equal to that in the age group 12-14 years. But analysis in terms of narrower age groupings shows that there was actually a falling off in relative heaviness of crime among boys after the age of 14 years.¹¹

THE sample of girls is so small as to make it doubtful what reliance can be placed on the distribution curve. The differences between the curve for the boys and that for the girls are, however, so striking as probably to be significant. In the case of the girls, we find that crimes against property commence at least a year later than among boys; that there is a peak at age 11-12 years, a sharp drop thereafter, and then a steep and continuous rise from age 14-15 years.

EVIDENTLY some sort of selective factor or factors is operative in these age distributions of juvenile crime. If they were governed entirely by chance, the distributions would show a proportion of delinquents at each age about equal to the proportion of all children at that age in the population as a whole. The Census Report for England and Wales, 1921,¹² the latest available, gives the following proportions of children at all ages from 7-15 years last birthday—the age range subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.

TABLE II.

Age	7-8	8-9	9-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16
Per cent.	12.5	12.4	12.2	12.3	12.5	12.7	12.8 12.5

(My own calculations).

¹¹It must be borne in mind that my data refer to a period before the international crisis. No doubt industrial depression has abnormally swelled the proportion of delinquent boys at post-primary school age levels. My figures may perhaps be taken to represent a more normal state of affairs.

¹²CENSUS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 1921. General Report, p. 162.

THIS is approximately a chance distribution. Assuming the sex ratio to be near unity, it would hold for the sexes separately, and indicates approximately what percentage of juvenile delinquency could be expected at each age if no selection were involved.

COMPARABLE STATISTICS FROM LITERATURE. Comparable statistics are not plentiful in the literature. Healy and Bronner, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-2, 255-6, give a chart showing that they found a sudden and steep rise in the curve of delinquency for boys at the age of 13-14 years in both their Chicago and Boston samples, and a subsequent *fall* after age 15 in the Boston figures. For girls, they found a steep rise in the incidence of offences after the age of 11, which persists steadily to the age of 16. This is true of first offenders as well as of repeaters. Their inference is that early adolescence is the time of greatest increase in juvenile crime—which is not very illuminating. It will be seen that these figures have some resemblance to mine, in that the age of 13 appears to be critical for boys, and about 11 years for girls in both sets of data.

THE Home Office report cited earlier gives, on p. 6, a table of the ages at first offence of two samples of Borstal boys. The curve for the first sample has a peak at age 12, and then a fall, followed by a subsequent rise at age 15. The second sample shows a steady increase up to age 15. But these samples cannot be regarded as representative of the general conditions found among young delinquents, since Borstal boys must *need* to be recruited from the extreme anti-social group. The first curve is of interest, nevertheless, as compared with my observations, since it, too, shows a decline between the ages of 13 and 15.

GERMAN and Austrian data relevant to our inquiry are utilised by Charlotte Bühler¹³ in support of a thesis to which I shall refer hereafter. She cites unpublished material of Ekenberg and Herzfeld giving the percentage of children 9 years of age and over "who had come into [Austrian] institutions because of vagrancy and acts of violence." Peaks occur at 15 for boys and 13 for girls, with a subsequent fall for both sexes. She also adduces Gruhle's¹⁴ distribution curve of the ages of 105 delinquent boys in an institution, which has two peaks, at ages 12 and 15 respectively. Finally she refers to Müller "who finds that among all juvenile delinquents in Germany between twelve and sixteen years of age, the highest percentage, namely 33, is found between fifteen and sixteen years, and 29 per cent. of these are boys."

¹³"The Social Behaviour of the Child" in *HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY*. Ed. C. Murchison, 1931. pp. 415-17.

¹⁴Gruhle, H. *DIE URSACHEN DER JUGENDLICHEN VERWAHRLOSUNG U. KRIMINALITÄT*, 1912. Gruhle himself (p. 120-1) draws attention to the smallness and selectivity of his sample; and his differential analysis of the offences suggests that the table of age distributions applies mainly to vagrancy and theft.

NOTES ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

THE value of Ekenberg and Herzfeld's figures cannot be assessed without more knowledge of the nature of the sample. Gruhle's population, besides being very small, appears, from his own account (see e.g. p. 173 op. cit., footnote xiv.) to have been highly selected from among the more extreme types of delinquents and to have been to a large extent subnormal, psycho-physically and socially. Müller's material is so curtailed in its range as to be of little use in our discussion. Above all, these data lose much of their value (and this applies also to Healy and Bronner's study and to the Home Office Report figures) through the lumping together of heterogeneous kinds of offences without discrimination. It is, for instance, well known that sexual offences and crimes against the person occur at later ages than do larcenies.¹⁵ To throw these kinds of crime together with larcenies may increase the incidence of crime in the older age groups.

BEYOND CONTROL AND OTHER CHARGES. At this point it will be worth while considering the age distributions found by me in the other main classes of crime among young delinquents. Taking first the "Beyond Control" charges, we have the following age distribution:

TABLE III.

	Age	Under 8	8-9	9-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	Total	
Boys											
No.	10	14	12	14	25	17	17	2	111
Per cent.	9.1	12.6	10.8	12.6	22.5	15.3	15.3	1.8	100
Girls											
No.	1	1	1	3	3	4	5	5	19
Per cent.	5.3	5.3	5.3	15.8	15.8	21.0	26.3	5.3	100

BEYOND control charges cannot be laid against children over 14.¹⁶ Hence these curves are artificially curtailed at the very age which we found to be critical for boys in regard to property crimes. The number of cases is very small, too. However, accepting these figures for what they are worth, we find that the curve for boys has a peak at age 11, or two years earlier than in the property crime; while the curve for girls rises steadily after the first steep jump at age 10.

Now a "beyond control" charge may cover anything from truancy and petty stealing to chronic incorrigibility, or, in girls, sexual offences, or merely ineptitude on the part of the parents. The delinquencies thus covered are, however, generally of a domestic rather than, as is the case with theft, of a public nature.

IN regard to the boys, the differences between the age distribution for property crimes and the age distribution for intractability probably indicate that different factors are involved in the two sorts of misdemeanour. But this matter will be returned to later. As to the

¹⁵Cf. e.g., CRIMINAL STATISTICS FOR 1929, pp. 76-8.

¹⁶The odd cases in the age group 14-15 were presumably charged on or about their 14th birthdays.

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girls, the number of cases is so small as to make inferences risky. With them, too, intractability seems to be maximally manifested somewhat earlier than property crimes; but the steady rise in both the stealing and the beyond control curves after the age of 13 bears out the experience of workers with girl delinquents, that the types of misdemeanour have more in common than is the case with boys. Pubescent girls charged with being beyond control are often potential or actual sex delinquents, and the thefts of pubescent girls are often connected with sex, in that the motive is personal adornment.

THE other two classes of crime found in my sample of cases gave the following age distributions:

CRIMES against the person.

	Age	8-9	9-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	Total
Boys	2	1	—	—	—	3	9	15
Girls	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	3

SEXUAL offences.

	Age	8-9	9-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	Total
Boys										
No.	1	—	1	3	2	4	6	19
Per cent.	5.3	—	5.3	15.8	10.5	21.0	31.6	100
Girls										
No.	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Per cent.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

THE number of cases is too few in both these classes to enable strict comparison to be made with the earlier data. No doubt physical qualities alone account for the piling up of the crimes against the person—mainly assault—in the older age groups. The age distribution of the sexual crimes is more interesting. It will be seen that, among the boys, the type of offence appears to become prominent *before* puberty, at about the age of 11—the same age found to mark the maximum of beyond control charges. We are led to suspect, therefore, that similar factors may be operative in these two types of misdemeanour. But physiological maturity has an important bearing on sexual crimes, as is evident from the marked rise in the curve at age 15-16. A striking peculiarity is that only one girl seems to have been arraigned on a sexual charge in the five-year period covered by my date. The explanation is, I believe, that officers are reluctant to bring such charges against young girls, and it is found more satisfactory to prefer the charge of being beyond control. This would confirm the reason previously advanced for the high incidence of beyond control charges among pubescent girls.

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS. The foregoing discussion may be summed up as follows: Crimes against property are at a maximum among boys at the age 13-14 years; intractability among boys is at a maximum at the age of 11-12 years; and sexual offences appear to be manifested markedly for the first time at 11-12 years. Among girls,

property crimes show two peaks, one at age 11-12 years, and another, steeper rise after the age of 14 years; intractability appears to be of small moment until the age of 10-11 is reached, when the curve shows a steep rise, which persists through pubescence; but we have reason to believe that sexual offences are also in part included in the figures for beyond control charges.

WHAT explanation can be given of these figures, which, as I have shown, cannot be due to sheer chance? The work of Burt¹⁷ and Healy¹⁸ has demonstrated how dangerous it is to seek for any single cause of the phenomena of juvenile delinquency. At the same time such apparent regularities as are shown in the data discussed above seem to suggest that some general factors are at work.

HYPOTHESES IN EXPLANATION. I do not want to discuss all the various hypotheses which have been advanced to account for the age distribution of juvenile delinquency. I should like only to draw attention to a distinctly radical one which I believe to be misleading, viz., Charlotte Bühler's conception of the adolescent "negative phase."¹⁹ She maintains that boys and girls pass through a "negative" or "anti-social" phase between 11 and 13 years (although these limits are very flexible), when they are more prone to be delinquent. She appears to regard this phase as being psychologically, if not physiologically determined. What evidence she and her colleagues have produced hitherto has not been at all convincing. They have used case study material, but this may be, and probably is, derived from selected children. Dr. Bühler also employs the age distribution curves I have previously cited from her work to substantiate her postulations. But this carries no weight whatever, for, failing independent evidence, her hypothesis of a negative phase amounts to no more than a tautological restatement of the fact that anti-social behaviour occurs more frequently at one age than at others.

AMONG contemporary authorities, Burt and Healy (op. cit.) have also operated with the conception of a period of adolescent instability which most adolescents have to negotiate, and which often issues in anti-social behaviour. They, too, base their deductions on selected case studies; but they do not drive the idea as far as Dr. Bühler does. Other investigators have disputed the existence of such a phase of instability.²⁰

¹⁷Op. cit. ¹⁸W. Healy, *THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT*.

¹⁹Op. cit., which also gives a bibliography of her other writings on the subject. She gives a full account of the alleged negative phase in her *DAS SEELENLEBEN DES JUGENDLICHEN*, especially p. 24 ff., 56 ff., based on studies of diaries kept by adolescents.

²⁰E.g., Murphy, *EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*, p. 429-32, discusses the negative phase, and cites investigations which indicate very strongly that it is the outcome of environmental conditions.

Brooks, F.D. *PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE*, p. 230 ff.

THE primary difficulty in dealing with this problem is the fact that adolescence is also a time of changing social rôles, of contact with new stimuli, of new obligations and responsibilities, of social demands which the child has never before experienced. All this, coming more or less simultaneously, and to many working-class children, without preparation, may well have a disorganising effect on a child's behaviour. It deserves to be noted that Gruhle, for instance, whose data have been used by Bühler as evidence of the existence of a negative phase, actually takes care to stress the influences of such social factors on the age distribution of juvenile criminality. He points out (op. cit. p. 113 ff.) that the first steep rise in his curves at the age of 12 years may correspond to the fact that delinquency only becomes sufficiently manifest at that age to incur social action; and that the second corresponds to the period just after leaving school, with its new liberties and responsibilities.

SOCIAL FACTORS. In my own view, the social—better, the social-psychological as opposed to individual-psychological—factors have by far the preponderant influence, at any rate in the crimes against property. Close acquaintance with some 50 young delinquents for many months has convinced me that it would be difficult to attribute to emotional instability the misdeeds of more than five or six of them. I do not think that the high incidence at age 13-14 among boys and after 14 among girls, is an artifact of police supervision. The police are as ready to apprehend a young thief of 11 as one of 13.

My experience has been that the East End boy is particularly restless and almost restive at the age of 13-14—i.e., *his last year at school*. And the reason is just because it is his last year at school. Until then he has accepted the routine of coming to school every day as a matter of course, looking upon himself as a child subject to discipline and restrictions. But in this last year at school his life seems to take on a new social orientation. His interests are turned to the future, and he impatiently awaits the day when he will be free of a routine which has become unattractive suddenly, and will become a wage-earner himself. He clings to those friends who have already left school and who are his models now. He often begins to think of himself as a man—he insists on wearing manly garments, and surreptitiously adopts such manly practices as smoking. At this age, too, the East End boy has enormous freedom of movement when he is not at school. As long as he keeps out of "trouble" parents are not concerned about his doings and whereabouts, when so many other more urgent demands are being made on their time. This liberty of movement which begins at about the age of 11 (as is, it will be observed, reflected in the distribution curves for offences against property), brings the boy into casual contact with other boys whom he often knows only superficially; and these

casual contacts of two or three restless boys with no organised outlet for their energies are, I believe, the main sources of juvenile crimes against property.²¹ This re-orientation of the boy's life after his 12th year is a consequence of the social structure of our society, and not of emotional "negativism" or instability.

BUT if this accounts for the peak at age 13-14, what is the subsequent drop due to? The period 1926-1930, to which my figures refer, was more normal from the employment point of view than the years since 1930. London, moreover, as is well known, has suffered relatively less than many other parts of the country from unemployment, particularly where school-leavers are concerned. This suggests that the lower crime rate found by me for the ages between 14-16 years is accounted for by the absorption of boys in industry. Probation officers in London will inform one that boys of 14-16 years generally commit crimes against property when they are not employed—which confirms my supposition. The conclusions of Mr. Locke²² as to the relation between industrial depression and juvenile crime also confirm it.

WE cannot, therefore, accept the "negative phase" as an explanation of the age incidence of juvenile crime among boys. Adolescence among boys does not set in till about 14; and adolescent instability should therefore, as Bühler herself notes, be most strongly manifested between 14 and 16 years in anti-social behaviour; but my data do not agree with this expectation, and a much simpler alternative explanation is offered.

FACTOR OF EMOTIONAL STABILITY. As regards the "beyond control" charges, it is possible that a factor of emotional stability is concerned in them—not, be it noted, in the sense of a pre-adolescent or adolescent "negative phase," but in the sense of an individual psychological characteristic. At the same time the social factor of the increasing liberty of the 11 year old boy (or girl, for that matter), no doubt enters too, in so far as it leads to undisciplined habits which make the boy or girl less tractable.

THIS, I believe, is also the explanation of the steep increment in age distribution of the *beyond control* charges among girls at the age of 10-11. I have already indicated that beyond control charges against pubescent girls are very often euphemisms for sexual charges, or at least involve a sex element. This might be interpreted as evidence of "negativism" or emotional "instability"; but I am also of opinion that a good deal of this intractability of girls during pubescence

²¹Cf. Dr. V. Wiley, L.C.C. ANNUAL REPORT, vol. viii. pt. 2, p. 76 ff., who holds this view too. The organised predatory gang described by Thrasher in his book, *THE GANG*, is a rare phenomenon in East London.

²²In CRIMINAL STATISTICS, cited *supra*.

is a reaction against the domestic drudgery and more or less close supervision to which they are subjected between the ages of 11 and 14.

THE stealing curve for girls seems to bear out this contention. The first peak at the age of 11 coincides with the little girl's period of comparative liberty. She is strong and active enough to seek mischief, but not sufficiently so for heavy domestic duties and still too young to require protection and supervision. The subsequent drop represents the period of supervision and domestic duties, during which the girl's anti-social reactions, if they occur, explode only within the home, as it were. Then comes the new liberation after leaving school—and with it sexual maturation. Sexual motives play a dominant rôle in the girl's life now, and her status as an earner gains her a certain amount of liberty, sufficient to provide the opportunity for petty thefts and other delinquencies.

IN conclusion, if my argument is sound, there is some hope of dealing with the problem of juvenile crime through such channels as our educational and employment systems, and by such means as organising the slum child's leisure round worth-while interests and activities, and exerting pressure on his parents. But if Dr. Bühler's interpretation is the correct one, we are doomed to accept the "negative phase" as inevitable, and like measles, to let it have its way with as little damage to the rest of the community as possible.

SOCIOLOGY AND REFORM:* A Discussion of the Relation which should exist between Sociological Science and the Demand for a new Social Order: by Reginald Wellbye.

I.

"THE chief value of sociology as of all other sciences is as a vestibule to a better life for mankind." So writes Dr. Richard Cabot in a Foreword to Dr. Har's *SOCIAL LAWS*. He continues: "Sociological laws are dead. Long live sociology! Such is the conclusion of Dr. Har's remarkable book." "In this book I feel a new spirit blowing into musty corners, sweeping out rubbish, clearing the air for constructive work on the science that was christened 'sociology' a hundred years ago,—a good while before it was born."

THESE words form a fitting opening because they crystallize the view to which this paper seeks to give expression, namely, that sociology has not so far found itself and will only have done so when it has come to recognise its obligation to give definite guidance to those who demand the improvement of society.

THE idea, so long worshipped, of truth for truth's sake, of worth in knowledge which had no necessary reference to value for the purposes of living, is, of course, fast losing its sanctity. But without pressing this point and insisting that unless sociology actually contributes to a solution of the major problems that vex society it is to be judged altogether profitless, it may be affirmed without likelihood of challenge that there does exist a need for some scientific or philosophic discipline, some organised body of thought, summing up the consensus of the relevant sciences, which should, on a plane of detachment above the emotional stratum which is the political field, be in a position to give practical advice to the large and varied body of social malcontents, of those who chafe at things as they are.

Now, whatever value for proximate reform there may be in the fruits of twentieth century sociological study, the acid test of sociology is the relevancy of its thought for those major political and social problems just alluded to.

WITH that preliminary let us briefly review the situation in which sociology, so conceived, has to function.

FOR the sake of thoroughness we will put the question: Has this co-operative adventure of the human race which we call community life, civilisation, been a success? If the datum of reference be the original condition of our humanoid ancestors then few, save cynics, will hesitate to give an answer in the affirmative. But if the measuring

*Paper read at a Discussion Meeting of the Institute of Sociology at Le Play House, on February 1st, 1933.

rod be the extent to which our present condition falls short of what we confidently believe we could make it, given only a united will, then we must reply that civilisation has been a very limited success indeed, social circumstance to-day being profoundly unsatisfactory and its continuance in that unsatisfactory condition a cause for the gravest concern.

WITH the problems of war, unemployment, and chronic poverty before us too plainly for anyone to miss there will be no need to marshal the evidence demonstrating the full extent of the remediable defectiveness in the conditions of our social life. It will be readily allowed that things are bad, and, further, that some remedy could and ought to be found.

BUT although we are so sensitive to the trouble we, nevertheless, do not know what is required to be done. It is true that the forum of our public life is flooded with alleged remedies. So far, however, are these various proposals from being examined in a scientific spirit with a view to the elimination of the false ones among them that they are more of a hindrance than a help, misdirecting our energies and disguising the real bankruptcy of our thought.

NEITHER history nor current events give us any encouragement to think that a true remedy reposes among the proposals and is bound in time to emerge by its sheer quality. Rather are we forced to the opposite view, and compelled to conclude that until light from a new source is thrown upon the social scene no remedy can appear.

WE thus look to some calmer region of thought than the political, to some disciplined vision of society which shall clarify our view of what is wrong and shew us—or make it easier for us to see—what has to be done.

THE attainment of this synoptic vision is widely thought to represent the field of sociology. Comte and Spencer both thought that a complete knowledge of society, of human nature and human behaviour in society, would yield values, values-in-experience, that would shew us how to improve society, and, moreover, supply us with the will to make the improvement, and many less distinguished supporters of the sociological ideal would never have found their interest enlisted except for a belief in the relevancy of the study for social reform.

IT has to be admitted that some recent academic sociologists, chiefly abroad, have displayed a tendency to narrow the field of sociology unduly for this outlook, but happily, as yet, so far is the scope of sociology from having been definitively marked out that it is not too late to reassert the larger conception, and even to enlarge that if found desirable.

Now, turning to those works in which the fruits of recent official sociological thought may be regarded as being embodied, what help, we may ask, does formal sociology offer the open-minded reformer—the person, that is, whose sense of human values protests against the existing social condition, but who does not feel able to accept either the diagnosis or the remedies of any school of practical reform?

WHAT are the writers of sociological text-books—almost all of them university professors of the science—preoccupied with?

AFTER, perhaps, formulating a new definition of sociology, they may commence their expositions with an explanation of the concepts: "society" and "societies." Then they proceed to describe the institutions, groupings, and structure of society, the evolution of its organisation, social relations, and the instruments of social control. The influence upon man and society of conditions physical, biological, psychological, and cultural, also come in for discussion, while among other aspects receiving attention are myth, magic, religion, crime, marriage, and the family.

THE value of these studies as part of the foundation of a systematised knowledge of society need not be depreciated. But the reformer disposed at first to be sympathetic to sociology and optimistic concerning its ability to help, turns from all this anatomy and physiology of society—largely a distillate from the data of other studies (history, human geography, biology, etc.)—with deep disappointment, feeling that while it may be serviceable where it is a question of effecting minor social adjustments, it is all completely beside the point when it is the social order itself which is under suspicion and current evaluations that are being indicted.

SUCH a sociology, indeed, is likely to strike him as being as detached from practical application as was psychology before Freud had turned its course.

IT does not afford us much help respecting how to change what appears unsatisfactory, nor even towards ascertaining whether our judgement of unsatisfactoriness is to be trusted or not.

WHAT then? If sociology is not to confess itself unable to counsel the reformer, if it is not to be content to pass on to some other branch of thought the task of clarifying and informing the vision of a better order and of directing the general lines of social change, how shall it conceive of itself and its province?

SCIENCE, in these recent years, has reached a critical point in its development. Now that, as Mr. Gerald Heard puts it, it has made the complete circumnavigation of the sphere of knowledge and has discovered, as an object of investigation, the scientist himself engaged in drawing up

his interpretation of the world in blissful ignorance of the distortion of his vision, it has had to allow for a factor of error whose existence it had never suspected.

AND in the same well-nigh unexplored territory of mind it has discovered, too, that its pretence of detachment from the common life of men can no longer be maintained.

UNTIL now science has always repudiated responsibility for the evil consequences that have often accompanied its applications, hinting that what men do with knowledge is perhaps an affair of ethics or religion, but anyhow lies outside the concern of science.

AND until now that may have been the proper reply. But meanwhile science has followed up its earlier and rather profitless incursion into psychology and is coming upon the springs of conduct and the source of human values, is becoming able to shew mankind how it is that science has been so often misapplied, and how humanity may use this tremendous power without doing damage to itself.

SCIENCE has discovered that it is incomplete without psychology, and that with psychology it is a single whole upon which is laid a unitary responsibility for the applications of knowledge to living. For it is clear now that in the long run the unitary concept: "man-applying-science" is not outside science but is a part of science. The mind of emotions, desires and purposes is as much part of the machinery by which change in human circumstance is accomplished as is that mind of objective science which, concerned solely with truth, merely discovers the hidden nature of things.

IF, now, it be true that science has significance only in relation to the art—that is, the practice—of living, only in so far as it is able to construct for us a less unreal picture of actuality than that furnished by unaided vision, a picture enabling us the better to realise potentialities and to avoid errors, then it follows that the harnessing of knowledge to the service of living requires the mediation of an organised body of thought of the nature of an applied science.

WHAT the applied sciences are to the "pure" sciences from which they derive this desiderated application should be to science as a whole in its bearing on community life.

THE departments of science would continue, as heretofore, to have their departmental applications, but in the matter of the general ordering of society there is required a study, a philosophy, which shall bring to a focus the mutually reinforcing beams of the specialisms and pass them on to society integrated as the pure white light of that true vision which is the foundation for a wise way of life.

If sociology will accept this rôle, will regard itself as the working edge of knowledge, the distributive agency of the social products of science, what, more precisely, can it hope to do, what kind of replies can it expect to be able to make to those who demand a social order nearer to the heart's desire?

IN its nature it will hardly be a science, except in the limited sense in which medicine, legislation, architecture, or photography are sciences; Dr. Har seems conclusively to have shewn that none of its alleged general principles possess the character of natural laws.

It will not, however, on that account be of small value only. Dr. Har considers that social studies might more accurately be described as "social art" than as science in the stricter sense. "A social art" he says, "might be defined as skill or wisdom which is useful to the appreciation of human values, to the improvement of human relations and the accompanying conditions of living. Now even an art," he continues, "presupposes certain working principles which need not be exact, but which must possess some measure of probability."

EXPANDING his conception of sociology Dr. Har elsewhere says: "The problems before the social student, then, take the following three forms: namely, how to discover what each one of us most centrally desires? how to get what we thus desire? and what is the meaning of these desires? . . . Science gives us a sense of power, but not of duty. For science is impersonal. . . . We need therefore a philosophy of value to interpret and unify our experiences, and not merely to describe them as science does."

THE conception of sociology as a philosophy rather than as a science was, some twenty years ago, urged by another unconventional sociological thinker, Professor Urwick. In his "Philosophy of Social Progress" he stated that he did not believe that sociology was or could be a science. Like Dr. Har, he considered that what passed for sociology was a collection of generalisations of very varying value. The question "How shall we live well?" he said, is never answered by any science. "What then?" he asked. "Can a social philosophy perform the impossible for us, though science must fail? By no means; but what it *can* do is just this: It can take the citizen, and explain what is involved in his membership of the whole social group or any part of it, in his relations to other members, in his connection with each of the institutions which help to give meaning to his actions; will also take each known process of change and each known or expected effect, and explain what is involved in the fact of its being a part of a far vaster process, an effect conditioned by an infinite sum of effects; will take finally each end or aim, and shew how its worth must be judged by its relation to the whole system of things worth having, which forms the moving ideal of human society."

"A SOCIAL philosophy," he concluded, "cannot tell us what to do, but it can tell us very clearly where social duty lies, and how attached to social facts; it can never tell us how to be happy or well-off—cannot, indeed, define the content of the end to which we give the name of happiness or well-being; but it can render explicit the general conditions upon which any valid ideal must rest. It cannot say to us, in reference to any known evil, 'This is how the misery can be cured'; but it will say positively upon what group of motives, impulses, and beliefs the cure depends. And it is in this way that it can reveal some of the significance of the structure and the process which we call society and its life."

IF a reservation be made respecting the acceptance of the term "social duty," this quotation is helpful in enabling us to envisage the character in which sociology, as an agent in social improvement, must appear before the public.

II.

HERE the subject might be left for discussion, the main thesis, that of sociology conceived of as the digestive apparatus of the sciences in their relevancy for the art of living in community, having now been set forth.

BUT the idea may take clearer shape if some attempt is made to sketch out, with a little definiteness, the nature of the attitude of such a sociology towards social reform. If the essay does nothing else it may extend and give vividness to the vision, while it will remind us that social students have made an encouraging beginning at collecting suitable material.

ACADEMIC sociology has tended, as already noted, to cultivate an attitude of remoteness from the problems with which the average socially minded citizen is concerned.

BUT in quarters where less constraint has been felt sociology,—or, at any rate, sociologists— have made incursions into the practical sphere. Attempts to make sociology spell communism, or some other political 'ism, have not been entirely absent, but upon the whole official, extra-academic sociology has confined itself to the suggestion of such reforms as could be advocated without appealing outside the circle of values or principles to which lip-service is universally paid.

AMONG these fields for social amelioration within the existing social order are included rural conditions, individual adjustment, treatment of delinquency, insanity, unemployment, coal crises, regional planning, and the fostering of the community spirit. Some of these attempts to apply sociology from an altitude of Olympian detachment might reasonably leave an observer with the impression that the application

of sociology to politics meant, if not the actual taking of sides in a controversy, at any rate the formulation of something in the nature of a middle way which it was fondly hoped might be regarded as having *ex cathedra* validity.

IF sociology would be wrong in regarding itself as a species of expert referee to decide political controversies, neither should it envisage itself as a sort of umpire to see that political discussion is conducted with due regard for sociological "laws."

UNFORTUNATELY any suggestion that sociology may have anything relevant to say respecting reform raises some such conception in the mind of both sociologist and layman. In the obscure state of sociology the layman is to be excused, but a larger vision ought to have come out of sociology.

THE truth is, however, that the study has not enabled the social specialist to gain a standpoint substantially different from that of his lay fellow citizens when it comes to proposals of reform. Where he notices political questions at all the sociologist tends to take them over much in the form in which they are stated by those who have raised them, and so his vision is clouded at the start. In this his behaviour is comparable with that of the doctor who should base his treatment on the patient's own diagnosis.

THROUGH his uncritical attitude he has never come to suspect that the problems taken over were, *as such*, incapable of solution, and should properly be regarded as symptoms masking deeper problems which have lain unrecognised through imperfect perception of social reality.

IF, then, sociology cannot pronounce for or against the panaceas—Land Nationalisation, Communism, Socialism, Fascism, Social Credit ; if it has no remedy for unemployment ; if it must decline to prescribe remedies for problems of local government, taxation, marriage laws, international affairs, etc.,—what kind of statement has it to make respecting the improvement of society ?

THE clue we seek is not to be discovered in the recognised literature of formal sociology. But if we look carefully outside the walls a very different picture presents itself.

AMID the welter of books on social problems and specific reforms which has been poured out in the later post-war years there has begun to appear a thin line of volumes in which the situation is examined from a novel point of view, a point of view approached by the different authors in curiously diverse ways—science, philosophy, psychology, neo-romanticism, religion, social anthropology all affording entry.

COMMON to all is a refusal to take social problems as set by popular ideology, and a disposition to regard as symptoms, merely, phenomena commonly taken as causal.

TURNING from the externalities of the politician and his followers and supporters these writers probe beneath the surface and expose spiritual lesions beneath material defects. The contribution which they make to our understanding of the realities behind the demand for reform is essentially sociological, and its appearance is in the highest degree significant, foreshadowing, as it almost certainly must, a complete reorientation of the social landscape.

It will suffice to limit mention to a few names, perhaps the most important. Lawrence Hyde has given us some penetrating criticisms of current values, valid irrespective of whether his plea for transcendentalist religion be found acceptable or not. Hugh Fausset, declaring that "the Western world is sick, not so much through want of intelligence, as through excess of self-consciousness and its denial of the instinctive life," has attempted to provide the basis for a faith in life. Trigant Burrow, in a book whose remarkable character is masked by considerable obscurity of style, has elaborated the conception that what passes currently for normality is itself in reality neurotic, while Gerald Heard, one of the most brilliant and imaginative minds of the day, has developed and widened the idea and presented us with a theory of an evolution of conscious outlook, besides stressing the significance of the discovery that mind has now to allow for the disturbance to reality occasioned by its presence as an observer. The profound thought of Professor Macmurray has contributed the fertilising concept of a freedom of character based upon reality of thought and feeling, while both he and Christopher Dawson and Ortega Y. Gasset have exposed the fundamental need for a unifying principle of experience. Light upon the essential elements in human make-up has come from the Diffusionist school of anthropology, which has exploded the belief in the innate warlikeness of mankind, while such studies of primitive societies as those of Margaret Mead have thrown much greatly needed light on the respective influences of culture and heredity in the formation of human disposition.

THE attention paid in all this work to mental processes testifies to the importance which psychology is coming to play in the understanding of the problems of society.

WITH this extra-mural sociological material before us we begin to have a vision of the sociological attitude in face of the demand for a better social order.

WHEN the social situation referred to us for our examination is subjected to philosophical analysis and is re-stated in terms of greater reality the familiar objects of the scene wear a very different complexion to that in which they appear to the ordinary person or to the authors and advocates of schemes of reform.

THE extraordinary poverty-amidst-plenty paradox, that is to say the wide prevalence of a standard of living offensive to the modern conscience side by side with a potentiality for wealth production which nobody seriously believes to be beyond our technical powers of realisation, this amazing and shocking paradox shews the economic problem to be merely a surface phenomenon, resting—as does the war problem, too—upon an inadequate or defective capacity for co-operation in the common interest.

SELF-INTEREST, real or misconceived, direct or at one or more removes, is usually invoked to account for this failure to in co-operation. The cause, however, is not quite so simple, and upon analysis there emerges a factor whose recognition is destined to revolutionise the process of social development.

THERE is in reality no clear-cut war between those who have and those who have not, such as is so often alleged. Neither can people be marshalled into sharply opposed categories by being classified as those who fool the voter and those who are victims of the fooling.

THE actuality revealed by sober examination is not a clear cut opposition of class interests, of differing and incompatible sectional "goods"; for the well-to-do, although they enjoy the immense advantage of escaping the miseries of poverty, are, on the whole, little more contented with life than the poor, while reformers and those willing to go on with things as they are are to be found liberally sprinkled over both categories.

THE real obstacle to amelioration is not class opposition, but mental attitudes. The significant truth which has to be recognised is that the divergent opinions which divide men and paralyse their will to united action arise from the fact that the picture of a given situation is not the simple camera-like registration of reality which it is tacitly assumed to be, but, on the contrary, a picture put together by the shaping or distorting pencil of each individual experience, an impression inevitably conditioned by the special thoughts, feelings, prejudices, philosophies, principles, and complexes of emotionally-toned ideas which together make up the perceiving instrument we call a human being.

THE individual tends to think of social facts as simply-perceived phenomena, like, say, the crude facts of a landscape, and hence when he encounters in another person a different version of the same phenomena he is driven to postulate wilfulness, perversity, mental blindness, conscious or sub-conscious self-interest in order to account for it. The truth really is that the more salient facts of the social landscape are as difficult to isolate and describe as the hitherto elusive vitamin. All but the most elementary social facts are so charged with

meaning and value for the observer, they so closely adhere to other facts, that they change their hue and shape as the observer approaches to examine them, reflecting back his own very personal bias.

RECOGNITION of this factor of error and distortion in the individual picture of social circumstance means that much of the responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of society and for failure to effect a remedy has to be transferred from citizens in their collective capacity as voters, politicians and publicists taking their own competence for granted, to citizens as individuals in charge of, and critical towards their own lives. More explicitly it means that a better social order will be reached more quickly by the indirect route of individual reform than by the seemingly more obvious one of propagandising for votes.

FAILURE to perceive that the individual citizen's conduct of his own life has a vital bearing upon the collective welfare has led to diversion of attention from the major to the minor factor in social pathology, from the individual to the institution, from the inner life to externality.

If sociology should endorse this finding its advice to the reformer would be that he should relinquish his faith in the idea of a large-scale reform of the social system, together with his confidence that, as a sort of by-product, such reform would cause the automatic disappearance of any defectiveness happening to exist in the individual, and, that, on the positive side, he should seek to expose the individual aspect, dealing meanwhile with the immediacies of the current situation without reference to any grandiose social or political doctrine.

To the likely objection that on this view the hope of being able to achieve a reorganisation of society within the "in our time" schedule, together with the sustaining optimism which that hope engenders, are both quenched, it is to be pointed out that not only is the hope unjustified and any energy-generating quality therefore wasted, but that it is actually hindering the very advance it is desired to make.

PSYCHOLOGY declares that schemes for the reform of society are largely projections of uncorrected individual desires, and that supporters of reform are largely compensating for defective quality in their own lives. Exposure of the influence of the individual on the character of society would inevitably bring to light the defective, devitalised, emotion-starved, sensation-drugged, value-myopic character of the average person, and with that wider vision would come the realisation that all this vital and spiritual poverty was actually considerably less dependent upon economic conditions than had been supposed. The physical, intellectual, and spiritual life which urban Russia is now enjoying in spite of its poverty and hard work,—that and much more could be provided here, and immediately, so soon as the vision of its worthwhileness appeared.

AND as to ultimate reform, a society whose units had succeeded, to an substantial degree, in freeing thought and feeling from distorting influences, in conferring on those operations spontaneity and freedom, and in undermining the egocentricity which now colours our whole outlook, such a society would be able to make its adjustments in an extraordinarily easy and frictionless manner, and so to change with unprecedented rapidity.

IT may be of interest here to remark that a small movement—known as Personal Politics—has recently been initiated which has for its objects the stressing of the dependence of society on the character of its individuals, and, further—in protest against the sterile intellectualism so prevalent today, in which the conclusions of thought are not allowed to change private life—the endeavour collectively to realise in personal experience the wider possibilities achievable in co-operation.

IF sociology became a vital and significant force in public life it should be a stimulus to the appearance of other agencies for the accomplishment of the mental transformation which must form the spiritual base for any enduring and satisfying material reform.

SUCH, then, is the new insight which sociological study might confer upon the reformer.

ANOTHER matter in which it might very serviceably help would be in summing up for the public the findings of psychology and social anthropology upon the character of "human nature," that subject of endless confusion and argument. An immense amount of extremely confident dogmatism is current concerning what is inherent in human disposition and what is not, and also as to what degree of malleability there may be in that native disposition, whatever it is.

ALTHOUGH, as Margaret Mead has pointed out, human beings, in different times and places, have tried out a rich variety of patterns of social life, we of this culture assume, without examination of these experiments, that our particular ways and ideas represent the nearest approach to the ideal, and we then proceed to reinforce this prejudice by highly speculative generalisations about human nature, assuming its essential competitiveness, its inherent cave-man-like quality, its natural quarrelsomeness, its predisposition to animalism, its inborn property sense, and so on.

AND, similarly, motivated by certain uncorroborated ideas as to what are valuable qualities in life, we assume that the young can be moulded into conformity without injury, and in that way we create a number of social misfits.

IN her two studies of primitive communities the authoress just mentioned has dissipated some of the hypothetical "facts" about human

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nature and its adaptability, assumptions which, having been acted upon as if they were truths, have been responsible for untold human misery and discontent.

SUCH facts as the rarity of unadjusted persons in Samoan society and the various reasons therefor connected with education, family life, freedom from secrecies, etc. ; and as the neurotic character of the adults in the property-orientated, emotionally stifled Manus community—in dramatic contrast to the unrepressed, spontaneous youth in the same society—such facts are culled in vain if they do no more than provide fleeting entertainment for a few curious readers of anthropology. Surely such clues to human nature are the raw material of the study whose function it should be to interpret science—science one and indivisible—to society for the practical ends of living more successfully.

THE wrongness of that facile philosophy which regards revolutionary tendencies in youth as natural, rather than as symptoms of social disease, and which toys with the idea of achieving reform via education, blind to the fact that, as a moulding factor, schooling influence is, and can be, no match for the home and the early post-education experience, is well brought out in the studies alluded to.

MORE direct illustrations from the field of psychology had perhaps better not be attempted, since the material coming from that quarter needs a great deal of laboratory treatment by the sociologist before a clear, usable precipitate can be obtained, but plenty of raw material is to be found—and not only in the workshops of official psychologists and psychiatrists.

A CONCLUDING illustration of the possible contribution of sociology to the problem of how to live well will take us nearer to philosophy and religion.

ALLUSION was made earlier to the need for a unifying principle of experience. In mediaeval Christendom every facet of experience was fitted into a theory of things, material and spiritual, a theory whose parts cohered and whose facts were mutually consistent. And it is claimed that as a result—and by no accident—medieval society was characterised by a unity in which were gathered up the varied aspects of life, practical, artistic, literary, scientific (such as it was), political and religious, so that there were not felt any discrepancies or gaps between them.

FROM the Renaissance onward this harmony became less perfect, and experience tended to split into compartments which did not make contact, but, on the contrary, left in the consciousness a sense of mutual inconsistency. The old explanation appeared no longer to fit the facts, and in any case was found by an increasing number of persons

to be less credible than it had formerly seemed. On the other hand the new theories were less coherent and satisfying, besides being usually amendments of the old theory rather than completely new ones.

IN modern times, in this western world, men's explanation of things, their justification both of incentive and misery, has been a hotch-potch into which have entered divine will and providence, a principle of progress, liberty, greatest good of the greatest number, the efficacy of reason, individualism, etc.

RECENT events—notably the Great War and its consequences—seeming to falsify the old confidence in carrying on, certain that all was for the best, have led to a pessimistic attitude. The cosmos no longer hangs together, while it appears to be quite indifferent to human welfare or altruistic aspirations. Regulative principles are an illusion; nothing very much matters—except having a good time, according to one's lights and means. Nobody any longer believes in anything in particular.

THE old principles, it is true, continue to receive extensive lip-service, while “sob-stuff” and sentiment are abundant. But they are only planks of a shipwrecked vessel to which people must cling because it is in the nature of a reflective, cosmos-conscious being to feel the necessity for explaining himself and his world to himself.

THE mutually exclusive compartments into which experience is divided by taboos, evasions, shams, inconsistencies and uncharitableness quite effectually prevent existence from being explainable, and in the absence of any sense that men can get on with their jobs confident that they are working with the order of things, whether divinely ordained or cosmically existent, there is no drive to common effort for ideals other than those which hold promise of material reward for the individual, and even then the drive is not great.

IF we agree, as it would seem we must, with those who affirm that mankind needs a credible vision of an order of things with which he can whole-heartedly co-operate, finding his own fulfilment in so doing, then this question, which is probably quite rightly termed essentially a religious one, is one to which sociology ought to address itself.

WHAT, if anything, is it able to say? Certainly, it cannot claim, on behalf of science, to explain cosmos. But if science is not able to explain cosmos, any more than it is able to give values, can it successfully demonstrate the folly of expecting a complete cosmological picture, indicating, perhaps, at the same time, where a satisfying principle may be found?

“It may seem a matter for surprise when we come to think of it, but it is a fact,” comments Ortega Y Gasset, “that while life has promoted

the most various entities to the rank of principles it has never tried to make itself a principle. Life has proceeded under the guidance of religion, science, morality, and economics; it has even proceeded under the capricious direction of art or pleasure; the one expedient that has never been essayed is that of living intentionally under the guidance of life. Fortunately, mankind has always more or less lived in this way, but such living has been unintentional; as soon as men saw what they were doing they repented, and experienced a mysterious remorse."

" . . . whenever, in all previous cultures, an attempt was made to discover the value of life or, in the current phrase, its ' meaning ' or justification, application was made to conceptions that lie beyond its limits. The value of life always seemed to consist in something transcending it, for the achievement of which life was merely an avenue or an instrument. Of itself, in its immanent aspect, it appeared quite devoid of estimable qualities, when, indeed, it was not considered to be charged exclusively with negative values."

THEN, after quoting Goethe's words " The more I think of it the more evident it appears to me that life exists simply for the purpose of being lived," he concludes: " There is no necessity to have recourse to extra-vital considerations, theological, cultural, etc. Life itself selects and constructs its hierarchy of values."

PROFESSOR Macmurray has given more precision to this concept of life as furnishing its own values. His thought is notable for the emphasis which it places on feeling as a driving force and directive principle—provided we can attain to spontaneity in the emotional life.

SPONTANEITY rules in the animal world; there the individual lives from within outwards, his actions are never, and obviously never could be, ulterior or in consciousness. When mankind arrived, with its power of reflection and speculation, and the individual became not only aware of its own actions, but conscious of itself making those actions, and when, in the course of historical development, the individual came to be set in opposition to the community in which his significance lay, spontaneity was displaced by conduct with a view to some more or less consciously pictured personal end.

FEELING, just as much as thought, has a way of getting caught up on the brambles of unreality, and becoming as misleading for conduct as thought can be; hence it has incurred profound distrust.

YET, as Professor Macmurray has told his wireless listeners, " Emotion is the very stuff of life, and the source of all its spontaneous activities."

WHAT is to be desired is the spontaneity of the emotional life and provision for its free expression. For, "like the mind, the emotions have their own capacity for form and rhythm and grace, and will develop that form if they are not thwarted and deformed by alien pressure."

IT is they which, if undistorted, give us our values, and in accepting our true feelings, that is, our feelings set free by clarification of our perceptions and a resolution of that mass neurosis which, as Trigant Burrow asserts, appears to our myopic eyes as normality, we are promised a life of freedom in which the clumsy expedients of codes and conventions become useless.

A LIFE of such reality and freedom satisfies itself because it allows of the individual expressing himself freely according to his nature, which is, in Macmurray's phrase: "spontaneous objectivity—ability to live spontaneously (that is, from themselves) in terms of the other (that is, for and in and by what is not themselves)."

THUS it is possible to discern a principle giving unity and self-completion to life, satisfying notwithstanding that it does not furnish a cosmic interpretation. The lack of a cosmic picture need not disturb us so long as we feel, through vital living, that life contains its own propelling and steering apparatus which, if not interfered with by egocentricity, guides the individual along a line of experience in which activities fulfil themselves in their own satisfactions.

THE demand for an ultimate "meaning" or "purpose" in existence would seem to be a manifestation of nervous self-consciousness due to a life in conflict with itself,—of, that is, a "vital disorientation," as Ortega Y Gasset has phrased it.

HERE, of course, sociology is applying itself to one of the deepest of human concerns. The significance of the existence of an intense interest in religion in the very age which is distinguished from all others by the widespread nature of its unbelief can hardly escape its notice, and if it is efficiently to perform a mediating service between knowledge and living it cannot evade this issue.

FOR, as Professor Macmurray has finely said: "without a free religious life, trained and developed, a man's whole being lacks a centre, and becomes a meaningless conglomeration of futile capacities and activities: because the religious aspect of our human life is its life of communion, in which it loses its isolation and realises the unity between its own selfhood and the universe which stands over against it. That losing the self in what is outside itself, in communion with the world, with nature, with its fellows, is the condition of its wholeness and of its wholesomeness, of its beauty and its freedom."

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AND further making manifest the relation between religion and life, he adds: "Religion and freedom are twins. That does not merely mean that without religion we shall never be free: it means that without freedom we can never be religious. For religion is the expression of man's nature in its wholeness, and it is only in freedom, through freedom, and for freedom that our nature can be perfected."

ENOUGH illustrations, probably, have now been given of the relevancy of sociological thought for the reformer, provided sociology will accept the wider rôle, so far vacant, of the interpreter of science to those who seek to make it meaningful for the activities of life.

VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE: by K. H. R. Edwards.

THE aim of Vocational Guidance is to secure the fitting of each into that employment most appropriate to and commensurate with the individual talents. This represents a modern aspect of Mill's individualism and follows his consideration of a social problem in terms of happiness and unhappiness. It is taken as axiomatic that for the individual to be happy he must do something he wants to do and that, other things being equal, his total happiness will be proportionate to the satisfaction resulting from the pursuit of a suitably chosen employment. The fitting of each according to capacity would produce, it is argued, a more contented and stable industrial system.

THIS being a highly desirable aim, it becomes the business of some voluntary agency, or the State, to promote the fullest individual contentment by providing freedom in the choice of a career and in vocational conduct. Vocational Guidance has been proposed as a suitable mechanism to secure this end. The validity of these Vocational Guidance procedures has so far been demonstrated with small samples of the population. It has been shown* that, on the whole, groups which have followed guidance appear to be happier and much more settled in their posts than groups which have not followed guidance. Actually this form of neo-individualism, represented by the desire to regard the individual as the new point of balance, is a compensatory mechanism induced by the conflict of the individual with some authority. It is almost unnecessary to state that individualism represents a trend which is most actively promoted in times during which it is absent or ineffective. When State absolutism is rampant, the repressed ideas and desires appear frequently as intellectual, and often practical, efforts towards individualism. Such tendencies may be, and indeed often are, utilised by the State for its own ends. For when coercion is the rule and the State demands universally felt, then the smallest concession by the State is looked upon with unusual favour. The allowance is magnified and seen out of all proportion to its real worth. In this way, several relatively minor concessions made under such circumstances can transform a resentful community into a more satisfied one. This enables further restrictions to be imposed by the State. The case of choice of employment illustrates the point. An enormous number of State regulations exist. The State, with generous feeling, requests the individual to choose his own career. Indeed, official administrative machinery is put into operation to deal with such choices. The individual looks upon this as true freedom. He can choose his own career. But this is a sop to Cerberus. In the normal course of events disillusionment swiftly follows.

*See account of London Vocational Guidance Experiments in *METHODS OF CHOOSING A CAREER*, by F. M. Earle. London, 1931.

THE numerous assumptions are those usually brought forward against any completely laissez-faire policy. The individual is taken not only to possess sufficient knowledge of economic conditions to make a good choice but also regarded as being able to state concisely what he actually does want. The very fact of choice occurring at such extraordinarily early ages effectively precludes any acquaintance, other than cursory, with economic circumstances. In addition to this, individuals differ remarkably in their capacity for expressing their desires, even if these were straightforward—which they usually are not. A conflict normally results from competition between two or more desires. Indecision as to which career to pursue appears. A person may, under such circumstances, state what he believes he desires, whereas this may not be at all representative of what he actually does want.

GRANTING that the choice could be made and stated, then there remain remarkable differences in opportunity of following choices. This is rather an economic and sociological rather than a psychological question and touches upon the rigidity of social barriers, the laws of inheritance and social prestige. Individuals do not possess comparable facilities to follow their choices even when these are the result of carefully arranged vocational guidance procedures. Unless some attempt is authoritatively made to remedy this state of affairs, it would seem that much of the vocational guidance work will be wasted effort. It can only be of fullest value when followed by deliberate attempts to secure suitable employments for the persons concerned. Guidance itself is an incomplete mechanism. It is a preliminary measure which must be linked up with others.

It is still an open question as to whether the process of fitting each into the most suitable occupation is a process which will ultimately benefit society. It has been demonstrated by experimental work, that guidance is a beneficial process on a small scale. It has yet to be shown that it is beneficial, proportionately or otherwise, on a large scale. There are two points, firstly an operation itself may be useful on a small scale but not so useful on a large scale. Secondly a beneficial process may not always have beneficial results. No one knows what the effect of applying guidance on a large scale would be. The widespread encouragement of individualism would perhaps produce rather interesting social attitudes.

A FOREMOST problem to be settled in any guidance scheme is the most suitable agent with whom to entrust the work of vocational guidance. The present position is that there exists a multiplicity of official, semi-official and private bodies all undertaking guidance work. Competition occurs between these and the existing lack of unanimity as to aims, methods and technique is a matter for reflection. There exists a crying need for centralisation and co-ordination together with the elimination

of overlap. The State appears to be the most suitable agent to supervise this process and to control all employment machinery. For this step authority may be required and the State is the only body to whom this is possible. It is not argued that the State should continue to exercise a virtual monopoly. Later on it could decentralise and delegate its authority when necessary. But before this can be at all considered, the existing tangle must be cleared away.

THESE proposals for State supervision of individual life may be recognised as a further unwanted encroachment on the personal liberty of the individual. It is certainly a proceeding which could not have been proposed, still less executed, some years ago. But the pressure of economic circumstances had led to the exchange of personal liberty for the wherewithal to exist by a large proportion of the population. The result has been that a large number of people have been subjected to a particularly autocratic form of State discipline. Whilst this has increased the emotional friction between the individual and the State it has at least rendered one section of the populace more amenable to receive instructions from the State. For the right to live and the right to work are universal rights no longer with this section of the community. As now qualified, they have been amended to the right to live as the State directs and the right to work as the State commands.

ALTHOUGH it may be true to say that the individuals comprising the State are more receptive through discipline to some forms of autocracy, yet the imposition of a particular kind of conduct by the State cannot be continued indefinitely. Such a proceeding will only be tolerated for any length of time so long as it is proved, to the satisfaction of the community, that such imposition is to the community's ultimate benefit. The co-operation of public opinion over this measure is very desirable. Vocational guidance is the kind of problem which cannot be carried through in spite of public opinion but which requires its full co-operation. This is because it will affect so many of the public and will touch upon things of such vital importance to them. The significance of the part which can be played by enlisted public opinion is fairly obvious. Steps have already been made in this direction. The various vocational guidance experiments, expensive and immature as they really are, at least have helped to convince the public of their practicability and so secured some public interest. The next step is to organise such interest and to secure its active assistance. These tasks are by no means straightforward. Some will be required to sacrifice a present for a future gain: others to exchange a tangible benefit for an intangible one. In some cases economic necessity will tend to limit the desire to assist. In others, a lack of intelligence will preclude co-operation. It is extremely unlikely that a Vocational Guidance Scheme could be proposed which will not receive strict opposition.

If any closely reasoned proposal is advanced it will normally meet with severe criticism from all quarters. Foremost in value are the opinions of those who advance sound and logical reasons against the proposal. Secondly are those who oppose but cannot state why they do so; these are prejudiced. Thirdly are those who oppose for the sake of opposing, objecting not to the character of the proposal but its source or some other minor point. It follows that the introduction of a specific vocational guidance scheme will encounter severe opposition from these quarters. If the scheme is really valid, subsequent history will provide the explanation of the use of force with which it may have been introduced. It behoves, therefore, that before any such scheme reaches the stage of practical endeavour, every effort should have been expended to secure the most valid and reliable procedures attainable. No pains must be spared to possess the highest possible efficient instrument for the purpose in hand. The dangers and consequences of failure are too grave to risk.

SURVEYING the general position, the validity of guidance with small groups has been established. But the social and economic limitations upon which the successful foundation of any scheme depends have not yet been fully examined. Neither are the forms of large scale guidance and the scope of its applicability at all settled. These are yet matters for discussion. They require immediate attention. Within the last decade Vocational Guidance has gone far. It has still far to go.

EARLY GENERALISATIONS CONCERNING POPULATION
MOVEMENT AND CULTURE CONTACT: Prolegomena
to a Study of Mental Mobility: by Howard Becker.

Two errors are especially noticeable in contemporary American social theory: one is the error of attributing originality to methods and conclusions that are hoary with age; the other is the error of confusing new points of view and new results with old doctrines to which they have a merely superficial resemblance. Both could be avoided if a modicum of effort were exerted in getting at the historical background of specific problems; a grasp of the whole field of social theory is not needed.

THIS article is an attempt to find out something of what has been thought in the past about such topics as population movement (so-called "territorial mobility"), culture contact, cultural and social change, and certain social-psychological changes, frequently appearing in conjunction therewith, which may be subsumed under the term "mental mobility."¹

IT is not an exhaustive survey, and in view of space limitations could not be even if the writer had the language equipment necessary. Further, the claim is not made that the authors quoted are the "original sources" of the ideas they advance; in many instances they have had a host of obscure predecessors. Again, the treatment of the material is not topical, for the reason that such systematisation would be virtually impossible without a highly artificial separation of phrases from context and a great deal of duplication. A simple chronological arrangement seems best, especially in view of the fact that some order can be instituted by rephrasing the more important generalisations in modern terminology. A great deal of danger lies in this method, however, unless the original is readily available for comparison, and consequently considerable quotation is practised; it appears advisable to be somewhat diffuse if distortion can thereby be avoided.

THE three groups of authors laid under contribution are: (1) Classical or Greco-Roman, comprising Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Strabo, Cicero, Caesar, and Seneca; (2) post-classical, comprising Aquinas, Ibn Khaldūn, More, Bodin, Bacon, and Mandeville; and (3) semi-modern, comprising Hume, Montesquieu, Turgot, Herder, and Heeren. Modern writers are not included in view of the emphasis on *early* generalisations; the function of the article is to let us see "what thoughts of old the wise have entertained"—not because anything can be *proved* by pointing to Plato, Bodin, or Turgot, but

¹For a brief discussion of the latter term, see the writer's article in *SOCIAL FORCES*, December, 1930, and the appropriate sections of his amplified adaptation of von Wiese's *ALLGEMEINE SOZIOLOGIE*, henceforth cited as Wiese-Becker, *SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGY*.

because in multitude of counsel there may well be some bits of wisdom that place problems in a "new" light. These men were not scientists in the modern sense; we expect from them suggestion but not hypothesis. Suggestion, however, may be worth while—*vixere fortes ante Agamemnona!*

1. CLASSICAL WRITERS.

MANY of the writers considered pay little or no attention to population movements as such; they must usually be inferred from accounts of culture contact cast in moralistic or ethnocentric terms. Herodotus, for example, says little or nothing about the trading journeys of his fellow-countrymen to Naucratis, the little Greek colony near the Canopic mouth of the Nile, but notes the haughty attitude of the Egyptians toward their young and pushing "inferiors," the Hellenes:

THEY have an aversion to using Hellene customs: in a word, they are the most conservative of all nations. This is a point in which all the Egyptians are punctilious.²

AGAIN, he says relatively little about the wide-ranging pastoral nomadism of the Scythians, but notes their aversion toward adopting the mores of "the stranger," the Greek merchant:

THEY [the Scythians] avoid as much as possible the importation of foreign customs, and have a particular aversion for those of Hellas . . .³

HE either knows or cares little about the perpetual invasions and conquests of the Sart regions of Persia by the Massagetae (variously known as Turanians, Dahi, and Sacas) but he offers an anecdote about "Persians" that clearly points to the nomadic abstemiousness and stern discipline seized upon by later writers as the fundamental reason for their formidable fighting power:

. . . a certain Artembares . . . made the following suggestion to the Persians, which they disclosed to Cyrus:—"Since Zeus gives supremacy to the Persians, and to you, O Cyrus, command of warriors, after the downfall to Astyages, take heart. We have a circumscribed country, one that is rough; but if we leave it, we shall find a better one . . ."

WHEN Cyrus heard this, he disapproved of the idea and said:—"Do so, but prepare yourselves to be ruled, not to rule. For from luxurious lands come men who love luxury. The same land cannot be prolific in wonderful fruit and in mighty warriors!"⁴

FURTHER, he implicitly points to the contrast between the "iron horse-archers" the Persian ruling class once were, and the softened

²Herodotus, HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN WARS I, cxxxv. (It should be noted that translations, particularly of the Classical writers, are used throughout, as with few exceptions the writer does not feel warranted in attempting his own.)

³*Ibid.*, IV., lxxvi., 1907.

⁴*Ibid.*, IX., cxxii.

potentates they later became when the mores of the agriculturalists of Iran had broken the nomad morale after inclusive conquest; the old Greek, for all his garrulousness, is a worthy forerunner of Ibn Khaldūn :

THE Persians adopt foreign manners with wonderful facility. They thought the Median dress was fairer than their own, and adopted it. In battle they wear Egyptian breastplates. Directly they hear of any new luxury they procure it, and have introduced from Hellas a system of pederasty. They are polygamous, and also keep concubines.⁵

HERE are a series of observations pointing plainly to population movement, culture contact, and mental mobility; they could be supplemented by many more, for Herodotus was not the father of *Kulturgeschichte* for nothing.

EVEN Thucydides, usually the model of the "history is past politics" school, could not refrain from a few simple, common-sense observations concerning non-political processes; indeed, population movement receives at his hands one of the earliest explicit treatments :

. . . Hellas appears to have had no stable sedentary population until a comparatively recent date, and to have been subject in earlier times to migrations, in which populations were easily dislodged from their homes under pressure from some more numerous body of intruders. There was no trade and no security of intercourse by sea or by land. Each community lived at a subsistence level by its own local production, without accumulating capital or investing it in the land, since none could foresee when the next invader would deprive them of their homes, which they had not yet learnt to fortify. They also took it for granted that their bare daily bread would be as easy to gain in one place as in another. For these reasons they migrated readily, and therefore did not develop great man-power or great armaments. The richest territories . . . were particularly exposed to changes of population. The fertility of the soil produced accumulations of power, which resulted in ruinous civil disorders, and at the same time these countries were more eagerly coveted by foreigners. On the contrary, Attica, which enjoyed the longest unbroken immunity from civil disorders owing to the thinness of its soil, never lost its original population; and one of the strongest proofs of my contention that the comparative development of other countries was retarded by migrations is to be found in the fact that the most important victims of war and civil disorders in the rest of the Hellenic world found an asylum, as refugees, at Athens, became naturalised there from remote antiquity, and so still further increased the population, with the result that they subsequently overflowed from Attica and planted colonies in Ionia.⁶

RIGHTLY or wrongly, Thucydides has here made several important generalisations, namely : (1) a stable sedentary population is necessary for the accumulation and conservation of material and non-material culture; (2) the habit of moving from place to place may be acquired as a result of historical processes; (3) the richest territories are

⁵*Ibid.*, I., cxxxv., (1906).

⁶Thucydides, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, I., ii., iii.

(Jowett's translation is usually considered standard, but the above passage is much better rendered by Toynbee.)

those most subject to changes of population, a generalisation pointed out by House;⁷ (4) civil disorders, *i.e.*, the class struggle, develop concomitantly with increase in cultural complexity; (5) refugees frequently bring great advantages to the countries that receive them; (6) population may increase by slow accretion from without, etc.

In another passage Thucydides hints at the condition upon which Goethe's Mephistopheles thus commented:

War, commerce and piracy
Are an indivisible trinity.

. . . . in ancient times both the Hellenes and those barbarians whose homes were on the coast of the mainland or in the islands, when they began to find their way to one another by sea had recourse to piracy.⁸

THUCYDIDES also points out the reason for the inland location of the older Greek cities, giving a historical basis for a peculiarity upon which, as we shall see, both Aristotle and Plato speculated:

. . . when navigation had become general and wealth was beginning to accumulate, cities were built upon the sea-shore and fortified; peninsulas too were occupied and walled-off with a view to commerce and defence against the neighboring tribes. But the older towns both in the islands and on the continent, in order to protect themselves against the piracy which so long prevailed, were built inland . . .⁹

He also perceived the importance of geographical location for the development of trade: Corinth was situated at "a break in transportation":

CORINTH, being seated on an isthmus, was naturally from the first a centre of commerce; for the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnese in the old days, when they communicated chiefly by land, had to pass through her territory in order to reach one another. Her wealth too was a source of power, as the ancient poets testify, who speak of "Corinth the rich." When navigation grew more common, the Corinthians, having already acquired a fleet, were able to put down piracy; they offered a market both by sea and land, and with the increase of riches the power of their city increased yet more.¹⁰

It remained for Plato, however, to make the first cardinal generalisations in urban sociology; he had observed the lax morality, the mental mobility, of Corinth and Athens, and he was anxious to build up a new *polis* with the simplicity, stability and sincerity which he believed existed in Sparta:

⁷ Floyd N. House, *THE RANGE OF SOCIAL THEORY*. (New York: Holt, 1929), pp. 54-55.

⁸ Thucydides, *THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR*, I., v.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I, vii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I, xiii. Cf. C. H. Cooley, "THE THEORY OF TRANSPORTATION," *Pub. Am. Econ. Assoc.*, IX. (3 May, 1894).

ATH. And is there any neighboring state ?

CLE. None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place . . .

ATH. Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous ; had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbors, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty savior would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. But there is comfort in the eighty stadia ; although the sea is too near, especially, if, as you say, the harbors are so good. Still we must be satisfied. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has also a bitter and brackish quality ; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways—making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations . . .¹¹

In a passage in *THE LAWS* he also makes several observations concerning colonies and the cause of social change which have been commented upon by Giddings as follows : " In no later writing that I know do we find in so few words so many cardinal generalisations as these lines contain upon the nature and behavior of human society." ¹²

Here is the passage :

CITIES find colonisation in some respects easier when the colonists are of one race, which like a swarm of bees goes from a single country, friends from friends, owing to some pressure of population, or other similar necessity ; or because a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight, when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common sacrifices, and all that ; but inasmuch as such colonies kick against any laws which are other than they had at home, although they have been undone by the badness of them, yet because of the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin ; and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws ; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years I was going to say that man never legislates, but that destinies and accidents happening in all sorts of ways, legislate in all sorts of ways. Either the violence of war has overthrown governments, and changed laws, or the hard necessity of poverty. And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilence, and bad seasons continuing during many years.¹³

SOME of Plato's generalisations may be formulated in modern terminology thus : (1) strangers are not controlled by the standards (mores) of their temporary stopping-place, hence their presence tends to bring about social disorganisation ; (2) isolation is favorable to social and

¹¹ Plato, *THE LAWS*, IV.

¹² F. H. Giddings, *STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF HUMAN SOCIETY* (New York : Macmillan, 1922), p. 96.

¹³ Plato, *loc. cit.*

mental stability; (3) it is relatively easy to control homogeneous colonies if the institutions of the home land are preserved, however imperfect these institutions were and are; (4) heterogeneous colonies predisposed as they are to mental mobility will submit to innovations more readily than will homogeneous, but it is some time before such innovations pass beyond the formal stage; (5) catastrophes may be immediately antecedent to social change; (6) social disorganisation and social change are correlated.

ARISTOTLE does little more than sum up the arguments of Plato and others about the best location for a city, but he does it admirably. The element of population movement is much more explicit in his comment than in the Platonic original:

WHETHER a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well-ordered state or not is a question which has often been asked. It is argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to good order (for a maritime people will always have a crowd of merchants coming and going), and that intercourse by sea is inimical to good government.¹⁴

PERHAPS the earliest recognition of the rôle of the city in promoting anonymity and thereby facilitating mental mobility is contained in the following passage, also by Aristotle:

. . . where the number of the citizens is too many . . . it is more easy for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as they will easily escape detection in so great a multitude.¹⁵

IN spite of the stray flashes of insight scattered here and there throughout their works, most Greek writers following Plato and Aristotle—Polybius,¹⁶ Eratosthenes and others—have relatively little to give us. Not until we come to Strabo, who finished the final revision of *THE GEOGRAPHY* between the years 17 and 23 A.D., do we find an *embarras des richesses*. Our only difficulty is in selecting the passages most significant for our purposes from the great number that are relevant. Inasmuch as we shall have occasion to consider the influences of geographical environment in relation to mental mobility, it is perhaps best to begin with a disavowal of geographical *determinism* by Strabo the geographer:

¹⁴Aristotle, *POLITICS*, VII., vi., 1.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, VII., iv.

¹⁶The last of the major Greek historians, Polybius, although of great interest in other connections, has relatively little of direct value for this study. His importance lies primarily in his methodological emphasis; he was one of the first to regard history as a natural process. One of his methodological passages, in fact, contains an obscure clause on the importance of ecological position and geographical location:

"The science of history is three-fold: first, the dealing with written documents . . . second topography, . . . the description of rivers and harbors, and . . . the peculiar features of the seas and countries and their relative distances; thirdly, political affairs" (Polybius, *History*, XII., quoted in Harry Elmer Barnes, "History, Its Rise and Development," in *ENCYC. AMER.* 1st ed., p. 212, italics ours).

ARTS, forms of government, and modes of life, arising from certain (internal) springs, flourish under whatever climate they may be situated; climate, however, has its influence, and therefore while some peculiarities are due to the nature of the country, others are the result of institutions and education. It is not owing to the nature of the country, but rather to their education, that the Athenians cultivate eloquence, while the Lacedæmonians do not; nor yet the Thebans, who are nearer still. Neither are the Babylonians and Egyptians philosophers by nature, but by reason of their institutions and education.¹⁷

THIS disavowal does not commit him to a barren cultural determinism, however; he is always willing and eager to reckon with the movement-promoting factors of the geographical environment. Further, he saw that certain types of population movement result in culture contact and mental mobility, as the following excerpts show (note the re-statement of Thucydides' theory about Corinth and the "break in transportation"):

CORINTH is said to be opulent from its mart. It is situated upon the isthmus. It commands two harbours, one near Asia, the other near Italy, and facilitates, by reason of so short a distance between them, an exchange of commodities on each side.

As the Sicilian strait, so formerly these seas were of difficult navigation, and particularly the sea above Maleæ, on account of the prevalence of contrary winds, whence the common proverb:

"When you double Maleæ forget your home."

It was a desirable thing for the merchants coming from Asia, and from Italy, to discharge their lading at Corinth without being obliged to double Cape Maleæ. For goods exported from Peloponnesus, or imported by land, a toll was paid to those who had the keys of the country. This continued afterwards for ever. In after-times they enjoyed even additional advantages, for the Isthmian games, which were celebrated there, brought thither great multitudes of people . . .

THE temple of Venus at Corinth was so rich, that it had more than a thousand women consecrated to the service of the goddess, courtesans, whom both men and women had dedicated as offerings to the goddess. The city was frequented and enriched by the multitudes who resorted thither on account of these women. Masters of ships freely squandered all their money, and hence the proverb:

"It is not in every man's power to go to Corinth."¹⁸

COMANA is populous, and is a considerable mart, frequented by persons coming from Armenia . . . The inhabitants are voluptuous in their mode of life. All their property is planted with vines, and there is a multitude of women, who make a gain of their persons . . . The city is almost a little Corinth.¹⁹

He contrasts the type of social structure found in focal points of movement, where mental mobility is prevalent, with the simpler type of society found among the pastoral nomads, and points out how contact with Greek and Roman standards, brought about by the rise

¹⁷ Strabo, THE GEOGRAPHY, II., iii., 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II., chap. vi., sec. 20.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. VII., bk. XII., chap. iii., sec. 36.

of navigation, tended to bring with it the social disorganisation of the nomad society :

AND when we consider the amount of fraud connected with trading speculations even amongst ourselves, what ground have we to wonder that Homer should have designated as the justest and most noble those [Scythians] who had but few commercial and monetary transactions, and with the exception of their swords and drinking cups, possessed all things in common, and especially their wives and children, who were cared for by the whole community according to the system of Plato . . . And this is still the opinion entertained of them by the Greeks ; for we esteem them the most sincere, the least deceitful of any people, and much more frugal and self-relying than ourselves. And yet the manner of life customary among us has spread almost everywhere, and brought about a change for the worse, effeminacy, luxury, and over-refinement, inducing extortion in ten thousand different ways ; and doubtless much of this corruption has penetrated even into the countries of the nomades, as well as those of the other barbarians ; for having once learnt how to navigate the sea, they have become depraved, committing piracy and murdering strangers ; and holding intercourse with many different nations, they have imitated both their extravagance and their dishonest traffic, which may indeed appear to promote civility of manners, but do doubtless corrupt the morals and lead to dissimulation, in place of the genuine sincerity we have before noticed.²⁰

STRABO has undoubtedly exercised a great deal of influence upon those social theorists who trace the rise of the class state to the inclusive conquest of tillage peoples by pastoral peoples. As might be shown in a detailed study of Gumpłowicz, Oppenheimer, Ratzel, Cowan, and others, Strabo has given in the following statements an anticipation of many points of importance in their theories :

ALL, or the greatest part of them [the Scythians], are nomades . . .

BETWEEN these people, Hyrcania, and Parthia as far as Aria lies a vast and arid desert, which they crossed by long journeys, and overran Hyrcania, the Nesaeen country, and the plains of Parthia. These people agreed to pay a tribute on condition of having permission to overrun the country at stated times, and to carry away the plunder. But when these incursions became more frequent than the agreement allowed, war ensued, afterwards peace was made, and then again war was renewed. Such is the kind of life which the other Nomades also lead, continually attacking their neighbours, and then making peace with them.²¹

THE nomades are more disposed to war than to robbery. The occasion of their contests was to enforce the payment of tribute. They permit those to have land who are willing to cultivate it. In return for the use of the land, they are satisfied with receiving a settled and moderate tribute, not such as will furnish superfluities, but the daily necessities of life. If this tribute is not paid, the nomades declare war. Hence the poet calls these people both just, and miserable, for if the tribute is regularly paid, they do not have recourse to war. Payment is not made by those who have confidence in their ability to repel attacks with ease, and to prevent the incursion of their enemies.²²

INDEED, this might almost pass for an abstract of Oppenheimer's THE STATE !

²⁰*Ibid.*, XI., viii., secs. 2 and 3.

²¹*Ibid.*, VII., iv., sec. 6.

²²*Ibid.*, VII., iv., sec. 6.

AGAIN, Strabo has pointed out one of the effects of isolation, *viz.*, the development of the mental basis for such "anti-stranger" manifestations as the Spartan *xenelasia*, although he draws his example from another source :

THE rough and savage manners of these people [the mountaineers of Spain] is not alone owing to their wars, but likewise to their isolated position, it being a long distance to reach them, whether by sea or land. Thus the difficulty of communication has deprived them both of generosity of manners and of courtesy. At the present time, however, they suffer less from this both on account of their being at peace and the intermixture of Romans. Wherever these (influences) are not so much experienced people are harsher and more savage.²³

AMONG the Roman writers Cicero is especially important for our purpose. His observations upon the mental mobility of maritime city populations are more detailed than those of either Plato or Strabo :

MARITIME cities are . . . exposed to corrupt influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilisation is more or less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only foreign merchandise, but also foreign fashions, which allow no fixation or consolidation in the institutions of such cities. Those who inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And even when they do not desert their country in person, their minds are always expatiating and voyaging round the world.

THERE was no cause which more deeply undermined Corinth and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and navigation had induced to abandon their agricultural and military interests.

THE proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are acquired by victory or imported by commerce ; and the very agreeableness of their position nourishes the expensive and deceitful gratifications of the passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For almost the entire Peloponnesus is surrounded by the sea ; nor, beside the Phliasians, are there any whose lands do not approach the sea—and beyond the Peloponnesus, the Enianes, the Dorians and the Dolopes, are the only inland peoples. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which girded by the waves, seem as if they were all afloat, together with the institutions and manners of their cities. And these things I have before noticed do not respect ancient Greece only ; for all its colonies likewise are washed by the sea, which have expatriated from Greece into Asia, Thracia, Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia. Thus it seems, as if fragments of the Grecian coasts had been appended to the shores of the barbarians. For among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore maritime, or inclined to navigation, if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans ; one for the sake of commerce, the other of pillage. Here then is one evident reason of the calamities and revolutions of Greece, because she became infected, as I before observed, with the vices which belong to maritime cities. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great advantage ; it is, that all the commodities of foreign nations are thus concentrated in the cities of the sea, and that the

²³*Ibid.*, III., iii., 8.

inhabitants are enabled in return to export and send abroad the produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers them a market for their goods.²⁴

HERE are several generalisations which, to be sure, may or may not be valid, but which are none the less important, inasmuch as the influence of Cicero both upon contemporaries and posterity was and is considerable: (1) the mental mobility associated with the type of population movement peculiar to trading centres gives rise to social disorganisation; (2) mental mobility is a phenomenon that may arise in a particular individual when no significant change in his geographical location has occurred; (3) culture contact is facilitated by geographical conditions making transthalassic movement easy; (4) the extension of the market is accompanied by the decline of agricultural and military interests; (5) the political disunion of Greece was an outgrowth of the social disorganisation concomitant with a high rate of population movement and mental mobility.

CICERO's contemporary, Julius Cæsar, certainly had excellent opportunities to observe the effects of movement and culture contact, and in his GALLIC WARS he shows that such opportunities were not altogether lost. Speaking of the various tribes against which campaigns were conducted, he says:

OF all these, the Belgæ are the bravest, because they are the furthest from the civilisation and refinement of (our) Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them, and import these things which tend to effeminate the mind . . . ²⁵

UPON their territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character and customs when Cæsar inquired he received the following information:—That there was no access for merchants to them; that they suffered no wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported; because they thought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courage impaired: that they were a savage people and of great bravery . . . ²⁶

It is not without significance that both the Belgæ and Nervii, although partly sedentary, practised pastoral nomadism; Cæsar's observations sound strangely like the comments of Herodotus upon the Scythians and those of Strabo upon the "Nomades."

AGAIN, Cæsar points out how the combined influences of accessibility and a culture making navigation possible produce similarity in the cultures of certain coastal areas:

THE island [Britain] is triangular in its form, and one of its sides is opposite to Gaul. One angle of this side . . . is in Kent, whither almost all ships from Gaul are directed . . .

THE most civilised of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the Gallic customs.²⁷

²⁴ Marcus Tullius Cicero, THE TREATISE ON THE REPUBLIC, I., 207-9.

²⁵ Cæsar, COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC AND CIVIL WARS.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II., xv. ²⁷ *Ibid.*, V., xiii.

AFTER Cæsar, men like Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius wrote much history, but there seems little in it that is relevant here ; personal moral and scandal-mongering narratives usurped the place of earlier straightforward accounts.

It is from the rhetorician and practical ethicist Seneca that the most valuable passage, for present purposes, is gleaned. He comments on the movement of large numbers of the population to the city of Rome, and analyses the motives which seem to account for such movement :

LOOK, I pray you, on these vast crowds, for whom all the countless roofs of Rome can scarcely find shelter : the greater part of these crowds have lost their native land : they have flocked hither from their country, towns, and colonies, and in fine from all parts of the world. Some have been brought by ambition, some by the exigencies of public office, some by being entrusted with embassies, some by luxury which seeks a convenient spot, rich in vices, for its exercise, some by their wish for a liberal education, others by a wish to see the public shows. Some have been led hither by friendship, some by industry, which finds here a wide field for the display of its powers. Some have brought their beauty for sale, some their eloquence : people of every kind assemble themselves together in Rome, which sets a high price both upon virtues and vices.²⁸

PARAPHRASING, his conclusions are as follows : (1) the large city offers opportunities for differentiation along highly specialised lines ; (2) both the elementary segmental cravings and the most highly sublimated desires may best be gratified in the large city ; (3) movement to the city is largely determined by a prior process of individuation ; (4) the highly specialised person finds the best market for his abilities in the city.

²⁸ Seneca, CONSOLATION TO HELVIA, in XI., vi.

**TOWARDS A NATIONAL PLAN: THE URBAN AND RURAL
ANTITHESIS: * by Geoffrey Clark.**

It is interesting when we are studying the growth of the Planning movement, to realise how very urban in outlook it has been. The earth's surface was considered as so many potential building sites and it is only in the last year or two that planners have learned to appreciate land as the raw material of the greatest of all industries. It would be unfair to blame Town Planners for this. Quite rightly their first struggle was with the chaos in large urban areas. Then from the study of sections of towns, they were driven to study whole towns: soon the Town unit was perceived to need further expansion into the region: to-day our regions have got to expand till they are co-extensive with the whole country. I do not mean by this any change in the scope of regional planning as understood to-day: I only wish to emphasize the need for a master plan. But, in this process of expansion the term Town Planning has ceased to be applicable: we are driven to face national planning, and we have learnt that before we can plan we must survey. As a matter of fact, the survey has been going on for years: from the days of the first history to to-day with its scientific examination of all things, the materials for our plan have been accumulating. What is needed now is a gigantic synthesis. I hasten to add that my vanity does not rise to this. My own object is to glance briefly at the present position, and then throw out a number of suggestions. Here, indeed, is a wide field of activity for sociologists, who in the synthetic study of folk, work, place, are the co-ordinators of the work of anthropologists, economists and town planners, and it is co-ordination which is vital to-day.

We will now begin our own brief survey.

In all forms of economic life the tendency is towards large scale units. Man's inventive genius has annihilated both time and space, factors which in the past have helped to segregate communities. Rapid travel, wireless telegraphy, the newspaper, the cinema, broadcasting, flying are all busily engaged in breaking down the barriers which formerly kept community life intact.

LOCAL dialect is dying out; a world language has been mooted; there are leagues of nations; endless international conferences; cheap educational tours; round the world joy-rides; ubiquitous jazz bands; in other words, the quality peculiar to place and to many generations of slow thinking, is rapidly disappearing before the mass production of everything appertaining to life.

* Paper read at a Discussion Meeting of the Institute of Sociology at Le Play House, on March 28th, 1933.

To us, whether we are young and thrilled by the excitement of being "modern" or a little less young and a little less thrilled, these are facts, and must be fully considered. They are the achievement of the main stream of life. They represent a cheeky attempt to supplant the balanced slow-growing work of nature by the swift guesses of men. That is a bald description of the more obvious characteristic of life to-day, which is attempting to create one huge world unit, possibly with one language, employing fool-proof gadgets for all menial tasks, and enjoying or possibly enduring a surplus of leisure hours; in fact, with every valley filled and with every mountain and hill brought low.

To those of us who dislike this prospect, it may be a comfort to think of the air in autumn on any gentle windy day. If we were observant of such things we could remember seeing a never-ending shower of seeds blown we knew not where; we only knew that somewhere they touched the earth. They were nature's ammunition. Let man falter in his stride for one instant, and nature will again take charge. Who can ever forget the blaze of poppies on the devastated land in Flanders.

Now, the old-fashioned countryman works in harmony with the power behind the wind and the blowing seeds. For generations he has stood up to nature in all her moods. His clothes have taken on the colour of her fields and woods. His home is little more than a huge bird's nest. All his customs come from age-long experience gained in his battle with storm and tempest, rain and sunshine. To him these things are life. The small village communities have grown up under the hands of such people. They depend for their continued existence on conditions not too far removed from those which created them; the need that is for a combined effort in comparative isolation.

So long as access is difficult and the roads are bad, the community will continue its life on the old lines. But bring along the railway; follow it by the motor reinforced by the telephone, the wireless and the bicycle, and the physical conditions which made for stability have gone. We will leave the village for the moment, at the point where its seclusion is being swept away.

As we turn over the pages of history, and follow the decline and fall of civilization after civilization, we cannot fail to notice the part which the town plays in these disasters; the town with its accumulation of riches and vast population of men dependent on their wits for their livelihood and deprived of all contact with the weather.

To me the weather is a symbol.

You will often see a townsman pause on the threshold of his office door and glance with horror at the drops of rain falling on the hard pavement; after a period of hesitation, lest one drop of

God's rainwater should fall on his urban hat, he unfurls a black umbrella, and on tiptoe and in dread hails a taxi and drives to his overheated home.

HERE, you may say, is a large bee buzzing in the bonnet ; my bonnet !

IT may be so, but let us see.

BEFORE this unkind digression, we were looking at the teeming populations in the ancient towns. Each in turn fell a prey to a more virile race, descending from the hill country and from a life in the open air. In time this race itself succumbed to the enervating influence of urban life. History was repeated. We have it in Egypt, in India, in China, in Persia, in Russia, in Italy, in Crete, in fact everywhere we look. And beneath all this rising and falling of kings and empires and cities, the village communities toiled in their fields, raised their crops, and tended their flocks and herds. They often went unmolested, and certainly were not obliterated. In many countries to-day they are living the same life as their ancestors lived in the time of the Romans and before.

I AM directly opposing town life to country life. They are poles apart. They express entirely different attitudes to life ; different methods of solving life's problem of existence. It seems to me of vast importance to realise this, and I don't think it is enough understood. The countryman is looked upon as backward and slow-witted by his more nimble-minded cousin of the city. But he is neither ; he is simply different.

WE have therefore two systems, the rural and the urban. The one tending towards stability, and, if you prefer it, stagnation ; the other pressing forward, innovating, tending towards instability and finally toppling over in complete collapse.

ENGLAND to-day is urban-minded, though possibly with less conviction than ten years ago. Nevertheless the very powerful middle-class, particularly its lower members, is solidly urban. It thinks in terms of semi-detached villas with garages ; of saloon cars and week-end motor rides along arterial roads ; of wireless ; of central heating and every other gadget for the protection of man from the weather and the horror of thinking. He is a product of the industrial age, and to me is our greatest tragedy and our greatest problem. He is responsible for the suburban development of all our towns.

IN the 18th century there was a balance which kept life fairly stable. There was a governing class, which, when it wasn't drinking and making love, was thinking and ruling. Beneath this class there was only the yeoman farmer and the cultivator of the soil. The middle class, though existing, was as yet of little importance. On the top of this carefully poised system was hurled the vast money-making machine

of the 19th century. The balance was entirely upset. There was no time for adaptation. Instead of wealth being in the hands of an educated, cultured class, it fell more and more into the hands of the hard boiled, slave-driving owners of factories. They were not the descendants of men who had been used to possessing wealth and of seeing life from a wider and more socially healthy angle. Wealth and personal possession eventually became objects in themselves. It was then that the awful "laissez faire" economic philosophy infected men's minds; that chaotic lack of system, the sole creed of which was to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest. It created in England an area as devastated as any in France during the Great War. The casualties and horrors which came in its train were infinitely worse. To-day we are faced with the appalling problem of clearing away the slums.

WISE men began to realise this. Legislation was brought in to control in some measure these predatory owners and managers. But they only nibbled at the problem. Nevertheless, we have to-day an impressive array of societies and institutes whose object is to bring order out of chaos; and control the monster.

WHEN all is said and done, the evolution of mankind, as nations and peoples, is very much the same as man's own evolution. He was the animal which, in the paradise of the Garden of Eden, ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge and was cast out into the wilderness.

CONSCIOUSNESS means choice. That is man's chance and man's peril. Man must choose his future; he must foresee. He must use his powers of analysis and synthesis to look at the facts of life whole and to plan his future existence and the surroundings for that existence. This is the planners justification.

THE Survey method we all know, is in the first place to examine the present position, to review the historic and geographical reasons for this position, *and then and only then* to formulate a plan for future guidance.

IN the foregoing pages we have briefly glanced at the position. We have followed the decline of the small village community to the point where man's invention has destroyed the conditions which threw it more or less on its own resources.

WE have seen urban civilisations totter to their fall before the swords of more virile invaders. We have watched our own particular towns spread appallingly under the mass producing system of the 19th century. We have seen qualitative work give way to quantitative production. Because of the horror of the system, we have seen certain organizations come into being to formulate activities which will

ameliorate the worst aspects of our urban existence. Before we begin to formulate our plan, we must look more closely at certain sides of our 20th century life, and take a second glance at the more familiar aspects in the evolution of man and his method of living. In the animal world, cause and effect form a most beautiful mosaic in both time and space. The shape and colour of the beast was determined by the needs of his particular case. In this way grazing animals gained their convenient necks; hunted animals their fleet limbs; predatory beasts their fearful powers, vulgarity as we know it did not exist: nor, which is of tremendous importance, but for our paper by the way, did that spiritual activity known to us as art.

PRIMITIVE man follows on much the same lines, but with a growing freedom of hand and head. The brain is freeing him from the mosaic of cause and effect; he is about to gain the power of stepping completely outside and himself watching the mosaic. But it is a slow and painful advance. In all the early products of man's hands æsthetic considerations take no part. They have arrived in precisely the same way as the stripes came to the tiger or the colour to the flowers.

THE point I am making is this, that up to a certain time the natural forces of life determined the forms which our implements, homes, and other artificial productions took. Man's houses were nests.

THE first advances were made in the realms of magic; his vivid child-like vision painted the lovely animals on the walls of his caves; his clumsy fingers cut those queer alarming figures to frighten away evil spirits. The sun, the moon and the stars threw their beam of light over the strange antics of his early imagination, and orientation became significant.

It is immensely important to realise that all peasant art, all the country beauties which we love so well, and particularly our own English villages are largely survivals of this early life. The harmony in all rural buildings is directly traceable to it. There is no question of peasant taste; it does not exist. Therefore, when by the sudden introduction of Board School education, you break down the balance between man and nature, you do nothing but damage, until you repair the loss by a complete and right education. This is a vital part of our whole problem; real education for every member of the community. Once what I have called the mosaic existence has ceased to function, that is the only way.

ON the top of this broken system, and one of the main causes of its breakdown, we have seen the creation of an industrial organization, imbued with the one object of making money in the form of large incomes and high wages. The emphasis is laid on these two aspects; a very wrong emphasis.

THE result has been, as we noted earlier in the paper, the rise of a dominant class entirely dependent on buying and selling or, in other words, exchange, and quite out of touch with creative production. Modern methods of advertisement show only too clearly the emphasis laid on salesmanship. The result has been that when the system, already top-heavy, was exposed to a primitive force, war, it tottered. The miracle is that it has not collapsed completely; that our national balance and grit has held it aloft so long, under these earthquake conditions.

OUR difficulty is to discover while so much energy is being expended in holding it up, whether to repair it, or to redesign it on an entirely new foundation. To let it fall about our ears will begin once again the weary climb from primitive beginnings; a climb which man has restarted on too many occasions as it is.

WE have shown that the gravest danger to a town civilization in the past lay in the enervation of man when he loses touch with what I symbolized in the word, *weather*; that is, natural contacts. He lives more and more on his wits and more and more in theory. Nevertheless, from these town civilizations we have gained the greatest mental and artistic successes. Almost all great thought has come from the towns. Man may have lost in physical stature, but he gained immensely in his mental and spiritual powers. But these victories were gained in days of religious intensity, or philosophical brilliance. The town will emphasize and increase, by its sharpening contacts, a hundred fold the richness of men's thoughts. It will also exaggerate beyond endurance their abundance. One day it was religious controversy, another it was luxurious humanism, to-day it is mechanical proficiency. Religion and the humanities have gone by the board; Vulgarity and ugliness are dominant. Except in the work of its noblest minds or in that of the few survivals of the old mosaic life, you can be dead certain that any product but a machine, is both vulgar and hideous. More work here for education.

THE reason for it all is simple. We have seen our natural man, the peasant, begin to disappear with the arrival of Board School education, entirely urban in outlook. Furthermore, we watched the mantle of guidance fall from the shoulders of the cultivated upper classes of the 18th century on to the less elegant backs of the money-making middle class. We followed, with the rise of this class, the rise of a machine-made age; qualitative standards fade before the utterly material standards of these people. Then we noticed a reaction. Poets had helped to discover the beauty of nature; prophets began to teach other standards than those of cheap utility. To-day there exists a vast body of thought in all classes which undertsands the evils and would see them redressed. It is to this body that we must look with hope. We now come to the core of the problem: to the principles which must guide our plan for the future.

THE first principle of all is *full consciousness* ; we must absorb the ever-increasing knowledge and apply its lessons. We must devise a system of Education which will open men's minds to the meaning of life so far as in us lies. We must be masters of our destiny. The old life of nature worked from the outside inwards ; we, free men, so we think and hope, must work from the inside outwards ; we have stepped right out of the mosaic and learnt to contemplate its beauty. Knowing this we must proceed by a process of sublimation to cull the essence from the old natural causal forces, which drive life on its upward path ; in doing so we are in harmony with evolution ; has not the totem, carved in superstitious dread, been exalted to the statue or image which in its highest form, fills us with spiritual joy ? Has not the cave man's vivid animal been raised to the glory of a Velasquez or a Rubens ? Has not the village shrine developed to the inspired splendour of the cathedral church ? In body and in spirit we are being freed and can turn in contemplation to drink our cup of consciousness to the full ; let us apply the lesson.

THEN again, the tendency towards a world unit need not frighten us ; it is immaterial for within its boundaries there will still exist races with their inheritance of memory and experience. It is for the world to disentangle its social and political problems, and give to each nation founded on this basis the chance to fulfil their highest functions in the world system. Within the nation each district must find itself, discover its true character and function. Instead of the natural, physical obstacles compelling local achievement, we want the innate local genius itself to force the pace. To achieve this we must teach our own Britain to know herself ; to gain inspiration from her past ; I want local pride and patriotism to be fully utilised as a spur to greater achievement. But, at the same time, we have got to fight this incubus of urban middle class vulgar uneducated thought and prevent it destroying before we have time to build up. How ? In the first place by dividing the country up into areas of predominantly Urban character ; and into districts of predominantly Rural character. Within these urban zones, the urban mind can have full play. Within the rural zones, the urban mind will be strictly controlled. Both methods of development are necessary ; each needs the other. But to prevent the self-destruction of the towns, the rural districts must remain rural. Rural life must be remade and carried on the back of a revived agriculture and the greatest care must be taken to foster local character, for at all costs we must prevent the destruction of quality.

ALL the time I am taking for granted that a great mass attack by the educational bodies will be carried out by all known means ; books, galleries, schools, lectures, B.B.C. museums, tours, in short, the whole host of allies which are to be had for good as well as evil.

MASS produced articles have their place in life ; in fact, for all the " drainpipe " side of our existence the machine is inevitable ; but it must cease from trying to be an artist. For all the qualitative objects which make for the beauty and the inspiration of life man and the brilliance of his brain and hands alone will suffice ; no machine will ever replace them. The vulgarity we shudder at to-day is simply the result of ignorance. Conscious taste is only given to the highly developed human being. Again we must teach, teach, teach. I think we shall find many more allies than we dreamed of. The great upheaval of the world war has at least done one good deed ; it has destroyed the smug complacency of the Edwardian times. Men's minds are being forced to face problems, of which in those comfortable days the mere suggestion would have seemed absurd.

THERE must be some hope for a country which could invent the ceremony of the pilgrimage to the tomb of the unknown warrior. The whole earth of England teems with unknown warriors ; the quality of their achievements has shaped the countryside. We must never allow their message to be lost in a welter of detached houses. So in our Rural Zones we must keep alive the quality of the past, while absorbing the benefits of to-day. Let us take the counties as our units, a perfectly modern idea. Let the counties develop their own greatness along their own characteristic lines. Let Dorset remain blue-grey, and give us mutton and milk, fine pottery and good wool ; let Somerset give us baskets, cheese and beef and lamb ; let Worcester and Kent send us fruit and Cornwall early vegetables. But much more than this ; let Dorset never forget its two noble Hardys : let Devon, need I fear this, remember her sailors ; let Somerset glow with pride as being the cradle of our church and the haven for our first real English king ; the enshrinement of such memories lifts mankind on to a higher plane. If we preserve them and what they stand for, I feel that the towns may develop with safety within their own areas, for they too have noble memories. If they succumb to the weakness of their own over-centralization, something remains to fill their place and carry on. But a complete decentralization, which would destroy both the strength of the rural life and at the same time abolish the convenience of centralization, must be prevented at all costs. My contribution therefore to the discussion on the question of large communities or small, comes to this. The tendency to spreading found in all the urban areas must be allowed to go so far and no further ; the rest must be preserved from this, by a strict rural zoning.

AT the same time, a mass attack must be made by all enlightened people to open men's minds to the reality of life ; I know no better foundation for this than the survey method as practised by this Institute.

FIRST, then, we must look at the country as a whole. Taking the map of England and Scotland, we see great areas of Urban development, conurbations, connected by arterial roads and railways and canals, and having as outlets seaside resorts, health resorts, mountain and forest reservations, and playing fields. In other words, work places, residential areas and recreational centres. All these are town planning commonplaces. That is the urban ramification. It is out of all scale with our island; it must rely on world trade for support. 32,000,000 or 80 per cent. of our population, live under these urban conditions, and form the quantitative part of the nation.

BEYOND these boundaries lies the rural countryside, more or less affected according to its position and character.

DEVON, Cornwall, Westmorland, for instance, are recreational as well as agricultural areas. Generally speaking, however, rural England is little changed, though in mortal danger of being utterly changed. And yet it is here that the real England is to be found; here where the spirit of our Saxon and Norman forefathers still pervades the scenes of their former toils and triumphs.

THE great towns are part of the world development, the great world unit, and must strive to be in the forefront of all world ideas. Though each has its peculiar characteristics, they tend increasingly to be influenced by ideas from Europe and America. It is for them to solve their problems in the light of modern scientific knowledge. They must be efficient machines for the carrying out of the business activities which brings them into existence. But the greater they grow, the more will they need the antidote of rural England. Not only as a play-ground, for they must cease to consider the countryside as so much amenity for the townsman. They will need it as a source of supply for such essential food stuffs as milk and meat, fruit and vegetables, as well as a source of supply for able-bodied men, and a reserve for mental balance. Numbers tend to breed uniformity of type and idea, all thinking tends to be superficial. A real countryman cannot be superficial.

THAT is why I say that in the rural zones all urban minded activities must be strictly controlled.

In a few counties, the county councils have carried out surveys and issued advisory planning schemes in the form of reports. But the whole method is too haphazard and piecemeal. There is no following up of these schemes with an intelligent explanation and propaganda. This is a mistake, as it is only by the creation of a keen public opinion that a real advance will be made. The skeleton of the organization is already in existence, with one vital exception. We want a Planning Commission, like the Forestry Commission or the Central Electricity

Board, to turn the schemes into a national plan. Under it the present local authorities are the natural organizations to carry out the work. All activities are under their control.

LET us now paint in the complete picture.

OUR national planning commission will draw up an advisory plan for the whole country: within the skeleton of this scheme all the regional schemes will be fitted. Within the regions, as indeed is now the practice, districts will carry out their own detailed plans, always conforming in broad outline with the major plan. The present idea of revision every three years should keep the plans active and up-to-date. At the same time, as the official surveys and plans are made, the country education authorities should help by carrying out local surveys in the parishes, and by creating in the schools tiny local museums. Everything should be made of local history. In the towns the museums can help by improving their arrangement on the lines of the Norwich museums. Slowly a public will arrive knowing and loving their country.

THIS can only be a sketch. None of the suggestions are revolutionary. The machinery exists, only the will to make full use of it is lacking.

BEFORE ending, I wish to say a word about the villages and the country towns. They are the surviving homes of the community spirit. They have not as yet been overwhelmed by urbanism. But it will strive to absorb them if we are too slow in our measures for their preservation.

RURAL England consists of parishes and rural districts, of villages and market towns. It lives by agriculture and the allied industries. We have several types of village development, the forest, the valley, the upland and so forth. The really typical English village was the manor village, with the common cultivation. It was a real community. There are still villages which depend on the manor, but with no traditional safeguards as in the middle ages and with no common lands. We need not quarrel with enclosure here, which is now the country's type of agricultural holding. But it would be a most excellent thing if village Community Councils stepped into the shoes of the old lord of the manor, where, through high taxation, he has ceased to function. Let them become a very great and useful power in the land by taking over the care of the parish in the form of councils of social service. This is very much in line with the thought of to-day. Their function would be to survey and plan the life of the area and keep a fatherly eye on all sides of the village life. They would form the most intimate unit of the national organized planning scheme. Above them the county rural community councils would have their organizations well equipped for action. They would

supplement and elaborate the work of the statutory authorities. And so with the schools and village councils working up a real planning campaign, enormous strides could be taken.

FINALLY, therefore, we say, plan nationally. Make a strict division between Urban and Rural, a division which is not arbitrary but founded on a real divergence in outlook and history. Carry out an educational campaign through the schools and parishes.

CREATE real citizens imbued with civic pride. Both the large units and the small are needed, but the one must not eat up the other. Our greatest duty is to intensify the work of surveying the life on this island, so that our national plans will the better fit our future national life.

COMMUNICATIONS.

AESTHETIC EMOTION AND ASSEMBLY EMOTION IN EDUCATION.*

EVERY side of life comes under the subject of Aesthetics, and that aspect of education involves feeling to a heightened degree. It is not entirely a matter of beauty, but goes beyond the narrow artistic sense to beauty of character and intellectual beauty. The essence of aesthetic is given by making an impression, vivid, unitary, definite, and emotional. The impression is not made by knowledge, or feeling, or volition, but by a unifying way of presentation, wherein feeling holds the image in its warm grip, and gives intimate contacts of aspects of nature, life, and art. A process which is dull or repellent, or irritating means artistic and aesthetic failure. The impression must be powerful, and thrilling, and intense; if not, the subjects are alienated.

AESTHETIC presentation must be kept distinct from two other forms of education, both important, but not in close relation to aesthetics:

- (a) The conveying of technique such as speech, writing, and various skills.
- (b) The intellectual process of thinking, and solving a problem. But if the intellectual efforts result in a great unifying view then it approaches the aesthetic.

ART and musical teaching may be looked upon from (a) the technique, how to read music, etc., (b) their history, and (c) the appreciation of them. Here the impression must be thrilling and intense, and therefore technique must be kept out, as well as any intellectual problem such as *What does it mean?* etc.

VERY high class literature cannot be dealt with by mediocre teachers under mediocre conditions, but should be presented in assemblies, not class-rooms. Some great humanistic subjects can be treated better by assembly methods, because:

1. We obtain a crowd or mass emotion, and a sense of bigness. The herd instinct or telepathy enters.
2. A few celebrations would break up the not very thrilling school year into periods divided by red-letter days, days possessing greater dignity and distinction than those devoted to class-room routine.
3. The alternation from class to celebrational work, from mass methods to group or individual methods, would be an alternation from impressional to expressional procedure and would represent a natural rhythm of the spirit.
4. The alternation would correspond to differences in teachers, and good rhetoricians, reciters, and vocalists might find hitherto unused opportunities.
5. Teachers themselves would be inspired and see fuller significances and historical relations.
6. Effective treatment can be given to great works like the book of JOB or Milton's PARADISE LOST. On account of the dignity or sublimity of many great works class-room treatment is almost impossible.

*Summary of an Address given to the Educational Circle in September, 1932.

TAKING a hint from Empire Day Celebrations we can see there is a definite case for the establishment of celebrations of five institutional units : Home, City (or Region), Country (or Nation), Empire, and League of Nations ; and later on for others on Fatherhood, Motherhood, Brotherhood, Sisterhood, and Neighbourhood. A third important group would be devoted to the great Virtues, including Temperance (Self-control) and Purity, Work and Saving, Charity and Courtesy, Consideration for Animals and for Natural Beauty, Wisdom and Truthseeking.

THE establishment of a large scheme of celebrations would be the chief means of conveying a common spiritual culture, illuminating and inspiring, to the nation, the empire and ultimately maybe (by means of " wireless ") to the world.

F. H. HAYWARD.

THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN A GENERAL EDUCATION.*

THE teaching of science in a general education should aim at giving a clear understanding of the nature of the world around us, and at the same time at inducing a habit of mind capable of looking at new facts impartially, with a sincere desire to arrive at the truth concerning them. This is quite distinct from the acquirement of detailed knowledge of any branch of science, which belongs to a later stage in education.

THE first introduction to science in the school should be gradual, and should certainly not take the form of a distinct subject. With modern school facilities, which should always include a garden, the approach should be from the side of life. The logical order of the sciences, proceeding from the inorganic to the organic world, is not the best for presentation to children.

THE pupils may begin with the study of plants, learning how they grow from direct observation. This is practicable even in a town. To learn to distinguish trees in the course of a walk, even in the leafless condition, gives an excellent training in observation. So with the common birds. Central London is rich in bird life, for those who have eyes to see. One consequence of such an approach to science is a realisation of the importance of rural life, so much undervalued in these days of mechanism and of teaching inspired by a purely urban outlook on the world.

SIMPLE natural history from books is quite allowable, and is enjoyed by almost all children, but an interest in strange and outlandish beasts should not take the place of familiarity with the common animals of the farm.

IN regard to the inorganic world, the main facts concerning the sun, moon, and stars are particularly well suited to study in the early stages of elementary science teaching. A simple telescope should form part of the equipment of every school. It is here, perhaps, that the notion of scientific law is best introduced, but the conception should be allowed to emerge gradually, and not to be forced upon the pupil.

It is at this point that a link is found with geography, now perhaps one of the subjects most satisfactorily taught in schools. Museum and country visits all play their part in making the pupil familiar with the broad outline

*Summary of a paper read at the Educational Circle in November, 1932.

of the universe. In drawing, a most important part of school work, the accurate representation of natural objects trains at once the art of scientific observation and the artistic sense.

In history, which forms the main part of Mr. Gould's scheme, stress would naturally be laid on the part played by ideas in the life of human society. The biographical method may well be employed here, provided that it is not allowed to degenerate into mere anecdote or gossip.

WITH older children some definite practical work should be introduced. Much in this way may be done by the encouragement of hobbies, as in school Natural History Societies. Before leaving the secondary school, the pupil should have a clear understanding of what is meant by scientific law. For this he must have conducted experiments, and those not merely qualitative. Some accurate measurements should have been made, and even at an early stage it should be learned that accuracy is an essential part of truth.

APPLIED science is no part of a school education. Under present conditions, most intelligent children acquire some knowledge of this by themselves. Nevertheless, some useful knowledge should be gained in the course of the school work, as to the meaning of a graph, of an average, of statistics.

C. H. DESCH.

EDUCATION IN RELATION TO WORLD CIVILISATION.*

OUR aim with regard to the Child, any child of any race, should be

- (a) to provide suitable environment so that his power shall have the greatest possible opportunity to develop,
- (b) within that environment to give him such instruction as may satisfy the normal demands of his consciousness, social and individual.

AT this stage the development of the white race is uneven and ill-proportioned, because for two centuries it has concentrated on mechanical science, and its spirit, always power-seeking, has under-estimated other than mechanical sources of human power. It has neglected to provide institutions suited to the changing conditions, and has left its soul in the Middle Ages. The condition of survival is *adaptability*, and this is overdue, especially in our present systems of education.

THE most significant changes are:

- 1. Physical distance has become a negligible factor in human affairs, resulting in
 - (a) The East and West now being neighbours and their great cultures becoming the heritage of humanity.
 - (b) A world-wide exchange of products and commodities, and consequently an international finance.
 - (c) Any vigorous national action causing strong world-wide repercussions.
 - (d) The boundaries between nations being as obsolete, inconvenient, and useless as city walls.

*Summary of a paper read at the Educational Circle in January, 1933.

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2. HUMAN modifications

- (a) Muscular power has decreased in value owing to superior mechanical power.
- (b) Dexterity, versatility, and adaptability have become more essential.
- (c) Standards of living are advancing and becoming more varied.

3. ECONOMIC changes

- (a) A decrease in the demand for labour, and consequently an increase of general leisure.
- (b) The approaching supersession of a profit-making system by a more effective distributive system.

How can Education prepare future World Citizens under these conditions, satisfy the development of social consciousness, and correct in the new generation the lack of balance evident in our own? The programme should be :

1. To abolish the present reverence for school buildings and yards. They are necessary as store rooms, museums, laboratories, craft work sheds, shelters in bad weather, but unnecessary, unhygienic and undesirable as prisons where children must sit in cramped positions.
2. To provide suitable gymnasia for all children and young persons.
3. To require that each student shall take, as part of the Training Course for Teachers, a year of individual travel, and submit a thesis on some aspect of social life observed.
4. To withdraw youth from the domain of labour, and dissociate in the mind of youth the idea of Education with that of "getting a living."
5. To provide a general synthetic course leading to self-knowledge, race-knowledge, and world-knowledge, for which the key-studies are *History* and *Biology*. History has been defined as "The cyclic poem written by Time on the memory of man" (Shelley). "The reasoned account of man's evolution on the earth" (F. S. Marvin), and "The study that reveals the normative impulses of human nature" (F. J. Gould). Nationalist and period history on intensive lines are the province of the specialist and should have no place in school. Regional geography and literature are both allied to history. Citizenship should be taught by a study of institutions and social life at home and abroad. A broadcast study of at least two languages beside the native tongue should be given, and regular letter writing to a foreign correspondent in each language undertaken. Arithmetic as a study is generally over-rated, and should be related to the practical needs of daily life. In Biology we should give an outline of the general evolution from simple to complex forms; the life cycle—birth, growth, reproduction, decay, death; that which works for health as opposed to that which tends to disease and degeneration. Links should be shown between vegetable, animal and man; parallel drawn between individual life and racial life.

A GREAT revision of popular values is necessary, but the acceleration of change in modern social life makes the Utopian ideas of to-day into the practical politics of to-morrow, and the accepted conditions of living on the third day.

HELEN CORKE.

THE "SACRED SOCIETY" IN GUERNSEY.

MISS Edith Carey (author of *THE CHANNEL ISLANDS*) sends the following note on Parts 2 and 3 of the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, 1932, from her home in St. Peter Port, Guernsey.

"As you know, the Article on 'Processes of Secularisation' interests me especially. Here we have, to a certain extent, both types of society. The 'little sacred spot' to which strangers are only admitted on sufferance; yet, within its borders, the native-born nomads, soldiers, sailors, colonisers, emigrants. Victor Hugo well said, 'La population de Guernsey est composée d'hommes qui ont passé leurs vies à faire le tour de leur champ et d'hommes qui ont passé leurs vies à faire le tour du monde.' He is quite right. Yet the latter were never deemed outcasts or degenerate by the former—on the contrary. But, when they returned to their 'sacred spot' they would as a rule revert to the old exclusiveness and 'taboos.' To the world at large, a Channel Islander is an Englishman, to another Channel Islander he is a Jerseyman, or a Guernseyman, etc. as the case may be. To another Guernseyman he is a St. Martinais, or a Vallais (or of whatever parish he may happen to be a native). I doubt whether he would acknowledge many 'sacred strangers' except perhaps a Lieutenant Governor as representing the King—his Duke.

"I THINK we may ascribe the difference to the two main types from which the Channel Islanders descend. The Breton or Celt—debonair, extravagant, superstitious, dreamy and procrastinating—apt to 'prend le plaisir pour le bonheur'; and the Norman or Scandinavian, cautious, industrious, secretive, ambitious yet prudent, obstinate, distrustful of strangers, shrewd, and with a genius for small affairs rather than for great, for economy rather than for enterprise, a conservative in politics, with a high regard for vested interests, for law, and for hereditary usage. Both types still persist, and I have met them frequently, sometimes in one family—which does not make for domestic peace and harmony!"

BOOK REVIEWS.

STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY: by Morris Ginsberg. Methuen. 1933.
(6s. net.)

A REVIEWER'S task is twofold, namely to indicate his opinion of the worth of a book, and to give some account of its contents. In the present case it is easy to fulfil the one duty, but hardly feasible in a short space to grapple with the other. Let it be said, then, roundly that this is first-rate work throughout. Every sociologist will be the better for studying it carefully, because it embodies much thought and likewise provides it. On the other hand, the matter is so diversified that to examine it in any detail here is out of the question. As, however, the problem of the scope of sociology occupies about a third of the volume, it may suffice to say a word on that topic, more especially seeing that the rest may be treated as an application to particular aspects of the subject of such principles as emerge from the general conception of it outlined at the start. It would nevertheless be unfair to Professor Ginsberg to make him responsible for what follows, since his is the eminently sane and judicious type of mind that avoids extreme opinions, and rather seeks to harmonise them by encouraging workers of all schools to carry on in the hope of eventually profiting by one another's results. I can but offer, therefore, in my own name, some conclusions suggested, if hardly authorised, by his treatment.

In the first place, then, it seems clear that sociology is science, not art, and therefore must eschew all valuation, except of course in regard to truth of fact, and all policy. Let the social worker by all means enter the temple of sociology, but let him lay down his tools outside his threshold and abandon himself for a while to heart-searching and meditation. We can study the history of a religion without accepting or rejecting it as a creed, and to do so enables us in the long run to know ourselves better, because in our human as opposed to our parochial character. In the next place, it seems no less evident that history taken at its widest—universal history, as it may be termed—must provide the material on which all sociological theory must be based. At this point arises a difficulty, because no purveyor of history, including prehistory, is content to serve up the material raw; though just in so far as he likewise submits an interpretation of it he may be accused of indulging in sociology under another name. So too the student of social anthropology may be inclined to resist Professor Ginsberg's well meaning attempt to restrict him to the study of the simpler peoples, claiming that one does not cease to be Man in becoming civilised man. As a matter of verbal convenience, however, let it be granted that the sociologist, rather than the historian or the anthropologist, is entrusted with the supreme duty of explaining human history in terms of such universal laws or general tendencies as, when purged of its accidentality, it may be presumed to reveal. For if history is to have any unity at all, it must be conceived as a social unity—a complex consisting in the inter-relations of individuals whose innate powers can be gauged by the disinterested observer only in so far as they are displayed in their mutual reactions, bodily and mental.

So far, so good; but what of the objection that a synoptic theory of human history is beyond any man's grasp? Rather, it may be said, let generalisation and comparison proceed along specialised lines of research corresponding to particular social institutions and activities of outstanding importance—natal and political association, economic organisation, government and law, religion and morality, fine art, literature and science and so on. Now, admittedly the correlation of facts is easier within one or another field so

artificially limited. But no genuine student of Man is going to be satisfied when *Homo economicus*, *Homo religiosus*, and the rest are introduced to him in a row after the style of Bradley's "ballet of bloodless categories." Now, as any anthropologist knows who has studied the culture of the simpler peoples, it is quite possible to view it as a whole both for ethnographical and for ethnological purposes. Nay, the bridgework entailed by bringing its various aspects into relation with each other—for instance, the marriage system with the law, or the religion with the fine art—is peculiarly enlightening, more especially when one tries to get past external features to the psychological forces lurking beneath. I believe, then, that every sociologist should start his training with a course of social anthropology, if only to learn how to go on to tackle civilisation in a like holistic spirit. If that does not answer in practice, I can only suggest that sociology should go into commission thereupon under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology. Let its members corporately acquire that sense of the interpenetration of all the social interests making up our present civilisation which individually they may find it hard to maintain after giving themselves up too wholeheartedly to some single branch of social investigation. Yet, even if that be the only solution of the difficulty, it can do none of us any harm to ponder on the broader and more ultimate purposes subserved by historical studies of all kinds; and, to my mind, Professor Ginsberg's book is designed to afford exactly the orientation required.

R. R. MARETT.

RACE MIXTURE: studies in Inter-marriage and Miscegenation: by Edward Byron Reuter. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., New York. (12s. 6d.)

THIS small volume, by the American author of *THE MULATTO IN THE UNITED STATES*, is dated in its preface from Honolulu, Hawaii, 1930. It is a collection of nine papers, some previously published, on civilisation and the mixture of races (1929), racial amalgamation in the United States, sex distribution in the mulatto population (1923), the legal status of racial intermarriage, colour and achievement, the superiority of the mulatto (1917), the changing status of the mulatto, the hybrid as a social type (1925), the personality of mixed bloods (1928). Each of these studies is complete in itself and presents a socially significant aspect of racial contact and intermixture; but the same general thesis runs through them all—that racial problems are sociological rather than biological. The physical differences between races, especially skin colour, are made the basis for caste distinction and differential treatment which give rise to psychological and sociological phenomena that are in no sense racial and may be understood only in social terms. This fact finds definite expression in the mixed-blood individuals who result from racial contact and association. The hybrids tend to be distinct in social position, culture status, and personality organisation; sociologically as well as racially, they are hybrid.

THE volume refers mainly to the negro population in North America, but obviously has a much wider application. The processes of migration and racial admixture are already so ancient and have been so wide-spread that there is nowadays no "pure" racial group of importance; and these processes are being more and more quickened up by the increase of transport and intercourse. The future may lessen in some ways the diversities among mankind, but that there should be a general uniformity is perhaps neither probable nor desirable. The unity of Humanity will include, even demand, diversity.

W. F. W.

HUNGER AND WORK IN A SAVAGE TRIBE : by Audrey I. Richards.
Routledge. 1932. (10s. 6d.)

DR. RICHARD'S book is a sound piece of scholarship which shows efficient training, wide reading, deep thought, and keen interpretation. It is especially valuable for the stimulus which it will give to future field-workers since it will compel them to pay proper attention to a range of facts which often escape description if they do not elude observation.

SHE commences by a critique of the term instinct. It is evident that if we mean by instinct a drive towards a general type of satisfaction in all members of the same species in a similar situation then hunger among mankind is an instinct; whereas if we hold instinct to be an identical mode of motor activity which in all members of the same species satisfies an identical desire there is no instinct of hunger among mankind. Much labour is wasted by theoretical discussions about the nature of human instincts when it is clear that an instinct is what you define it to be. Hence Dr. Richards lays stress upon the infinite variety of ways in which man satisfies his hunger. Some peoples do it by collecting wild fruits and roots, others by catching wild animals, others by domesticating plants, others by domesticating animals.

UNBURDENED by the weight of psychological interpretations of what different schools of thought mean by instinct, Dr. Richards proceeds to make a sociological study of the rôle played by nutritive needs and the activities to which they give rise in human culture. She chooses the culture area of the Southern Bantu as her field of research though any other culture area would have suited the purpose of her investigations just as well.

Now there are many different ways of describing culture since being a functioning whole any one process can theoretically be described in terms of all the others. Hence it is partly a matter of convenience from which point one starts. One may, if one pleases, make a comparative study of the human family and describe its functions, two of which are reproductive and economic functions. From this point of view one describes the family in terms of its social functions. On the other hand one may, if one chooses, make a comparative study of man's sexual and economic activities, in which case one instances the family as one of the social groups which organise these particular activities. Personally I prefer the former approach. It is clear that what we call a social group or an institution and what we call their functions are one and the same thing. Hence to explain an institution in terms of its functions is to describe its activities. Whether one considers such a description an explanation of the institution depends on the meaning one attaches to words. What is important in this place is to realise that when we say that people by acting together in social activities, such as eating together, maintain by this means the solidarity of the social unit to which they belong we are saying what can be equally expressed in other words, namely, that the social group expresses its solidarity in the communal and co-operative activities of its members. These are two aspects of a single complex whole. A social group is based on common sentiments and it is in virtue of these common sentiments that its members act together. The common sentiments of a group are formed by the mechanism of collective behaviour. The expression of a sentiment and its formation are one and the same process.

It is therefore one of the aims of Social Anthropology to describe accurately and fully what are the main types of social activity which necessitate recurrent contacts between individuals, contacts which are at the same time formative of sentiments and their mode of expression. This is where the

most important part of Dr. Richard's thesis lies. She shows how nutritive contacts and the reciprocal obligations which spring from them are among the chief ties which unite savages. For the savage is deeply interested in food and his relation to his dinner is direct. What then are the nutritive contacts of a primitive society? First of all, in the chronology of an individual's life, the mother-child contact. This contact changes from the pre-weaning period to the periods of early and later childhood and up till marriage. Marriage is another constant type of nutritive contact since husband and wife have reciprocal duties to fulfil in the production and preparation of food. The family is an eating group, or at any rate an economic group. The attitude of a child to its parents are obviously formed to a large extent by their relations to it in situations of food. The same is true of later contacts with older brothers and sisters when the child has cut adrift from its mother's apron strings and the tit-bits of the pot. In the same way it can be shown that a boy's contacts with his kin are largely concerned with economic activities since, especially among a pastoral people, the kin form an economic group and a child enters into the society of its kin in early infancy. Also the relations between chief and commoner are largely of an economic nature. Dr. Richards gives an admirable account of the wide range of nutritive contacts in primitive society and the order of their occurrence in the life history of an individual. She takes us up a mountain and shows us everything which can be seen from where we stand.

THE last part of her book is devoted to the sacralization of food. Here we think she has not done full justice to the labours of Durkheim and his school, particularly to the brilliant exposition of Radcliffe-Brown on the subject of food in primitive societies. Food being of vital importance to society becomes, like other things of social importance, the object of ritual (*e.g.* totemism). Since it is the object of ritual for all the members of a group the group expresses its solidarity by ritual enactment towards the object. A ritual meal may thus at the same time express the sacredness of food and the unity of the eaters. Dr. Richards discusses this dual process at length and examines closely the various types of situation in which food is used for sacred purposes, as in commensualism, sacrifice, food-taboos, and so on. She shows how situations in which food plays a part, a sacred part in this instance, promote the formation of social attitudes.

THROUGHOUT her book Dr. Richards sticks closely to the facts with the result that her findings always rest on a solid basis. The reviewer has only one observation—not a criticism—to make. One can regard society from innumerable view-points but it is not immaterial to ask which is the view-point that is likely to get us nearer to those generalizations about culture which sociology aims at. Personally we believe that it is by a study of social groups in their full functional context rather than by a single study of a socio-biological function in its manifestations among every different kind of social group. Suppose instead of taking the "reproductive system" or "nutritive system" as Dr. Richards has so well called them the reviewer were to write a book on the "sleeping-system." This would be a legitimate and valuable study. The first type of sleeping contact is the mother-child type (the father being excluded). The father comes back, the child being turned off the bed though allowed to share the hut, since of all sleeping-contacts the contact of marriage is the most prominent. Later sleeping-contacts change and the child forms a member of the sleeping-group of its sisters or brothers. Stress would be laid on the sleeping hospitality provided by the kindred, on the sleeping division between the sexes strengthening sex solidarity, on the importance of common habitation during initiation,

on the significance of sleeping together as the essence of courtship bonds, on the sleeping accommodation provided by the chief at his court, etc., etc. We could then pass on to note the ideology of sleep, the concept of souls (Tylor), the sociology of dreams, etc., etc. One need not elaborate the possibilities of such a subject. But though this would be an interesting approach it would not be that made by the reviewer, who is of the opinion that it would tell his readers little that they did not know before. He prefers the classical manner of approach in which a social group is taken as a functional whole and the relations of its members with one another are considered in their completeness as well as the totality of the contacts with members of other groups. Dr. Richards would be the first to admit that a consideration of the family, or kin, or age-set, or tribe, from the point of view of their nutritional functions must produce a very one-sided account, *e.g.* even in the economic sphere the kin have often other functions to perform than those directly related to food (house-building for example) while the full list of their social functions includes some which we consider of equal importance to their nutritive contacts (for example they are a vengeance group and mutual assistance group for payment of fines or of bride-wealth). The reviewer does not think that the difference between the approach he advocates and that adopted by the authoress in her book is purely a matter of words but that it very largely determines, in the immediate future, the value of Social Anthropology. Leaving this broad question on one side there can be no doubt that Dr. Richard's book performs the greatest service which a theoretical treatise can perform, namely, it compels a further range of observation in the field which will lead to a new grouping of data and a further elaboration of problems. Like Professor Malinowski he wishes he could have read her books before and not after his field-work. He would like to pay, however, his highest tribute to Dr. Richard's perspicacity by saying that the conclusions she reached, first by a book study of the data, and afterwards by field-work, are amply borne out by many pages in his unpublished note-books.

E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD.

INTERPRETATIONS, 1931-1932: by Walter Lippmann. Allen & Unwin. 1933. (10s. 6d.)

MR. LIPPMANN is the editor of the NEW YORK WORLD and these articles appeared in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE. They form a critical record of the events of 1931 and 1932, crystallising and explaining much of the immediate past which is bewildering to the man in the street: written vividly and fearlessly, they foreshadowed many events which later came to pass, and they are never dull.

MOST of them deal with American subjects, from economics and Mayor Walker to the Bonus Marchers and the nomination of President Roosevelt. While the country was lethargically waiting for the prosperity of 1929 to be automatically restored, Mr. Lippmann's must have been the one small voice declaiming the necessity of a balanced budget and of a national programme to come to grips with the depression; that the United States are not self-contained and must adjust themselves to their new position of a creditor nation. In Europe the author sees the need of Franco-British entente and of the removal of the Polish Corridor with its ever smouldering menace to peace. He pays high tribute to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Coming to London in March of last year, he was struck by the "general bullishness" of England in contrast to the pessimism of the Continent, and he estimates that "Great Britain has resumed its ancient position among the powers of Europe."

A. H.

FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION: by
R. R. Marett. Oxford University Press, 1932. (10s. net).

IF the Gifford Lecturer for 1931-2 carries his learning lightly, neither those who were privileged to sit at his feet at the University of St. Andrews nor those who read the lectures in the volume before us can be in any doubt concerning the scholarship that lies behind the light and sometimes humorous form of presentation. As would be expected, Dr. Marett has chosen for his subject certain aspects of social anthropology, and in developing his theme he has displayed a philosophical and psychological insight into the profounder meanings and values of primitive ritual, custom and belief which on the surface might appear as merely crude modes of thought and behaviour.

HAPPILY it is now becoming widely recognised by anthropologists that the ways and ideas of the "folk" in all ages and cultures are pregnant with a far deeper significance than was at one time realised, since within their proper context the institutions of primitive society are the means by which the group satisfies its wants and masters its environment. Every custom and idea, like every material object of human design, has some definite function to fulfil within the integral system of culture of which it constitutes an indispensable part. Thus, as another worker (Dr. Malinowski) in this field of research has demonstrated in a study of "Sex and Repression in Savage Society," the type of desires and day dreaming expressed in mythology are correlated to the social structure of kinship. Therefore, myth in primitive psychology cannot be treated as typically aetiological or explanatory in its aim. In this connexion Dr. Marett aptly remarks, "if one is expected to 'swap one coin' of scholarly mintage for another, myth as assessed by its real function might be termed not aetiological but fidejussive. Its business is not to satisfy curiosity but to confirm the faith. It is there to cater, not for the speculative man with his 'Why?' but for the practical man with 'How if not thus?'"

MYTHS are not called into being by the exercise of reasoning powers so much as by appealing, through the imagination, to the affective dispositions of the mind, expressing in concrete and intellectual terms certain abstract ideas, happenings and customs, not by way of explanation but in order to strengthen and confirm what is already accepted and believed. Mythology, therefore, has a sociological function to fulfil since it maintains the established order by referring the sanctions of the tribe to a supernatural authority universally recognised and which cannot be changed. "It was so in the Alcheringa." If this reign of custom makes for a static society, it also produces a social solidarity, and closely knit kinship which may well be the envy of more progressive cultures. The tribal elder presides over a social system which is Church, State and University in one, and "speaking as one don to another," the Rector of Exeter, "would congratulate the primitive gerontocrat on the general adequacy of his curriculum regarded as an organ of educational mass-production."

SIMILARLY, the religious complex, analysed in the opening chapter of this volume, is shown to consist in a triple function of thought, action and feeling, the efficacy of which lies not in the intellectual sphere, for savage thought is at a low level, nor indeed in the domain of ritualistic activity, though "in primitive ritual the tune counts for a great deal more than the words," but in the ambivalent *mana* which gives power, significance and reality to what is

done. "Neither to know, nor to do, but to feel that he can do is the deepest aspiration of the savage. He seeks from cult neither truth nor works so much as a sense of power," and this it is the purpose of *mana* to supply from within, and not from without.

ON this hypothesis, gods start as portions of the ritual apparatus, and passive agents of the will of the operator, but as they increase in personality, they "symbolise in concrete shape that conditionality which the religious man comes more and more to feel in his efforts to adjust himself to his universe by means of rites." Thus the truth of religious symbolism lies not in what it says, for it speaks darkly, but in what it makes a man feel, namely, that his heart is strong. Consequently, it gives him hope which in its turn leads to the faith that moves mountains, and thereby overcomes the fear that otherwise might sap the streams of vitality at their source. But fear being secondary to hope, if equally fundamental in religion, introduces an element of caution, and stimulates good living (purity and humility) by exerting a chastening force directly helpful to the good life. When it finds an outlet in black magic it becomes an enemy to strenuous living, and in consequence the dabbler in the black arts is regarded as an enemy of society and a performer of illicit rites.

THE horror of incest, again, is very deeply laid in the primitive mind, and Dr. Marett's treatment of this aspect of his subject in the chapter on Lust will repay careful consideration by psychologists and sociologists as well as by social anthropologists. The function of woman as the source of generation in the maintenance of peace and purity in the "mother kin" is skilfully worked out, and some very shrewd thrusts are made not without effect at the weaker points in the Freudian armour. In the final chapter the question of woman as the peace-maker is further discussed, this time in relation to the parental instinct. "The mother, who is essential woman, is at once holy and unclean," and being pre-eminently tabu and having *mana* in like proportion, "she was in a strong position to exert a will of her own." Her will being for peace in the home, she plays the part of the peace-maker "within her own fire-circle." Brotherhoods, in fact, are but "enlarged motherhoods," and behind the inviolability of the law against shedding kinly blood is a mother's curse.

BETWEEN Faith and Charity there are three fundamental emotions—Conscience, Curiosity, and Admiration—which are fraught with evil to humanity unless they can be turned to social and spiritual ends. Therefore, in primitive society they are brought under the discipline of religion and tribal morality, so that by an organised ritual of penance, pardon and rehabilitation, the moral sense is educated and made to bear a fuller social witness. Similarly, the vigorous training of initiation is not without its significance as a moral discipline, while participation in a mystery ritual is a means of keeping truth alive. "Prefiguration is the only language of hope and faith; so that every true visionary, civilised or savage, takes liberties with the actual in order to provide the soul of his dream with some sort of picturable body."

SOCIAL anthropology is a human science, and never has the philosophy of primitive life and culture been treated in a more delightfully human manner than in these pages. It is with hope, the evidence of things not seen, that we look forward in faith to the completion of these remarkable Gifford Lectures.

E. O. JAMES.

GENETIC PRINCIPLES IN MEDICINE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: by Launcelot Hogben, M.A., D.Sc. Williams & Norgate. 1931. (15s. net.)

THIS is one of the most important recent books dealing with the foundations which Biology has laid and is laying for Sociology. It is indispensable for those who are developing Sociology as an analytical and evolutionary science; and it is one of the first fruits of Professor Hogben's professorship of Social Biology in the University of London.

To those who believe that the danger of our present sea of troubles is largely due to the fact that they are still so far from being charted, this able book will be very welcome; and very useful it should be to students who are patient. If success in the domain of things, *e.g.*, utilising the resources of physical nature, and in the realm of organisms, *e.g.*, securing a healthier race, depends on the application of sound science to all bio-social problems in an all-round way, it is to be recognised that the escape from our world-wide troubles is *more Sociology*. The people perish for lack of knowledge, and we put the blame on some mysterious "crisis." The fact is that the evolution of social organisation has outrun our understanding of it; our social car has become so huge, so complex, so intricate, and so subtle, that we cannot drive it with efficiency, let alone safety. We are not educated up to the level of our social car; and the power of control depends on the power of understanding. We need more sociology. Professor Hogben will help us.

It is not merely that we know too little in regard to the science of sociology; another source of fallacy is that we are apt to think that we know much more than we do. Thus the science of human heredity, which has been so much discussed in recent years, is still a very young and tentative science; thus again the modern methods, say genetic and statistical, are still very unfamiliar to many; and again the process of evolution, which goes on in some measure—up or down—however man controls or misunderstands it, has raised many new problems in the last generation. Think only of what has followed from the annihilation of distance.

VERY important, as the author shows, is the utilisation of biological conclusions towards a clearer understanding of social problems; for we need the most and the best that the biologists can tell us, for instance, in regard to organisms, functionings, and environments, corresponding obviously to the sociological co-ordinates of Le Play—Folk, Work, and Place. On the other hand, to many of us Sociology is the science of the nature, continuance, and evolution of Human Society, just as Biology is the science of the nature, continuance, and evolution of Organic Life. There is a specificity and autonomy which cannot be left out of consideration in Sociology without fundamental fallacy. Thus to take one instance, the "Social Heritage" in Galton's phrase, is in the Kingdom of Man, even more distinctive than the "Natural Inheritance" of the component men and women.

THE contents of Professor Hogben's book, more constructive and less polemical than usual, are the following:—(I.) The Problem of Twin Resemblance; (II.) Single Gene Substitution in Human Pathology; (III.) The Serological Data for the Study of Gene Localisation; (IV.) The Genetic Basis of Social Behaviours; (V.) The Concept of Race; (VI.) The Nature of Genetic Selection in the Social Group; (VII.) The Growth of Human Population; and (VIII.) The Social Application of Genetic Principles. These are self-contained chapters, prolegomena to a scientific sociology. They require some patience on the reader's part, but they show a master-hand throughout, and they are very rewarding. We cannot review them in a critical sense, but we would put them next to Dr. Fisher's GENETICAL THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION to indicate our estimate of their outstanding merit.

J.A.T.

THE REORGANISATION OF EDUCATION IN CHINA: by the League of Nations' Mission of Educational Experts. Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, Paris, 1932.

SOMETHING does not tally. Are the generally accepted definitions for the word "Education" at fault, or have the gentlemen of the Mission mistaken the husk for the kernel? These gentlemen were deputed by the League of Nations, at the request of the Chinese Government, "to visit China for the purpose of studying the present situation in regard to public education and the long traditions of culture peculiar to the ancient civilisation of China, and with a view to submitting recommendations on the most suitable procedure to be adopted to ensure a better adaptation of this educational system to present-day conditions of life."

THE purpose of this visit seems thus clearly expressed: public education, that is "the means of making our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil"* is to be examined and reported upon, especially in its connection with the long traditions of culture peculiar to ancient China. The Chinese themselves define "education" in two monosyllables: *li jên* "to establish or set up a human being."

BUT what do we find in the Report? We find that the Mission spent three months in China, during which period it visited the schools and universities of Mid and North China. We find that it reports, with meticulous care, on *systems of instruction*, and methods of administration which it found in use. Doubtless many of its recommendations will be of great service to the Chinese Educational Board, but of *the matter forming the basis of Education* there is hardly a word. The ancient civilisation of China receives short shrift; on page 24 we read "The old Chinese traditions are rightly considered out of date. Most of the springs of China's high civilisation have run dry." Half a page is then devoted to deprecating this sad state of affairs, but no analysis is made of these "old traditions," many of which might, with benefit, be revived. Moreover these were far more than "traditions" in the usual sense of the word. They were a series of ethical pronouncements woven into a system which, in the opinion of Meadows,† was mainly responsible for the longevity of the Chinese Empire. It is in fact more than doubtful whether, with the abolition of this system promulgated as it was by a remarkable written "Esperanto," the State can preserve its entity, or Chinese culture its unity. The gentlemen of the Mission have no fears on this point (p. 43), but no serious student of Chinese history can fail to recognise, in the complete collapse of ancient ideals, a destructive force threatening the existence of the State.

AND are these "old traditions," these ancient ideals, so "out of date"? One at least serves as a basic principle in the League of Nations itself. It was expressed by Confucius in the ANALECTS Book (XII., Chapter 5): "within the Four Seas (*i.e.*, the world) all are younger brothers and elder brothers." The words of Confucius it must be remembered provided the foundations of Chinese teaching.

TO-DAY this foundation is provided, to a great extent, by the words of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and the propaganda of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. The teaching of to-day is therefore violently anti-everything-non-Chinese, and is calculated to foment inter-racial animosities to a dangerous extent.

*ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY: by Richard Hooker, 1593.

†THE CHINESE AND THEIR REBELLIONS: by Thomas Taylor Meadows, 1856. This is by far the best and most appreciative analysis of Chinese civilisation that I know.—F.A.

IN Mr. Justice Feetham's REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT IN SHANGHAI, Part V., MAIN QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE SETTLEMENT, p. 206 we read :

" [in] control of the Council's schools, and of any scheme for grants of assistance to private schools [it must be undertaken] that the teaching of the schools concerned shall not be in any way directed to the promotion of international or inter-racial animosities. In view of the character of the textbooks which have been in use in some schools, such a stipulation cannot be regarded as superfluous."

IN the TIMES, 19th January, 1932, quotations from some of the textbooks are given. For instance in the NEW CHINESE COMMON SENSE READERS (for Lower Grades) appears the following exposition of banking :

The foreign banks in China issue banknotes and the Chinese have complete faith in them. They simply print hundreds of thousands of pieces of paper and exchange them for so many coins of ours. Is not this kind of loss great ?

THE only thing they undertake is the little labour in the accounting department ; and they make the profit from the Chinese by the Chinese capital. In one item of banking alone the money they make in China is about \$100,000,000 per annum.

BESIDES this, they annually plunder from us \$400,000,000 to \$500,000,000 in the names of land-tax, land assessment or various other taxes ;

and so on *ad infinitum*. In the NATIONAL HUMILIATION READERS various dramas designed to show the perfidy of foreigners are printed, and children are also taught Songs of the *Three Peoples Principles* as :

The flags of Imperialism that are brutally dyed with innocent blood are waving.

The barbarous troops like wild beasts are roaring round my ears.

They butchered my beloved brothers, they murdered my dear uncles.

Hot-blooded and high-souled brethren ! Set your goal, clearly and quick !

SUCH teaching under the old system is unimaginable ! It is indeed not too much to say that no single factor in the world to-day is a greater potential menace to the cause of World Peace than is much of the "education" given in China. It is obviously impossible for Tom, Dick, or Harry to approach the Chinese Government and find fault with their methods. But surely when a Mission of "Educational Experts" is invited by this same Government to visit China and give advice, might their Report not contain some mention of this all important subject ?

It may be objected that I have not reviewed the book under consideration. The objection is valid. Were the title other than it is ; were it, for instance, THE REORGANISATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION IN CHINA nothing but good could be said of the volume. Professor Gilbert Murray himself, Chairman of the Body which despatched the Mission, writes on 13th February, 1933, to THE TIMES and states that the book has met with hardly any "serious criticism." He seems indeed very happy about the whole undertaking.

THE Members of the Mission give the Chinese Government much good advice ; they harp upon the desirability of a system evolved from indigenous roots, not one imported from abroad ; they admire what has been done under the adverse conditions of late decades, and they write with encouragement of the future. But is this not a discussion of the husk ? With regard to the kernel, "education" : "the means to make our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil"—there is silence.

FLORENCE AYS COUGH.

SOCIAL DECAY AND EUGENICAL REFORM : by F. C. S. Schiller.
Constable & Co. 1932. (6s. net.)

DR. SCHILLER is a whole-hearted eugenisist. Looking out on the world, he sees in most countries a population above its optimum density, in which the upper ranks fail to maintain their numbers, so that successive generations are recruited more and more from the lower. Intermixture of ranks causes deterioration of the best, no society having as yet learned the art of preserving its best elements. Like many other students of social affairs, he views with alarm the growth of machines, noting that along with their growth goes an increasing inability of the men in charge of them to control them. He sees also how social welfare work tends to preserve the unfit, and how feeble-minded, more dangerous to society than the actual insane, steadily increase in numbers, bringing about by their intermixture a wholesale deterioration. In the present work he is less concerned with checks on the multiplication of the unfit than with the positive encouragement of the best elements in society, that is, with positive eugenics. One redeeming feature is, however, noted in passing. The voluntary restriction of families may be expected to increase, but as a firm believer in inherited qualities, Dr. Schiller believes that women with strong maternal instincts will transmit those instincts to their daughters, so providing some check to the progressive decline of the classes possessing high intelligence.

THE principal suggestion for positive reform made by the author is the revival of the importance of the clan or gens. Pride of family should be encouraged on moral grounds. A scheme for the improvement of the peerage is outlined, according to which a peerage bestowed on one who has rendered great services to the country should pass to the family rather than to the individual, so that on the death of the first holder the children and grandchildren would elect their most worthy member as his successor. Fall below a high standard would involve the lapsing or even withdrawal of the peerage. The House of Lords consisting of such a real aristocracy, reinforced by representatives of the universities and other bodies, would become a true senate, the House of Commons—which the author evidently regards as past hope—being left as a talking shop shorn of much of its power. One simple reform suggested would seem to be both practicable and desirable, namely, that ministers should be free, as in other countries, to address either House.

A FURTHER suggestion is more fantastic. Let children of approved parentage and robust health be selected at a glorified baby show and brought up under carefully regulated conditions with the object of furnishing a class of distinguished men ready made. The selected children would be kept conscious of their high destiny, and would be expected to act in accordance with it. One has a vision of a class of insufferable prigs, with an occasional scandal when a child showing originality is provoked by feelings of reaction to some act of independence, but Dr. Schiller has no such qualms, and boldly develops his scheme. He lays much stress on the segregation of the most brilliant pupils from the common herd, but it must be the experience of most teachers that the presence of a few gifted pupils in a class raises the whole level, so that probably as much would be lost as gained by such a plan.

THE author is interesting and stimulating throughout, as well as provocative. His schemes for dealing with plutocracy are suggestive. He anticipates little help from the intelligentsia, the people interested in ideas, who are inclined to approve of liberty and to scoff at practical eugenics. Strangely

enough, he regards journalists as the most typical of this class. The members of the intelligentsia are said to be urban in their habitat and to dislike athletics, and thus to stand outside of the author's superior class. But do not Leslie Stephen and the horde of literary and scientific mountain climbers belong to the men interested in ideas, and more typically so than the journalists? Men of science he distrusts on account of their habitual caution, and clerics from long tradition of conservatism. He looks to doctors and teachers as the most likely adherents of a policy of positive eugenics, and looks to them to carry out a campaign in its favour.

THOSE of us who have less faith than Dr. Schiller in deliberate selective breeding may not take such a gloomy outlook, and may console ourselves with the thought that exceptional men do arise from seemingly unfavourable origins. The name of Faraday has been much in the public mind during the last twelve months, and one Faraday is of greater value to the world than a host of specially selected young men, brought up from infancy to regard themselves as superior to their neighbours. The author, however, preaches his gospel with such force and brilliancy that no student of social questions should fail to study his views.

C. H. D.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA: edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, M.A., L.L.D. Harrap. 1931. (8s. 6d.)

THE essays which form this book were delivered as lectures at King's College. Five of them—The Theorists of the American Revolution, by Professor McElroy; the Early English Radicals, by Professor G. S. Veitch; The Revolutionary Era in France, by Professor Holland Rose; The Socialist Tradition in the French Revolution, by Professor Harold Laski; and The German Thinkers of the Revolutionary Era, by Professor H. G. Atkins—are general in their survey of the period: but the other four are short appraisals—of Burke by the Editor; of William Godwin by Mr. C. H. Driver; of Jeremy Bentham by Professor J. W. Allen, and of Thomas Paine by the Rev. Dr. Norman Sykes.

If the key to the present lies in the past, these articles should be of special interest to-day, when Europe appears to be fast liquidating much of her political heritage. They deal with the years which saw the American and French Revolutions and during which industrialism was beginning to change the world. These three upheavals produced fresh problems and fresh doctrines. Men learnt that they were all equal, and clamoured for equal rights; that they were free, and proceeded to overthrow their tyrants; that they were brothers, and must help each other. Many of the ideas were legacies of the past: others belonged to the present and the future. Paine, with his suggestions for social services and for the disarmament of nations; Alexander Hamilton, with his outline of a British Commonwealth of Nations; Godwin, denouncing evils which still exist—all sound surprisingly topical.

PERHAPS the most attractive of the thinkers is Burke—the only Conservative and the only one who combined practice with theory. Perhaps it is because he was a practical politician that "the rapid progress of the world along the course which Burke with prophetic prescience foresaw . . . makes it every day increasingly evident that he still has a message to deliver of primary significance to modern man."

A.H.

L. T. HOBHOUSE, HIS LIFE AND WORK: by J. A. Hobson and Morris Ginsberg. Allen and Unwin, 1931. (12s. 6d. net.)

THIS is an excellent memoir of the life and work of the social philosopher, university teacher, Liberal journalist and experienced Chairman of Trade Boards, the late L. T. Hobhouse (1864—1928), Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London. The biographical part is written by his friend, the well-known expert, J. A. Hobson, and the exposition of his philosophical work by his distinguished pupil and successor, Professor Morris Ginsberg. The work also contains a valuable and interesting selection from his essays and articles—mainly from the *MANCHESTER GUARDIAN*,—written in white heat during the Great War. The first and longest of these selections "The Problem" is of particular value and interest as giving Hobhouse's view of the cardinal factors needing consideration in post-war reconstruction.

THE nobility of Hobhouse's character, the impressiveness of his personality, and the breadth and solidity of his studies well deserve the tribute of such a volume, which is also of great value not only as a help to the understanding of a distinguished and deeply humane scholar and practical social mediator, but also and even more as a stimulus to lucid thinking and to well-considered social action.

THREE particular points are selected here for comment, not as bulking importantly in this account of his life and work, but for their own intrinsic interest.

THE first is (despite a charming essay on "The Artistic Fallacy") a conspicuous absence of any solid contribution by Hobhouse to aesthetics, whose cardinal function he appears to have misunderstood and underestimated (p. 151, and p. 172). The prime strength of Hobhouse, as of most English philosophers, lay in ethics—in his case intimately bound up with politics.

THIS leads to our second point—the question how far his strong Liberal bias (we should not, however, call him a party politician) was an advantage, and how far a disadvantage, to his strictly sociological studies. To make due allowance for strong political feelings in scientific research in sociology is as the history of that complex science clearly manifests) a duty hard to fulfil. Was it this Liberal bias that led to the divergence of view as to the conduct and contents of the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, of which Hobhouse acted for some time as Editor? (p. 46.)

REMEMBERING the foregoing perhaps we ought not to be surprised—though, in truth, we are—that in this memoir, so far as we can find neither the late Professor Sir Patrick Geddes, that eminent sociologist of world-wide fame, nor his loyal co-adjutor, the late Victor Branford are mentioned. Yet the latter was initiator and founder of the Sociological Society (now developed into the Institute of Sociology) and of the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* as its organ—both early in the century—and it was Branford also with Geddes who moved the late Dundee manufacturer, James Martin White, to found and finance the two chairs of Sociology in the University of London.

THE memoir gives no indication that this distinguished first holder (with Westermarck) of a Martin White Chair, understood, or was influenced by the remarkable scientific contributions to Sociology of either of the two above-named investigators though they and Hobhouse co-operated together for a considerable period. Does not this suggest a failure involving a great loss to the advancement of the science?

FINALLY—and this is our third point—the writers of this Memoir are to be congratulated upon the delicate and admirable way in which is portrayed for us the intimate, and profound and excellent influence exerted upon Hobhouse and every part of his work over the long period of thirty-five years, by a peculiarly happy and fruitful marriage-union.

THE book contains a speaking likeness as frontispiece, a bibliography of Hobhouse's principal works, and an index. The type and paper are good.

B.B.

CORNER OF ENGLAND: by John Martin. Williams & Norgate.
1932. (4s. net.)

THE "corner of England," with which this book deals, is the unattractive district in South London which one sees when leaving London Bridge Station—unattractive, that is, to the ordinary eye, but full of interest to the author of this thoughtful and sympathetic study of the people and their conditions; and he would be a dull reader who did not find his own interest acutely stirred by the description of the life of the district and the discussion of its social problems. To one who knew the neighbourhood intimately forty years ago, as the present reviewer did, the picture painted by Mr. Martin, with all its drabness of tone, is one to hearten and encourage. It reveals the tenacity of the deep social instincts of the people in the face of disintegrating factors which might well have obliterated them, and it also shows that in various directions there have been changes of a genuinely constructive character. That some of the developments are introducing fresh dangers and problems Mr. Martin would be the first to agree—indeed, the interest of his pages consists very largely in the discussion of these dangers and problems—but he sees clearly the elements of hope and progress in the newer social features, disturbing and menacing though some of them may be.

Mr. Martin has the perfect touch for presenting a social survey—no prejudices, wide sympathies, a sense of proportion, a keen eye for facts, and the insight which sees the significance of these facts both for the people of the particular district and for the greater world which contains so many districts of the same kind. In dealing with the social features of his "corner," the author succeeds in keeping alive the sense that it is men and women who are his subject-matter, and not mere forces and tendencies and functions. Nevertheless, he discusses with penetration and judgment all the "subjects" which the concrete lives of the people bring into the mind of the philosophical observer. Among them are birth-control (which constitutes, Mr. Martin thinks, the most significant single alteration in the habits and customs of the people during the last fifteen years), diminution of drunkenness, changing attitude towards marriage, success and defects of education, social services as an element in real wages, over-crowding, working-class politics, decay of formal religion, gambling (rampant, but not so ruinous as drink was), drifts towards and away from crime, class and colour consciousness, unemployment and unemployment insurance, industrial unrest, the reaction of machine industry on democracy, and the place of leadership in the modern social structure. The discussion of these subjects against a background of local knowledge and observation, of extraordinary completeness, makes this book one of outstanding value.

A. J. W.

WORLD AGRICULTURE—AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY: by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press. 1932. (12s. 6d.)

THIS report, which we are told was mainly drafted by Miss Margaret Bryant and Miss Doreen Warriner, supervised by a committee of which Viscount Astor was chairman, is a most valuable work, well documented, authoritative and lucid. Its main purpose is to ascertain and explain the causes of the crushing depression which afflicts agriculture all over the world, and thereby provide the basis for remedial policy. Since roughly about two-thirds of the world's workers are occupied in agricultural and kindred occupations, that depression amounts to a world calamity of far greater magnitude than we who live in an over-industrialised island can readily realise.

THE facile guess which finds the explanation of the agricultural crisis in over-production is shown to be a delusion, except in the case of certain special products in which excessive production has been fostered by governmental action as a part of national policy, as in the case of beet sugar, or by mistaken efforts to maintain prices, as in the cases of cotton, rubber and coffee. Even in wheat, the increase of output in post-war years has been less than the normal increase of world demand judged by pre-war experience, and broadly what agricultural workers over the whole field have done has been simply to increase the supplies of foodstuffs and textile raw materials in due proportion to the needs of the world's increasing population. It follows that the main and fundamental causes of the slump in prices have to be looked for on the monetary side of the price ratio; in other words, that it is due to the frenzied deflation of currencies and credit, following upon equally frenzied, but more pardonable, inflation, wherewith the world's bankers and financiers, an aurolatrous folk, have afflicted humanity. The Golden Calf has added that sin more to its record.

THE twentieth century has seen a great advance in agricultural science, and a considerable quickening in the progress of agricultural efficiency, achievements which *should* ensure all-round prosperity. The main lines of progress have been three. First, for various purposes, especially for cereal production, there have been great advances in labour-saving machinery; thus, for example, the combine harvester, of which America had 37,000 in use by 1929, enables two men to cut, thresh, winnow and bag the grain of fifty acres per day of wheat of the average American yield. Such inventions increase the net, and not the gross output; they enable the country to feed the town more amply, but they also drive workers off the farms to work in the towns, if there they can find work to do. Next, we note such achievements in plant breeding as those which have produced the new Canadian wheats, which have added, in Canada alone, something like a hundred million acres to the world's potential wheat-fields, and the new Australian wheats which have made wheat-growing possible in even greater areas of arid country. In the third place, we may group together other achievements in plant and animal breeding, and in combating plant and animal diseases, which neither displace labour, nor greatly increase the area under cultivation, but which enable peasants and farmers to increase the quantity and improve the quality of their crops. This is the story set forth in adequately full summary in the first part of the work under notice. The second part deals with the agricultural policies of governments and their underlying motives, both in relation to normal conditions, and in order to meet the existing crisis. Three types of policy are noted; those followed by capitalist states with commercialised agriculture, that of Soviet

Russia, and, in contrast to both, the aims of the peasant states of central and eastern Europe to secure to the bulk of the population the highest possible standard of living and the greatest possible gross income, and to create a society neither capitalist nor communist.

WE note one curious blunder, where the authors touch upon the past history of our own country and say: "In Great Britain . . . it was the industrial revolution which extinguished the peasant by necessitating a hasty transition to commercialised agriculture, and, therefore, the consolidation of holdings, the provision of capital, and large-scale ownership." Actually, that transition was a slow process, and it preceded and prepared the way for the industrial revolution, instead of resulting from it.

G. S.

SMALL-TOWN STUFF: by Albert Blumenthal. University of Chicago Press. Cambridge University Press. 1932. (22s. net.)

WHAT are the limits of the field of the Social Survey? Can it hope to extend its scope beyond the history and formal organisation of community life on which it has so far tended to concentrate, and to enter into the province of thought and feeling which is usually regarded as properly belonging to fiction? Mr. Blumenthal has attempted to do this and has chosen the small town as offering an exceptionally advantageous point of attack. In it, customary modes of thought and feeling are more widely prevalent than in larger units of society; the individual at once stands out more distinctly from the network of community life and is more deeply influenced by the quality of his social environment, which indeed affects his reactions not at one or two points only, but to almost all his circumstances and activities.

Mr. Blumenthal has rightly emphasised the importance of traditional standards of judgment and thought in the community and of the force of public opinion in a society small enough to allow of personal relationships of varying degrees of intimacy between almost all the members. Thus he devotes separate chapters to the citizens' attitude to their town, the intimacy of their knowledge of one another and their standards of personal judgment, to the extent and influence of gossip, as well as to family life and standards, the associations and interests of the children and youth of the town, local politics and the more organised groupings for educational, social and religious purposes.

THE book bears the marks of patient and unbiassed research and of an intimate knowledge possible only to the resident member of the community, of customary levels of conversation, social relationships and standards of values. Is it due to Mr. Blumenthal or the nature of the community he describes, or to a necessary limitation of a scientific social study that it contains little or no suggestion of the dynamic force of the deeper emotions and aspirations of the human spirit? **SMALL-TOWN STUFF** takes us a stage further into the understanding of community life than does the survey which regards as its main subject the organisation, activities and membership of social institutions, in that it attempts a qualitative study of social relationships. It is unsatisfying as a picture of "the total drama" of the life of a society, to portray which is said to be its aim in the Editor's Preface. Must the sociologist then give way to the novelist or prophet or poet when he reaches a certain point in his study of human relationships, or has he to find the technique to enable him to extend his field to the ultimate places of the spirit? It is an important question for sociology.

H. J.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

METHODS OF SOCIAL STUDY: by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.
Longmans, 1932. (8s. 6d. net.)

IN the field of social study in Great Britain there are few better known names than those of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Now after 45 years of investigation into social institutions the authors have published an account of their own experiences and methods in the course of their enquiries into human groupings and relationships. They ignore none of the influences of geography, climate, tradition and custom which form the "social atmosphere in which every man grows up, and in which, all unconscious of its weight, he lives and moves, and his contemporaneous social institutions have their being." Perhaps the first impression made by their book on the less practised social student is one of respect for their immense thoroughness and honesty, and of pleasure at the zest with which they consistently seek for significant facts among the most prosaic documents, through long sittings at dreary meetings, or in their own study, where they shuffle and reshuffle their countless slips of paper till all are checked and correlated. Who could help enjoying the picture of the two students "playing with a sheaf of notes" in their "game with reality," building up and knocking down hypotheses, and occasionally enjoying the "stimulating recreation" of "backing" rival ones. The authentic joy of the scholar shines out from the description of the search for the "common form" with which the records are filled; the interest in social structure ever enlightened by the exciting chase after the human factor; the emergence of leaders and motives; the side lights on other sources of information. Nor is the picture which the students reconstruct with so much happy labour a static one, but rather in its broad sweep it brings to light the hidden forces which continue to shape and reshape the mass; beneath the intense activity of the craftsman run the "more tranquil and deeper currents of philosophic brooding," seeking ever to discover whether ethical values are indeed arising out of the secular movements of successive social expediences, whether morality is actually part of the nature of things.

THE technique of social study as seen and practised by the authors is indeed of subsidiary importance as compared with grace and strength of character. Humility, patience, courtesy, imagination and above all the open mind are the most important qualifications for the social investigator. In so far as he or she possesses these qualities, the door is open for him to enter into the "joy of life" to be found in sociological research.

THE book commences with an attempt to determine the province of sociology and to classify social relationships according to their origins in animal instinct, religious emotion, humanistic principles or deliberate planning. It ends with a chapter on the relation of science to the purpose of life. Here instances are given to prove that an applied science of society is possible at least in the fourth sphere of deliberate planning of the social structure. On the other hand, the authors are conscious of the limitations of sociology, which as a science, they suggest, deals only in its generalisations and predictions with "that strange abstraction, the average human being," and not with "the exceptional, the peculiar characteristics of the individual man, and the manner of his influence," which "are at present, and possibly always will be, outside the scope of a science of society." A second limitation is suggested in that science "deals only with processes" and not with the purpose of life. "Is man's capacity for scientific discovery the only faculty required for the reorganisation of society according to an ideal? Or do we need religion as well as science, emotional faith as well as intellectual curiosity?" It is in the implications of this question that some students of sociology may part company with the Webbs. Are the feelings in the

individual or the social consciousness which are the ultimate guides to the use of discovered powers indeed unaffected by science, or is the latter to be so clearly distinguished from emotion, art or religion as is here implied? There are passages in this book which suggest that even the authors themselves have not always found this to be so in their experience. H. J.

DOES HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF? by R. E. McWilliams. Dent. 1932. (3s. 6d.)

HEGEL has said that the only thing we learn from history is that men never do learn from history. And so history repeats itself.

MR. McWILLIAMS attempts to rid our minds of such fatalism by facing up to the facts both of past experiences and present conditions. He looks back a century and finds in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars a close parallel with political, social and economic circumstances to-day. The similarity is so amazing that one is forced to ask whether the outcome of our present difficulties will be a repetition of the horrors of the post-war period a hundred years ago. Two questions thus arise:

- (1) If history repeats itself, what will happen?
- (2) By what means can the course of history be diverted to the general good?

THE 1914 war was not more momentous than that which closed in 1815. In effects they are much the same. For Prussia in 1815, "the new and relatively poor power seeking to enlarge its territory and strengthen its position," we are to read Italy in 1918: for Castlereagh, holding the balance between the nations in 1815, we substitute Lloyd George in 1918: for the policy of Metternich, with its "realism" and guarantees, we have Clemenceau and the same slogans: Great Britain, in 1815 the centre of the world's commerce, and now America, bidding for commercial leadership: for the Holy Alliance, now the League of Nations—and so on.

MR. McWILLIAMS makes the comparison alarmingly clear. But there are some essential differences the significance of which is perhaps not sufficiently brought out, *e.g.*, in 1815 Napoleon was made the scapegoat; he was banished to St. Helena. In 1918 the Kaiser retired to comfortable freedom in Holland. But the treatment of France in defeat in 1815 was kinder than that meted out to Germany in 1918, the indemnity demanded of Germany being relatively three times heavier than that exacted of France. In 1918 the burdens and penalties of war were laid entirely on the people and not on the sovereign. THAT lesson learned, will history repeat itself? Present tendencies in Europe suggest, in the light of the past, that we are entering a period of national rivalries, economic troubles, growing popular unrest and at the end revolutions and wars. "Whether history repeats itself depends on whether men permit it to repeat. Left to themselves, the forces that move men and nations will go on producing similar results." "We must face up to the situation. The troubles of the present time are primarily economic. Until Europe is restored the whole world must suffer." "Two things are essential:

- (1) The destruction, or at least drastic reduction, of the barriers which now impede European trade and industry at every turn. An economic, not a political, united States of Europe would set Europe on its feet.
- (2) The help of the United States."

THOUGHTFUL and full of portent as this little book is, it is no Jeremiad. But we end with the question: "Will democracy prove more enlightened and less selfish than autocracy?" On the answer to that question depends the answer to the question: "Will history repeat itself?" D. P.

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THE NEW MORALITY: by G. E. Newsom. Nicholson and Watson, 1932. (6s. net.)

THE Master of Selwyn has placed under no small obligation all those people, who, having but little sympathy themselves with the subversive literature of the day, are afraid it is doing no good to their younger contemporaries, and would like in consequence to have much clearer ideas about it.

He goes about his task in a methodical manner. He began by making his book a reply or counterblast to the book *MARRIAGE AND MORALS* by Bertrand (Earl) Russell. Since that first planning of the book, however, he has added a great many references to subsequent books written or edited by Earl Russell as well as to books, papers and broadcasts by other people, bearing more or less closely upon the subject. The reply to *MARRIAGE AND MORALS* now begins on p. 49. From that point onwards references to it are indicated by small figures in the text and reproduced in a list at the end of each chapter. The reader has a choice. He can either read the two books together, as the Master doubtless at first intended him to do, or he can disregard this very specific reply point by point, sentence by sentence, to *MARRIAGE AND MORALS*, and read this volume straight through, relying upon the extensive array of other references and quotations to enable him to appreciate the material with which the Master is dealing.

If it is allowable to reconstruct the position in a small compass, it is something like this. Freud conceived that maladjustments to life, appearing as "nerve" or "mental" trouble, were due to repressions of sexual impulse imposed by the conventions of morality, as he observed them in the last four decades of the 19th century. Take away the conventions, he argued, and men and women, boys and girls, will function better in every way: you will have a better world. Earl Russell, his wife and his friends in Europe, America and elsewhere, observed that this prescription "plays the cat and banjo" with the family as we know it. They were undisturbed by this (so far as the adults were concerned) believing that for various fairly obvious reasons this institution of the family was doomed; but held that those couples who have offspring should maintain a partnership so far as the interests of the offspring require it. How was this to be accomplished without reimposing those very conventions which according to Freud had done all the damage?

THE reply was that modern mechanical contrivances for contraception enable human beings to separate at will sexual indulgence from parenthood. There is not to-day, argues Russell, any occasion for parents to abstain from indulgence outside the marriage bond for fear of causing confusion in regard to offspring. At the same time they pointed out that the nurture of children is for the most part abominably performed in families, and that for the majority of children the crèche, and later the boarding school, is a better and happier place. The upshot, as the Master of Selwyn points out, is the disappearance of the family as we know it and the establishment of sexual promiscuity. These two changes, Earl Russell and his friends declare, the rising generation of both sexes wants and means to have.

THE Master of Selwyn counters with the contention that the human race has never aimed simply at better functioning in a purely physiological sense; that there has always been a spiritual element, from which has come *purpose*: and that people have controlled the sexual impulse not because they did not know any better but in the interests of what Aristotle called the "good life." This last involves both moral and social considerations and its mainspring in the past has been religious belief. The Russell

school take the matter further and aim at eliminating the whole conception of "duty" and exterminating everything savouring of religion.

WE do not pretend for a moment that this brief and crude statement does justice to the Master of Selwyn's elaborate argument, or to the wide range he covers, but we must press on. The whole controversy arises from three problems, all as old as the race, *viz.* (1) Why do marriages fall below expectation as life partnerships? (2) Why does the family, regarded as an institution designed for the nurture of children, do likewise? (3) Since communities—containing numerous ill-assorted couples and ill-nurtured children—suffer in consequence, cannot something be done about it?

As the Master points out, the issues were put with so much greater point, force, beauty and eloquence by Plato, that we wonder whether after all, we need base all our hopes of improvement upon Sigmund Freud!

THE other day Carl Jung contributed an article to the first number of CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY, a new International Quarterly Review of Psychodiagnostics, in which he summed up the contribution of Freud to human progress as the destruction of certain hypocritical conventions which exerted despotic influence in the German world sixty years ago. That contribution is much further curtailed when we remember that it was not conventional Germany which influenced this island sixty years ago. Quite the contrary! Rather it was the highly unconventional Goethe, interpreted by Thomas Carlyle—who assailed every kind of humbug with the fury of an Isaiah—in the sphere of morals; and the subversive Strauss, in the realm of religious belief. The typical thinking young couples who married in the sixties in Britain were probably less amenable to convention as such than any generation this island has seen.

TO-DAY, when Freud has so long been a household word, we are all far, far more inclined than our grandfathers were to think that conventions, traditions, customs, even prejudices are probably worth keeping. The Volksmuseum movement, strong in every civilised country and particularly in the Americas, bears eloquent testimony. The fact is that the whole paraphernalia of Bertrand Russell-ism is hopelessly *démodé* and *vieux jeu*. When, as a young man, he used to come down to Winchester and go about in a red tie he was already falling behind the keen intelligences there who were equipping themselves with devotion for serious thinking upon life's problems.

EARL RUSSELL's last book is the SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK. It is only scientific in the narrowest sense and the last thing it does is to look out! If the post war years have established anything at all it is the futility of applying to such infinitely subtle and elusive subjects as marriage, family and nurture, the categories of mathematics. Professor Hogben, as passionate a foe of tradition, religion *et hoc genus omne* as Earl Russell himself, has just told us that biology has at present absolutely nothing to tell us that can help us with them. What biological speculation is available is, as the Master of Selwyn points out, favourable to monogamy and the traditional family, but Professor Hogben does not consider *anything* sufficiently established in biology for us to use. The mechanistic presumptions in Freudian psycho-analysis belong to another age and the process appears to be losing ground rapidly.

THERE is left the "case work approach." Can anyone who has ever seen Earl Russell conceive or picture him stooping to anything in which cleverness counted so little as family casework? The answer is "NO," and at that

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point, quaint and amusing figure that he is, we must bid him and his books, his philosophy and his mathematics, farewell. Turn to any survey of American divorce, "An endless procession of miserable people who have made a mess of their lives and go on making a worse and worse mess of them each time they begin again." This limited experiment in loosing the ties built up through millenia (14 at least) is already a failure, and yet this foolish Earl proposes brightly to "scrap" almost the entire framework of our emotional lives! It is not that this theory or that, this suggestion or that, is wise or foolish, correct or erroneous. We know next to nothing of the emotional life of an individual, still less that of a couple, least of all that of a group like the family. Apart from the intuitions of poets and prophets, any serious study of it must proceed by way of the case work approach at its most patient and most objective, and must be undertaken, whenever possible, by those rare birds, *born* family case workers and no others.

J.C.P.

CULTURE AND PROGRESS: by Wilson D. Wallis. McGraw Hill Book Co. 1930. (25s.)

A BOOK of this kind suggests many reflections on the present state of sociology. The author has no theory of his own to propound, but attempts an impartial survey of the interpretations of the facts concerning human culture that have been put forward by various schools. He has read widely, and his chapters roam over a vast field. The book may be opened at almost any page with a prospect of finding some fact or quotation, interesting in itself, although sometimes having little bearing on the general problem: how are we to bring the varied facts of social culture under some general scheme? Authors of no importance are cited for very commonplace statements, along with passages from the leaders of thought. We have accounts, good in themselves, of the history of tobacco, tea, coffee and Christmas cards, but these are not brought into relation with the general idea of culture and progress. A good summary of famous Utopias is included, but the subject is left in the air. In his discussion of the happiness of savage communities and of the evils of civilisation, the author seems to revive the abandoned position of Rousseau, and he has sound reflections on the misuse of science in warfare, &c., but the problem of using science for the welfare of the community is not faced.

SUCH a treatment is typical of much sociological writing at the present day, especially in America. Social facts are collected and tabulated, and essays on isolated aspects of social life make their appearance along with the facts, but we miss any scientific presentation, either in the light of some guiding principle, or even as a systematic grouping which might serve as the basis of a generalisation in the hands of a synthetic thinker. Comte and Spencer were premature in their theoretical work, but they pointed out a possible path to the construction of a science worthy to rank with the established sciences. Unless we have some guiding principle, we must continue to flounder about in an uncontrollable mass of detail. It is disappointing to see so much real hard work put into the production of bulky publications which, for all their miscellaneous erudition, do nothing to advance the subject of sociology. With the exception of a serious mis-translation of two lines in a quotation from Schiller on p. 366, few mistakes have been noticed in the present work, and the author has no doubt given pleasure to many by his collection of data from very varied sources, but the hope may be expressed that in his next publication he will aim at a more synthetic treatment.

C. H. DESCH.

LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGES: AN INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTICS: by Willem L. Graff, Ph.D. D. Appleton and Company. 1932. (18s.)

THE number of comprehensive works on language to which the English general reader has hitherto been able to turn, is by no means great. Those of Sapir and Jespersen, which date from 1921 and 1922 respectively, have scarcely had any rivals, and Professor Graff is justified in his attempt to present to "the sociologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist, and the philosopher," "a survey of the outstanding results and prevailing tendencies of the science of language." His footnotes frequently refer to authorities on more particular aspects of the subject, and an appendix contains a long bibliography—which might, however, have been classified to advantage—of "all the works that have been of immediate use" to the author.

IN Part I., Professor Graff deals in successive chapters with "the Phonetic Elements in Language," "Meaning," "Units of Signification," "Accentuation," and "categorising in language." Part II. is taken up by the question of "Drift and Diversification" and concludes with a survey of the languages of the world, classified on a genealogical basis.

To have treated of both language and languages within the limits of the ordinary book is no mean achievement; yet the author has found room not only for description and the many complex questions of theoretical linguistics, but also for a discussion of the theories around which controversy has raged in the past. He has, too, drawn illustrations from numerous languages, both past and present, in order to dispel as far as possible the illusions to which the reader is subject, when acquainted with only one or two. The diagrams in the chapter on phonetics, and especially in the section on the theory of the syllable, are welcome; though their use in the chapters on meaning is abrupt and tends to unnecessary obscurity.

AGAIN and again Professor Graff emphasises the distinction between the business of the linguist and that of the philosopher by showing how language has, both phonetically and semantically an existence apart from human thought; and his originality reveals itself when he applies this idea, for instance, in discussing the rôle of the word within the sentence, or in condemning for himself any attempt at the morphological classification of languages.

ONE might wish that the material relative to the life of language in society had been collected in a separate chapter; but it is easy to find fault with the presentation of such a subject as language. Where criticism does find more important ground is in the author's method. It is unfortunate that the expression of opinions which he hopes will prove stimulating to the professional linguist (p. viii.) should have been vitiated by the pursuit of an object stated at the very outset. Professor Graff proposes to protect "the subtle distinctions suggested by linguistic analysis" from contamination by the traditional terms of philosophy and psychology, but the elaborate technical nomenclature, which he adopts with this end in view, is on the whole a failure. Subtle distinctions do not readily lend themselves to the definition implied by scientific terminology, and Professor Graff's glossary is far from sufficient. It is not enough, to give a simple instance, to define patois as a dialectal variety without defining dialect itself, and the space occupied by many transparent terms might well have been given to an explanation of the unknown otherwise than by the unknown. In the book itself this inconsequence of detail produces an unevenness which detracts from its value as an "introduction to linguistics."

J.P.C.

THE THEORY OF WAGES : by J. R. Hicks, M.A., B.Litt. Macmillan.
1932. (8s. 6d.)

THE task which is attempted in this book, Mr. Hicks tells us in his preface, is "a restatement of the theory of wages in a form which shall be reasonably abreast of modern economic knowledge."

His method of approach is the one which necessarily must be followed by all who rely upon the deductive method in economics. Mr. Hicks begins by treating "labour" as a "commodity consisting of discrete homogeneous units, for which therefore there are well defined curves of supply and demand," and concludes that if this homogeneity were an actual fact wages would, in a state of equilibrium, be equal to the marginal productivity of the units. He recognises that this is "a method with very considerable dangers, which can only be avoided if we think back our arguments into a more cumbrous but more realistic form as frequently as possible." Accordingly he proceeds to modify his initial inference by successively taking into account first the fact that individual workers differ from one another in productivity, then that the same man varies in his productive efficiency from time to time, and later that the conditions of wage bargaining are modified by the existence of trade unions and the intervention of the state, particularly by public provision for maintenance of the unemployed.

OBVIOUSLY a treatise on these lines by a lecturer in Economics of the London School of Economics will be useful to students desirous of passing the examinations in Economic Theory of London and other universities. But whether it is calculated to be of use to seekers after knowledge obviously depends on the degree of the author's success in supplementing his abstract reasoning by a realistic study of actual facts. It is rather disturbing, therefore, to notice the extreme paucity of Mr. Hicks' references to concrete facts, and his airy indifference, when he does take notice of them, if he finds they fail to harmonise with his theories. Thus we read (p. 190), following on a discussion of the effects of rigidity of wage levels during a period of depression of trade, "This picture of the incidence of unemployment appears to follow unescapably from our reasoning; but it is extremely surprising. For . . . the situation of Great Britain between 1925 and 1930 was essentially similar to that of the community whose economy we have just analysed" but "the position was not only different; it was almost diametrically opposite." The surprise in no way disturbs Mr. Hicks' complacency. On the other hand he remarks, "The antithesis is, however, so complete that we need not despair, and conclude that we are on altogether wrong lines. So perfect a negative can hardly be a coincidence."

SUCH an attitude no doubt conduces to Mr. Hicks' mental comfort, but it hardly induces us to take seriously either his main conclusion or the incidental pronouncements which he puts forth in the course of his argument. Among these latter we may notice on p. 96 "So long as we are concerned with wages in general throughout a progressive community there is no need to fear inelastic demand," a statement which, in view of recent experience, is surprising in a book published in 1932. On page 121 we read "Under the assumption of competition it follows that an invention can only be profitably adopted if its ultimate effect is to increase the National Dividend," as though profits could never be got by exploiting socially injurious products like the "parliament brandy" of the eighteenth century and the poison gas of to-day. Perhaps Mr. Hicks shares with his colleague, Prof. Lionel Robbins, the theory that socially injurious products should be regarded as adding to the National Dividend of Wealth, instead of subtracting from it. If so, he should note Patrick Geddes' warning to the

London School of Economics, "Ethics without Economics is futile, Economics without Ethics is sordid." But what are we to think of this? On p. 235, "Every unhired factor [of production] which is acting as 'entrepreneur' must get its marginal product, since if it got less, its owners would prefer to hire it out." No doubt when, for example, capitalists who had bought cotton mills in the boom of 1920 found they failed to get the expected profits, or indeed any profits at all, they would have preferred to have hired out their capital, but unfortunately they lacked the power to recover the funds they had sunk. Even a lecturer on Economics ought to know that enterprise sometimes results in big, sometimes in small profits, and sometimes in loss; and that it is utter nonsense to say that entrepreneurs' capital "must get its marginal product." These examples are fairly typical of the sort of result that comes from too great a reliance on abstract deductive reasoning, and on information obtained too exclusively from the writings of academic authors. Economics must be regarded as also a field study if the teaching of professed economists is to have any practical value.

ANOTHER defect in Mr. Hicks' treatment is that he endeavours to isolate the theory of wages, treating it apart from other aspects of economic life with which wages are inextricably bound up. While he allows in his argument for the heterogeneity of "labour," he lumps together all other factors of production as, indifferently, "Capital" or "Property," and assumes perfect solidarity of interest among the owners and administrators of "Capital." Here so far from keeping abreast of modern economic knowledge he is not even level with the economists of the eighteenth century, who, in discussing wages with a special eye on agriculture, allowed for the fact that behind the wage-paying farmer there stood the landlord, the tithe-owner, the rate collector and the tax collector. Similarly to-day the industrial employer is a buffer between his employees on one side and, on the other, mortgagees, bondholders, and the bank where he has an overdraft, besides the demands of the central and local government. The tragedy of his situation in times, such as the last twelve years, of appreciating currencies and falling prices is that the pressure on him on both sides is intensified, on that of fixed charges even more than on that of wages. To ignore this fact in the discussion of wage problems of the present day inevitably leads to a distorted view of the situation and valueless conclusions. G. S.

THE SANTA CLARA VALLEY, CALIFORNIA: by J. O. M. Broek.
Oosthoek, Utrecht. 1932.

THIS interesting piece of research was undertaken as a study of the transformation of landscape by man. A well defined area in California—the Santa Clara fruit growing valley—was chosen and surveyed chiefly from the "landscape" point of view. The author says, "The various ways in which white man has used this region during the century and a half of his occupation have resulted in definite changes in the landscape. There is a fascination in tracing these successions of land utilization and in evaluating the various forces that brought them about."

THE first part of the book gives a "graphic sketch of the region as it is to-day; . . . a short discussion of the fundamentals of the physical setting; and a survey of the landscape as it was found by the white man. After this introductory material, the ensuing chapters analyze the transformations which have occurred in the landscape from Spanish times up to the present, special emphasis being placed, first on the social-economic forces leading to these changes, and second, on their geographic manifestations."

EXCELLENT photographs, maps and statistical tables illustrate the subject matter throughout.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY : by Kimball Young. F. S. Croft & Co.
(\$4.00.)

THIS is a large book, but its 673 pages are fully justified. In fact, it is not a book, but a library. The author's able summarisation of the views of other social psychologists (with liberal quotations) is of great value in itself, and shows that he is a careful student (not a mere spinner of theories *ex nihilo*). But his own original contribution to the subject consists in the study of personality from the angle of the group life by means of the "case" study method (which his preface indicates it is his desire to vindicate).

YOUNG students who feel discouraged by the technical nature of the opening chapters might do worse than turn to Part III., Chapter XI., and read on from there, starting with the "cases" in small print, then turning back to see what these really thrilling stories (for they beat all fiction!) illustrate. Sheer interest will carry them on through the discussions of such subjects as Colour Prejudice, Propaganda, Public Opinion, Censorship, Fashion. Then they may feel encouraged to tackle the valuable discussions in Part I. of such subjects as Heredity and Environment, Conditional Reflexes, the Janes-Lang Theory of Emotions, the Mechanistic and Purposive Theories of "Instinct," &c.

THE author holds that there is no evidence for the instinctiveness of sociability. Behaviour rests fundamentally upon the physiological needs of the organism. "Personal-social" and cultural pressures modify and enlarge the scope of activities in reference to these biological demands. "Associated with these organic responses are the feelings or affective states of pleasantness or unpleasantness." Learning is affected by social suggestion. There is no evidence of a general "instinct" leading to imitation. (Mr Young feels strongly that the word "instinct" is much-abused.)

He gives us much valuable information, including statistical tables, about current social questions; but his observations seem to have been confined mainly to American social life. There is, for example, an interesting discussion of the "political boss" system. It sounds strange to us to hear of teachers being forbidden to dance or fall in love, or to "treat objectively current political problems"; but, since even the most docile of teachers must have some influence upon the minds of the young, such facts throw light upon much that puzzles us about American mentality. The suggestion often made that "Prohibition" is an incentive to lawlessness may be true in a far wider sense than "Wet" propagandists realise. In the Western States, at all events, we seem to find side by side with a tendency to control personal conduct, a widespread disrespect for the law and a tendency to "lynch law."

A FURTHER glimpse into the working of the American mind is afforded by the statement (p. 343) that "in economic status the professional groups stand between the labouring classes and the employers." Is even an American psychologist unable to conceive of any social gradation on a basis other than economic? Are we to conclude that the American doctor or lawyer or minister is treated as a social inferior by *any* employer of labour, because the money which pays his fees comes out of industry? How would Mr. Young regard our (former (?)) public school attitude towards boys whose fathers had made their money "in trade"? And which is the worse form of snobbery?

WE gather that the status of the teacher, though not too good *here*, is far lower in the United States. We at least *pretend* to believe in education.

One wonders what will be the future of a land which allows parents to decide what is to be taught to their children! No wonder so many Americans do not believe in Evolution! How could they?

If "radicalism" (as Mr. Young, in common with other social psychologists, thinks) is due to repression in the home and elsewhere, an appropriate prayer for present-day America would seem to be "*Après nous le Déluge.*"

BUT at any rate Mr. Kimball Young has provided some splendid reading material for those long winter evenings in the Ark!

WARNER WARCUP.

A HISTORY OF FIRE AND FLAME: by Oliver C. de C. Ellis. The Poetry Lovers' Fellowship, London. 1932. (15s.)

A WORK which contains beautiful and fascinating photographs of the spreading of flames in explosive mixtures of gases, with an account of their bearing on accidents in mines, seems at first sight to be a strange product of the Poetry Lovers' Fellowship. This unusual combination arises from the personality of the author. Dr. Ellis is a poet and a critic of poetry, but he is also a brilliant investigator in the laboratories of the Safety in Mines Research Board, and unlike most scientific workers who have a private hobby, his two activities are by no means kept separate in his mind. Hence we have a study of fire and flame which, whilst strictly scientific throughout, traces the ideas which have become associated with those phenomena through the ages, in language which is always poetical, and sometimes rises to heights of real eloquence. Dr. Ellis's reading is encyclopædic. His list of authorities at the end of the book is a long one, and although the absence of footnotes or references in the text makes it difficult to check his statements by comparison with his sources, it is clear that he has critically considered a vast range of studies in mythology and in history. His erudition is not obtrusive; the innumerable allusions to myths, to literature, or to the history of the sciences present themselves naturally, and the flow of the story is not interrupted by explanations. To criticise his views would call for much labour, and although he may seem occasionally to press too far his parallels between gold and fire, and their relations to water, in his interpretations of myths, it must be for experts in folk-lore to decide whether his theories are sound. It is sufficient that the treatment is such as to make the work valuable as a sociological study. Fuel, used on an enormous scale, plays a vital part in modern industry, and to have traced out the history of men's ideas on the subject of fuel from early times to the present is a real achievement. Both the general reader and the student will find this book of absorbing interest. The closing sections, on the modern theories of flame and combustion, are mainly for the chemist, but they are simply worded, and the subject is made to develop naturally from what has gone before. The author has some marked dislikes, which he does not conceal, and, worker in the field of coal though he is, he looks forward to the replacement of coal, wherever possible, by electric current generated by water power under international control as the means of escape from the worst features of modern industrial civilisation.

C. H. DESCH.

DOES OUR IDEA OF JUSTICE NEED REVISION IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN RESEARCH?: by Alice Raven. Golden Vista Press, 1932.

A PAMPHLET giving further expression to Miss Raven's views on criminology, which deserve to be widely known and carefully considered.

SIN AND NEW PSYCHOLOGY: by C. E. Barbour, Ph.D. Allen and Unwin. (6s.)

DR. BARBOUR examines the teachings of the great psychologists (Jung, Freud, Adler and McDougall) and shows that there is no essential conflict between them and the doctrines of Christianity. A change of names does not alter facts; though it may cause a change of view-point (*e.g.*, Sin means the guilty act or condition of a responsible person, but "complex" suggests something we cannot help getting, like "flu").

CHRISTIANITY faces the facts about human nature: the more Science (including psychological science) reveals about man the more we realise how accurately Christian theology deals with the facts. His sense of weakness, of inadequacy to cope with the tasks and problems of life without help from some higher power—his sense of conflict within, "and fears without," his lack of mental peace and harmony, his felt need for some unifying purpose—all these are facts known to Psychology, which correspond to Christian doctrines.

DR. BARBOUR shows that an ideal is recognised as being psychologically essential to human progress. Christ, as the only completely integrated personality, is the only perfect objective standard. Deviation from this standard is Sin, which is not merely sensuousness, selfishness, and lawlessness, but the guidance of our own lives by our own standards instead of those of Christ. The cause of Sin is the divided mind (possibly due in part to an inherited propensity for evil).

FREUD asserts that "we are all miserable sinners": perfect integration will only be attained when the ego meets the "ego ideal" (which seeks to mould our life according to a worthy standard). "Perfect integration" is "abundant life."

TEMPTATION is defined by Dr. Barbour as "an effort of the unconscious to guide the life into activity that will give expression to unconscious desires, but which activity would be antagonistic to the moral ideals of the consciousness." "Sublimation" is the remedy: the old interest must be forgotten in the love for the new ("the expulsive power of a new affection"). A suggested definition for "conscience" is "the conscious mind examining the life in the light of the goal it has set up for itself, and its direction of the life towards the realisation of that goal." When conscience condemns the ego for "sin," "guilt" is felt. Whereas the "inferiority complex" is cured by faith in oneself, the sense of guilt is cured only by faith in God. M. Coué (this is not the author's illustration) bids us say "I can": Christianity says "God can"—or with Paul, "I can . . . through Christ."

PSYCHOLOGY shows that confession is better than repression. Psychoanalysis cures some cases simply by leading the patient to recognise what is wrong. Confession is good for the mind as well as for the soul. Where the trouble is moral, however, something further is needed. Diagnosis is a necessary stage, but it is not cure. When the devil is cast out the house must not be left empty, lest seven other devils enter. If Christ enters, peace will reign. Affections wrongly directed must be redirected to God and forgiveness secured, thus bringing about (a) the reintegration of the personality through a unifying purpose and object, (b) right relationship with our social and spiritual environment (for he who loves God loves his brother also). Faith brings Power and Peace.

THE word "Sin" is out of fashion. But there is no worse sin than that of the Pharisees who called evil good, and good evil. The new Psychology has

done us a service in revealing the mechanism of Sin and Guilt (though under new names). Those who try to explain sin away, however, will only help it to strengthen its grip (like a disease ignored and allowed to develop unchecked).

DR. BARBOUR'S analysis of the New Psychology will be valuable even to students uninterested in the theological problems with which he deals.

W. WARCUP.

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION: An Analysis of the Theories of Spencer and Ward: by Elsa Peverley Kimball. Columbia University Press. 1932. (\$4.50).

THE title fully indicates the scope of this painstaking study, which gives to the student who desires to know the main points in the lives and ideas of two eminent sociologists, all that he requires, with little comment or criticism. In each case a biographical sketch, very well done, is used to indicate that the educational theories of Spencer and Ward were the outcome of their own youth. The author wonders whether—

SPENCER'S educational views were not in part at least a defense, intentional or unintentional, of the type of education practiced in his family for three generations, and whether, also, Ward's theories of education were not to some extent the expression of a life-long protest against the educational poverty of his childhood and youth as a tenth child of "moving-frontier" parents. In neither case do the educational theories of Spencer and Ward appear to have been primarily the results of much, if any, inductive or experimental work.

THE chapters devoted to the educational theories of Spencer and Ward are clear and thorough, evincing careful scrutiny of all the works of the two sociologists. The author has been able to read an unpublished manuscript of Ward's, written specifically on Education, and this seems to have been his only essay devoted to that subject in itself.

IN the last pages of the book wherein Spencer and Ward are contrasted, it is shown that the two sociologists were complementary to each other in their views on education, one of the most marked differences being that "Spencer's was an aristocratic, private, more or less tutorial scheme of education, while Ward's was for all the children of all the people." Spencer greatly influenced the thought of his time, but there was a rigidity about his theories which was absent in Ward's ideas, and this fluidity in the American sociologist will perhaps make his work the more lasting of the two.

E.M.W.

MENTAL SUBNORMALITY AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY: AN OUTLINE OF A PRACTICAL PROGRAM: by Howard Becker. Reprint from the *SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW*, Vol. VI., No. 2, 1932.

IN this pamphlet Dr. Howard Becker outlines a practical programme for the control and treatment of mental subnormality, for adoption by local Communities in the United States.

TYNESIDE COUNCIL OF SOCIAL SERVICE. Tyneside Papers (Second Series), No. 4: **HOUSING ON THE SOUTH BANK OF THE TYNE.** 1933. (2d.)

IN this paper the housing position revealed by the 1931 Census is compared with the position in 1921. Shortage of homes, size of homes, and overcrowding are discussed. The main figures are set out simply and clearly in table form.

RECONSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION IN RURAL INDIA:
by Prem Chand Lal, Ph.D. Allen & Unwin. 1932. (10s.)

DR. PREM CHAND LAL was formerly Director of the Viswa-Bharati Institute of Rural Reconstruction at Sriniketan, Bengal, founded by Dr. Rabin-dranath Tagore; and this valuable study is based upon his ten years' experiences at Dr. Tagore's educational institutions there and at Santiniketan, upon his investigations in various Provinces of India, and upon his travels and studies in Europe and in the United States of North America. The general problems of the Indian village and of rural reconstruction are, by common consent, vast in scale and urgent in character; 85 per cent. of India's 350 millions are stated to be engaged in agricultural industries. There is great need to vivify and develop the village life in all its aspects—socially, culturally, economically, and from the point of view of sanitation and health. This is a mighty task, for which the Indian peoples themselves must inevitably and rightly be the principal agents and must take the chief responsibility.

THE first half of this attractive volume gives a condensed and suggestive account of the history, principles, and working of the Institutes, with an evaluation of their activities, as a guide to the wider application of these in the other Provinces, and in the Indian States. The second half treats of, and makes recommendations concerning:—the rural elementary school as the community centre: the Scout movement and the Youth movement: the education of adults: the education of women and girls, about which the author is very urgent that therein lies the key to India's progress: vocational training in agriculture and in various branches of industry: the training of teachers and community leaders. And, throughout, he strongly urges the spirit of co-operation. He ends by saying that India has been a land of saints and mystics, a land where renunciation has found favour, even with kings and princes; that some of the greatest leaders—political, religious, and social—have been recognised as such from their lives of sacrifice and renunciation, and that the age for renunciation has not passed, nor shall it ever; it is in the very heart and soul of the people. And for the social and national service indicated in this book, leaders are required, with a high sense of duty and a spirit of service and self-sacrifice: who, through their personal lives and example, will inspire the young men to take up the cause of the millions who need their help and guidance.

W.F.W.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ENGLISH LE PLAY SCHOOL TO RURAL SOCIOLOGY: by Eitaro Suzuki, College of Agriculture, Gifu, Japan.

THIS is No. 24 of the RESEARCH BULLETIN of the College of Agriculture and contains an exposition in Japanese of the ideas of the English Le Play School. It shows close attention to all the publications on Regional Survey of Le Play House. The author makes it clear in his introductory note that he sees much to criticise in the work of the Le Play School, and is by no means a convert to Geddesian Sociology. He thinks, however, that those studying local communities can use the methods of the Le Play School "who are actually well experienced in Regional Survey."

KAGAMI KENKYU HOKOKU. (Research Bulletin of the Gifu Imperial College of Agriculture.) No. 19. A PLAN FOR A RURAL SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY IN JAPAN: by Eitaro Suzuki. College of Agriculture, Gifu, Japan, 1931.

IN a note to foreign readers the author explains that this plan is for a Sociological Survey as distinct from a Social Survey. He discusses the natural community or natural area which might be the subject of such a survey, suggesting that all Rural Surveys in Japan have so far given too little attention to this subject. There are many references to American books in the Japanese text.

FARM AND VILLAGE HOUSING.

HOUSING OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS.

HOUSE DESIGN: CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT.

HOMEMAKING, HOME FURNISHING AND INFORMATION SERVICES.

HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT AND KITCHENS.

PRESIDENT'S Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, Washington D.C., 1932. (Each \$1.15.)

THESE are Vols. VII., XI., V., X. and IX. of the Reports issued by the President's Conference. Vols. III., VI. and VIII. were reviewed in the October, 1932, issue of the REVIEW. The volumes under present consideration relate more directly to house design, planning and building; furnishing, equipping and management by the "homekeeper." They are well illustrated by photographs and plans.

FARM AND VILLAGE HOUSING. A major feature of this report is that it brings together existing information to serve as a manual for the farmer. There are instructions on how the farmer can acquire plumbing, electricity, and heating equipment bit by bit at a cost which the majority could probably afford. There are also comprehensive instructions on the mixing and use of paints, on the building of frame houses, on the protection of health, and on the planning of the farmstead for beauty and utility. The report points out that so far less attention has been paid to making the farm attractive than to making it comfortable.

BUT the lasting service of the report is perhaps its revelation of the lack of information extant on farm housing. The authors find that in comparison to the need little has been done; there are no suitable house plans to meet the varying needs of different sections of the country and different types of farming; there have been no attempts to adapt the farm house to its special functions; there are no comprehensive studies on reconditioning.

THAT these deficiencies must be met is self-evident and the report calls for the establishment of a central agency for research on farm housing problems to inspire and co-ordinate investigations to get at the facts by which better homes for America's farmers can be provided.

THE report contains also a history of rural architecture in America, a study of village economy, and summaries of the housing conditions of Indians and of migratory labourers—conditions so bad as to constitute a social problem. An extensive bibliography of publications dealing with the many aspects of farm housing is included.

HOUSING OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS contains the report of the six correlating committees whose business it was to digest the material assembled by the twenty-five fact-finding committees of the President's Conference and to indicate how their findings could be translated into action.

THE report on Standards and Objectives gives a picture of the quality of housing Americans ought to enjoy. The statement of these standards reveals how far short of the possible present housing falls. It also reveals the complex nature of housing—its dependence upon the neighbourhood, the public utilities, the financing system, and the government of the community. As Robert P. Lamont, former Secretary of Commerce, says in a foreword, the statement of objectives "once for all proves the impossibility of producing acceptable housing by isolated individual effort."

THE committee has painted a realisable physical ideal for the small house of the future. It has shown how much of this ideal could be immediately translated into reality and what is still to be worked out. The Committee's report will serve as an inspiration and guide to engineers, to architects, to builders, and to dealers in materials in the development of the house of the future.

THROUGHOUT the reports in this volume runs the demand for a permanent Housing Institute to inspire and guide the many agencies that must be mobilised if the far-reaching programme outlined is to be put into effect and the ideal for American housing realised.

HOUSE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT. This volume covers such subjects as design, construction, heating and ventilation, plumbing and sanitation, lighting and refrigeration. The reports on these were the result of intensive study by recognised leaders in their respective fields, who have brought together in their studies much of the best thought and experience of recent years in an attempt to eliminate faulty design, uneconomic planning, defective construction and imperfect equipment in small dwellings.

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IN addition to the final reports of the three committees, this book contains a number of hitherto unpublished studies conducted by each of the committees, some of which involved considerable research and are important original contributions to this branch of housing literature.

AN important consideration of the reports is the possibility of reducing building and equipment costs "to bring new houses of high standards within the reach of families of modest means, and particularly the wage-earning group of the population."

HOMEMAKING, HOME FURNISHING AND INFORMATION SERVICES. In this volume we pass from the planning and building of the house to the equipping, decorating and furnishing—from the exterior to the interior. Here the emphasis shifts from the architect and builder to the "homemaker"—the woman who is responsible for all that "home" means to the family and the community.

THE Committee on Homemaking dealt primarily with the home in its relation to family life and development. It attempted to show how the design, construction and equipment of the home each definitely modify daily behaviour, stressing the necessity of planning, building and equipping houses in such a manner that physical mental and moral growth will be encouraged by the presence of facilities for the best possible development of individual and family life.

THE members of the Home Furnishing and Decoration Committee, all of whom were leading experts in this field, emphasised the importance and possibility of bringing beauty as well as comfort and convenience in furnishings within the reach of families of modest income.

THE Committee on Home Information Centres, in dealing with this practically new but valuable service, has endeavoured to make concrete suggestions as to the best ways of getting accurate and appropriate information to each householder or home-maker.

HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT AND KITCHENS. "The relief from the thralldom of needless routine is the negative aspect of a problem which in its positive phase involves the organization of the forces concerned in daily living in such a manner that the greatest advantages possible may be obtained. Work becomes a joy when facilitated by intelligent planning. It also provides an outlet for the spirit of service that is the basis of a happy home." The importance of the homemaker herself is the dominant note of these reports, and here we come into the fields of psychology and sociology more directly than in any of the other reports. If the homemaker is to fulfil all the duties and responsibilities laid upon her in the best possible way; if she is to manage her home with due regard to each member and their individual needs; to herself and her own needs and to those of the community in which she lives, from economic, health and moral standpoints, then she must not only live in an Ideal Home, but must be an Ideal Woman!

ALTHOUGH these volumes relate only to housing problems in America and are therefore best judged from the American standpoint, we in England would do well to look more closely at our own housing problems in the light of these reports. It has long been a conviction of the English housewife that it takes a woman to plan a house and that architects "know nothing whatever" of the needs of the homemaker who has the working of the house when it is built. Now that women are taking up the profession of the architect we may hope great things, but until their influence begins to be felt expert homemakers and architects would do well to collaborate and would in the study of these volumes, find much to study of exceptional interest and profit in the solving of their mutual problems.

THE INDEPENDENT WORKER AND THE SMALL FAMILY BUSINESS:
by J. H. Parker. Reprinted from the JOURNAL of the Royal Statistical Society.
1932.

THIS pamphlet reprints a paper based on material obtained in the course of the Merseyside Social Survey. Perhaps the most interesting section is that on the small shopkeeper and the hawker. The tables of average weekly net income are particularly interesting.

BIRTH CONTROL AND PUBLIC HEALTH. Society for the Provision of Birth Control Clinics, 1932. (18.)

THIS is a plea for giving birth control an assured place in Public Health effort. It consists largely of evidence collected from birth control clinics on their experiences of cases dealt with.

PIONEER SETTLEMENT: CO-OPERATIVE STUDIES: American Geographical Society Special Publication, No. 14. 1932. (\$4.00.)

IN Part 2 of this journal for 1932 a review appeared of *THE PIONEER FRINGE* by Isaiah Bowman. The work now under review is a further outcome of the research programme on the subject undertaken by the American Geographical Society with the financial support of the Social Science Research Council.

ONE of the most fascinating functions of both sociology and geography is to reconstruct the past and it is only by intensive study and analysis of the present that the problems and "human ecology" of a past regime can be correctly rehabilitated. It is not merely of academic moment that such a restoration be attempted, since only by an analysis of the past can the future be planned. Naturally it is in the pioneer zones of the present that the principles can be investigated although in these same areas trends for the future can only be profitably forecast by analogy with the past. Such studies of the present as this are thus invaluable both for the student of present conditions and as a record for the future historian. It is difficult to adequately review a work composed of the researches of twenty-six authors and perhaps the most useful way is to give a statement of the field covered so that workers can discover what is relevant to their own line of research. The areas treated are: Canada (6 articles); Alaska (1); Northern Great Plains of U.S.A. (1); S. America (3); British South Africa and Rhodesia (4); North Africa (1); U.S.S.R. (3); Mongolia (2); Manchuria (2); and Australasia (4).

THE treatment of the topics is naturally uneven with so varied a set of regions and a so cosmopolitan a group of writers. The diagrams, as is customary with the American Geographical Society, are both well drawn and produced, though occasionally diagrams appear which display an air of certainty in their construction that must lack justification from the scarcity of data. Apart from the routine diagrams of crops and railway influence there are two which especially attract by their originality. The map of S. Rhodesia (p. 193) effectively dismisses as useless all soils in the tsetse fly zone by combining a soil and tsetse fly map. The second is the map on p. 328 which shows the arable and cultivated ground in the northern *hsien* (counties) of Manchuria by the orthomorphic shapes of the counties reduced in size to the correct area of land represented. There is a further refinement in the attempt to centre in some counties the polygons over the "centre of gravity" of the arable area. Finally (dealing with the make-up of the volume) there are excellent bibliographical references either as footnotes or end-page collections and the one regret is that the method has not been standardised for all the articles. This is a needless and irritating difference in technique to be found in a single volume.

THIS notice of the volume may fitly conclude with one or two quotations. The social questions have been dealt with by several authors and it is significant that in the marginal lands here treated it is in several cases the social aspect that has proved the touchstone in the success or otherwise of a new community. "Assuming successful settlement, it is the social lacks of the frontier that constitute the most significant item in the costs of settlement" (p. 7). These social requirements vary, of course, with the racial grouping that occurs before the "melting-pot" action of new areas has time to operate, *e.g.*, the differing desires of Ukrainians, Scandinavians and Memnonites.

THE Canadian Pioneer Problems Committee has set forward the following objectives of study:

1. The area—the physical controls of settlement.
2. The people—racial and ethnographical characteristics.
3. The progress of settlement.
4. The life history of the pioneer community.
5. The results of settlement.
6. A scientific appraisal of policy.

THE question of policy has been approached with special ability by the various writers on Africa, where policy is the key-stone in effective settlement. It is so, not only in regard to agricultural requirements (such as a limitation of scrub bulls), but in the attitude of the settler to the indigenous native. Six rules have been given for the guidance of the settler, *viz.*:

1. Learn the language.
2. Understand the customs.
3. Adopt a policy of justice.
4. Avoid familiarity.
5. Consider the home life of the natives.
6. Provide amenities of religion, education and recreation.

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FINALLY, throughout the essays there is a feeling that a scientific study should precede, or at least keep pace with, settlement, even though settlers would not attempt now to grow indigo on their first acquaintance with such an area as New England. As a result of a blind approach to a region, "there has been much waste of human life and labor in the settlement of hilly lands, poor lands and other lands ill adapted to agriculture, which could have been avoided. . . ." (p. 77).

ANDREW O'DELL.

OURSELVES AND THE WORLD: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN: by L. E. Lumley and Boyd H. Bode. McGraw Hill Publishing Co. (\$15.)

A CERTAIN pleasant ease and good intention, combined with some looseness of thought and of structure, typical of many books emanating from the United States, are illustrated in this sociological volume compiled by two Professors of the Ohio State University. As they say themselves, they wish to present the idea of democracy as a guiding principle of intelligent living—not only democracy as a political structure, but as an ideal in all human growth "worthy of our best aspirations."

IN a chatty way they survey children, heredity, environment and habits, and come to institutions in Part II. Here the chapter on "What is an Institution?" is the best in the book, but when they deal with particular institutions the views expressed are somewhat superficial, as a sentence or two on the purpose of education show:

"THE educational system is a vast and costly social structure for the purpose of developing versatility in young people, helping them to play their parts skilfully, and opening their eyes to more parts than now exist. Another way of saying this is that education is a process of discovering meanings in living."

THE definition of Religion is narrow, and rules out Confucianism, Buddhism, and Positivism, among other religions—

"RELIGION has always been and now is a system of *beliefs* in supernatural powers of some kind, and the *practices* carried out as a consequence of such beliefs."

ON the other hand acute questions give the student food for thought in the chapter on "Money and Banking," which concludes with the remark that "there are many complicated problems yet to be solved in connection with money and banking," though no mention is made of the doctrine of Technocracy that has been spreading in the United States since 1920. Various present-day political problems, peculiar to the United States are enumerated and discussed. America's foreign relations being touched upon in a broadminded way, and more and better education being urged as the remedy for "making peace." The concluding chapter, "Principles and Persons" gives various instances of difficult situations and asks *What would you have done?* with the object of showing the futility of ordering life by rule, without thinking.

INFORMATION on present conditions is ample, and to some extent the treatment is historical, yet the true historic sense is wanting in that stress is laid rather on the defects than on the relative values of the past, so that due appreciation is not given to it. A curious omission is that of any estimation of art in its many forms, no indication being given that it plays any part in life or citizenship or ideals. But that is also a defect in many English books on sociology or civics.

As a class book for young university students the volume is good; as a treatise on sociology it is of moderate value; and as an exposition of American methods and ideas it is excellent.

E.M.W.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FROM MORAL PHILOSOPHY: by Gladys Bryson. Reprint from INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. XLII., No. 3, April, 1932.

THE COMPARABLE INTERESTS OF THE OLD MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCES: by Gladys Bryson. Reprint from SOCIAL FORCES, Vol. XI., No. 1, October, 1932.

IN these two papers Miss Bryson continues her studies on the relation between the old Moral Philosophy and the modern social sciences. Reference may be made to her article in the same field in the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW for January, 1932.

THE WORLD IN AGONY: by Alfred Plummer, LL.D. C. Griffin and Co. 1932. (2s. 6d.)

To this vigorous little book by the Vice-Principal of Ruskin College, Oxford, Sir Arthur Salter contributes a foreword, which sums it up very effectively. "Dr. Plummer's theme is the central defect of our economic system. This system is increasingly incapable of translating increased productive capacity into equivalent purchasing capacity. . . . We need to increase consuming power so that it can utilise our productive machinery and employ our involuntarily idle." This can be done by reducing hours of labour and increasing wages. But in order that hours may be reduced and wages increased without danger of bankruptcy "we want not only national policy but world policy; not only national government, but a world government."

In arguing his case Dr. Plummer makes very effective use of statistics relating to the recent trend of industrial development in the United States, which show increasing factory outputs combined with reductions in the number of workers, and a diminishing ratio of total wages to the value of the output. He further supplies interesting statistics of the recent increase in the world stocks of wheat, cotton, rubber, sugar, nitrates, petroleum and non-ferrous metals. On the other hand, he leaves unexplored the question how it is that the world demand for these and other commodities has fallen to such an extent as to make the accumulation of stocks a disaster, beyond pointing out the evil effects of organised attempts to support prices by holding up supplies.

DR. PLUMMER presumably only attempted a brief introduction to the study of the world crisis, and his readers may be recommended to proceed next to Mr. G. D. H. Cole's *INTELLIGENT MAN'S GUIDE THROUGH THE WORLD CHAOS*. He calls his book "an economic Diagnosis," and perhaps is reserving prognosis and discussion of remedial action for a later study. If so, one can hardly complain of certain large omissions, *e.g.*, the ignoring of the fact that among peoples who make up the greater part of the world's population, for example, Indians and Chinese, it is still true that population presses upon the means of subsistence; and the neglect to supply any suggestion with regard to the ways and means of arriving at a world policy and world order. G.S.

SHEFFIELD SOCIAL SURVEY COMMITTEE. Survey Pamphlets.

No. 4. *A REPORT ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN SHEFFIELD:* prepared by A. D. K. Owen. 1932. (1s.)

No. 5. *A REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADULT EDUCATION IN SHEFFIELD:* prepared by G. P. Jones. 1932. (6d.)

No. 4 of this series will, perhaps, be of greatest interest to social workers at this present time, when unemployment is so urgent a problem. The Report goes very closely into all important aspects of the question. The statistics are worked out up to the end of 1931 and in some cases to June, 1932.

No. 5. The primary purpose of this report is to "review, as objectively as possible, the past efforts made in Sheffield to provide adult education in order to meet the needs, opportunities, dangers and evils of a rapidly growing community" and to give a brief description of the facilities at present existing.

"THE activities described are less capable of definition and measurement than the phenomena dealt with in preceding surveys. They are, however, of considerable importance to all who desire some qualitative notion of the social life of Sheffield."

HOUSING PROBLEMS IN LIVERPOOL: Liverpool University Settlement. 1931. (1s.)

ENCOURAGED by the success of a small survey in 1930, members and associates of the Liverpool University Settlement undertook a larger Survey of Housing Problems in Liverpool, the findings of which are embodied in this report.

SIX compact areas of bad housing were selected and large scale plans of each were obtained, thus enabling the field work to be prepared with care and thoroughness. Each area is discussed separately in the report; taking them together about 765 houses are included, each of which was visited during the survey.

THE information obtained has been placed at the disposal of the Director of Housing in the hope that it may assist the Housing Committee in their work.

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COUNCIL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF RURAL ENGLAND: Papers.

No. 26. RURAL HOUSING : by Percy Morris. 1932.

No. 27. TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING—The Next Step : by G. L. Pepler. 1932.

No. 28. TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING as a means of preserving Open Spaces and Rural Amenities : by Sir Lawrence Chubb. 1932.

THE first of this series deals with the very urgent matter of rural housing. It is realised that modern economic conditions, such as agricultural depression, the invasion of the country districts by industrial workers and residents, and the vogue of the "week-end" cottage have seriously affected the question, and that, as Sir Raymond Unwin says in his Foreword, "Industry itself, and indeed our whole social organisation, depend largely upon the welfare of the rural population and on their primary productions; that welfare in turn depends in no small degree on maintaining an adequate and contented population of rural workers used to, and happy in agricultural and other rural occupations; clearly it is impossible to maintain such a population without a sufficient supply of good healthy homes, suitable for their needs and adapted to their pursuits." The pamphlet is illustrated by a large number of admirable photographs.

No. 27. THE NEXT STEP indicates the new developments and applications possible under the Town and Country Planning Act of July, 1932. The Act is discussed with particular regard to those points that are of direct import to the C.P.R.E.

No. 28 also deals with the Town and Country Planning Act, but the author confines his observations "to certain definite points, namely, how far the Act can be used to secure the provision of Open Spaces, Playing Fields, and National Parks and to prevent disfigurement . . . and generally, to what extent it is likely to prove a factor in the protection of rural amenities."

FOREST LAND USE IN WISCONSIN : Report of the Committee on Land Use and Forestry. Executive Office, Madison, Wisconsin. 1932. (\$1.00.)

THIS report was drawn up in response to a request from the Governor of Wisconsin, who realised that Forest Land Use was a fundamental factor in the life of the State and must, therefore, be taken into serious consideration in view of the present economic crisis.

THE Committee responsible for the report have gone very thoroughly into the question and discuss the economic conditions that have followed in the wake of the removal of the timber wealth. They present a programme for the restoration of economic self-sufficiency to the cut-over regions of the State and recommend a system of forest control, both State and private, and a permanent committee on Land Use. The utilisation of forest areas for protection, recreational use, and park land also receive due consideration and is an important feature of the recommendations.

A COMPREHENSIVE Bibliography is appended.

THE GROWTH CYCLE OF THE FARM FAMILY : by C. E. Lively. Ohio State University : Bulletin No. 51. 1932.

AN analysis of the Size, Composition and Developmental Changes occurring in certain Ohio Farm Families, in relation to Age at Marriage, Duration of Marriage, and size of Farm Business. The author sums up the purpose of his study thus :—"In spite of the growing volume of literature dealing with agriculture, country life and farm population, only limited study of the farm family itself has been attempted. In presenting this brief study . . . it is the hope that some contribution may be made toward a better understanding of that human group for which agriculture is both a business and a mode of life."

THE FARMER'S GUIDE TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH IN 1931 : Royal Agricultural Society of England. John Murray. 1932. (1s.)

THIS volume, though it appears under a new title, continues the series of annual summaries of Agricultural Research in its leading branches, issued by the Royal Agricultural Society of England under the direction of its Research Committee. It is the purpose of the Society to use the publication as a means of spreading the lessons of research amongst those to whom they are likely to be of greatest use, and to give the farmer information on the results of the year's work in a summarised and simple form.

A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND: by John Minto, M.A., F.L.A. Allen & Unwin, 1932. (10s. 6d.)

THIS book by the Librarian of the Signet Library, Edinburgh, is one of a systematic series of practical and authoritative manuals of Library work, surveying Library polity and practice in their latest aspects. There is internal evidence of the librarian's pen in the careful arrangement of subject matter, the marshalling of facts section by section, led in by Preface and Introduction and rounded off finally by two appendices and an index—all very thoroughly done. The first part of the book gives a chronological account of the gradual growth of Library law in this country. The second half is devoted to the Library Association, the training of librarians, and to the various kinds of libraries, *e.g.*, County, commercial, technical, for the blind, for hospitals, schools and so on.

THE conspectus by Mr. James Hutt of the various acts of Parliament relating to Public Libraries, museums and gymnasiums appears as an appendix to the book and forms a valuable table of reference. D.P.

THE RETIREMENT OF NATIONAL DEBTS: by William H. Withers. Columbia University Press. (King.) 1932. (\$5.00.)

IN this volume the author has provided estimates of the debt burdens of thirteen nations, and a history of debt management since the War, which includes a description of the new types of debt and of modern forms of national sinking funds.

A LARGE part of the volume is devoted to the consideration of the effects of debt retirement upon production and the distribution of wealth. The older theories of the effects of taxation upon production and upon the incomes of the various economic classes are critically discussed, and a new theory of the nature of debt burden is presented. The treatment is unique in the extent to which it introduces dynamic and institutional factors, leading into the fields of money, banking and international trade.

THE author's thorough examination of these complicated and pressing economic problems will be of interest alike to business men, government officials, and students of economic theory.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OPERATION OF RAILWAYS IN BRAZIL: by Julian Smith Duncan. Columbia University Press. (King.) 1932. (\$3.75.)

THIS volume contains a detailed investigation (with statistical tables) into the history and operations of the Railways in Brazil. Government subsidy to privately built and operated railways enabled Brazil in 1855-90 to utilise lands and resources far in advance of the time when private capital alone would have made such development possible. For various reasons, however, many of these railways came later into the hands of the Government and at the present time there are three types of operators; the federal government, state governments, and private companies. This study is an attempt to discover which type gives the best results from the standpoint of national economic well-being. The author lived in Brazil for three years, travelling over the main divisions of the roads studied, interviewing government officials and company executives and visiting all the important railway shops.

THE INDIAN MINORITIES PROBLEM: by Sir Azizuddin Ahmed, K.C.I.E., O.B.E., I.S.O. The National League.

THIS is a short pamphlet outlining the problem of the government of India from the Muslim point of view. In it the author contends that "No constitution for India, however skilful and sympathetic its devisers might be, would work even for six months unless the Muslims are given that honour and power in it which is their due." He insists on an equal partnership on the grounds of their historic leadership in India, but realises that the Muslim community is handicapped by a greater lack of education, as well as by numerical inferiority to the Hindus. The only possible solution is "compromise" and the continuance of England's "generous rule."

THE MEANING OF THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS: by Victor Frêne. 1931. This pamphlet traces the unrest in Manchuria to the imposition of "western modernisation" in the East and contends that the ceding of Manchuria to Japan by the League of Nations would destroy that CONFIDENCE which is the only basis of a possible harmony between East and West.

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THE DRAMA OF THE KINGDOM. A Pageant Play written from the Plan of Abdul Baha Abbas: by "Parvine" (Mrs. Basil Hall). Weardale Press, 1933. (2s. 6d. net.)

"THE DRAMA OF THE KINGDOM" is a representation of the principles of the Bahai Faith, written at the instigation of Abdul Baha, the Apostle of the movement and son of its prophet Baha'u'llah, by a disciple who actually sat at Abdul Baha's feet.

The author, who writes under the name which Abdul Baha gave her, "Parvine," is Mrs. Basil Hall, wife of Captain Basil Hall, R.N., and daughter of Lady Blomfield, herself one of the leaders of the Bahai movement in Europe.

THE play, which consists of a prologue, four acts, and an epilogue, conveys a message of peace, co-operation and universalism presented with charm and distinction. It will interest all who have at heart the promotion of human welfare by spiritual means.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: by Prof. Bernard C. Ewer. Macmillan. 1929. (10s. net.)

"THE corruption of the best is the worst." Prof. Ewer suggests (in different parts of his book) that (1) baffled self-assertion is the root of more nervous disorders than is the sex-instinct; and (2) our major accomplishments have their roots in love and ambition.

HE thinks that we need more studies of animal learning, especially of the young, in its natural environment, where behaviour is likely to differ from laboratory responses.

THE subject of psycho-neurotic disorders is usefully treated, and there are interesting remarks on Personality, particularly as regards the period of Adolescence.

THE author has summarised skilfully the views of other writers, without making any striking contributions of his own. This is a useful and readable text-book.

W. WARCUP.

THE FILM IN NATIONAL LIFE: by the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films. Allen & Unwin. 1932. (1s.)

THIS contains the report of an enquiry conducted by the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films into the service which the cinematograph may render to Education and Social Progress.

THE main part of the Report deals with different practical aspects and discusses the film in relation to industry, science, education, recreation, and the Empire. The last chapter contains a statement of the Commission's final recommendation—that a National Film Institute should be set up in Great Britain.

SEVERAL important Appendices give details of film projection, the usage of the cinematograph in the Empire, and a bibliography of books and papers on the subject.

THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF PROHIBITION: by Clark Warburton. Columbia University Press. (King.) 1932. (\$3.25.)

By making use of new sources of information and of modern statistical technique the author of this book has measured the output of an illegal industry which publishes no records; and he has reached far more reliable conclusions regarding the economic effects of prohibition than have hitherto been possible. The book is divided into four parts—The Consumption of Alcohol—The Effect of Prohibition upon Expenditures—Other Economic phases of Prohibition—Effects on efficiency, public health and safety, etc.—Summary and Conclusions. The whole discussion is illustrated by statistical tables and figures.

COMPETITION IN THE AMERICAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY: by Reavis Cox. Columbia University Press. 1933. (\$4.50.)

A WIDESPREAD revival of interest in "Trust problems" makes particularly appropriate at the present time an examination into the effects of the American Trust dissolution decrees of 20 years ago.

BECAUSE of the detailed care exercised in working out the provisions, the decree which divided the old American Tobacco Co. into independent and competing units is probably the most interesting. The purpose of the present volume is to study the effects of this decree both upon the individual companies and upon the industry.

THE student of the problem of industrial monopoly will find much of value in this book.

NEW YORK SCHOOL CENTERS AND THEIR COMMUNITY POLICY :
by C. A. Perry and M. P. Williams. Russell Sage Foundation. 1931. (50 cents.)

THE utilization of idle school accommodation for approved leisure-time pursuits has for some time been a regular function of educational administration in the larger American cities. Developing from lecture and entertainment programmes these activities are now mainly recreational and under the new name of "community centers" continue to give opportunity for indoor games, athletic sports, club meetings, &c., but are also something more. The change of name signifies a broadening of both function and administrative method, and it is the purpose of the authors of this study to discuss the history and significance of this latter development as revealed in the New York School Centers.

DESERTION OF ALABAMA TROOPS FROM THE CONFEDERATE ARMY :
by Bessie Martin, Ph.D. Columbia University Press. (King.) 1932. (\$4.50.)

THIS study emphasises a topic of military history which has been generally ignored. It treats of the definition of desertion, of the distribution of deserters by number, time and place, of the military, political, social and economic causes for desertion, and of the efforts to check it by measures of military force and social relief. This study finds that desertion of Alabama troops was a manifestation of sectionalism in the state, due largely to the prevalence of poverty. Here is a phase of war that cannot be glorified, although, as the author shows, it has its heroic aspects. The book is illustrated by maps.

PLANS FOR CITY POLICE JAILS AND VILLAGE LOCKUPS : by Hastings
H. Hart. Russell Sage Foundation. 1932. (\$1.50.)

THIS book of plans for adequate city jails and village lockups is the practical outcome of an enquiry into the condition of the existing provision for prisoners in the States. These conditions have been found very far from satisfactory and it is the author's hope that the plans here presented may be used wherever possible to effect urgent improvements.

LE PLAY HOUSE NOTES AND NEWS.

MONTHLY DISCUSSION MEETINGS. The series of Monthly Discussion Meetings will be continued during the summer by Meetings in May and June, the dates and times of which will be announced later. In May, Mr. Gustave Spiller will read a paper entitled *TOWARDS AN AGREED BASIS IN SOCIOLOGY*. Advance copies of Mr. Spiller's paper have been prepared and can be had on application by those wishing to take part in the discussion.

THESE meetings are open free and without ticket to members and others interested.

SUMMER REUNION. By kind invitation of Miss R. A. Pennethorne the Summer Reunion of members and friends will this year be held at Maidenhead. A programme of visits to places in Maidenhead and its neighbourhood is being arranged. Particulars will be circulated to members after Easter.

FIELD STUDY MEETINGS. The series of Vacation Meetings for Field Study which have been arranged continuously since Le Play House was opened in 1920 will be continued this summer by four meetings which offer varied opportunities for study in holiday surroundings.

IN July (probable dates 17th to 29th inclusive) a Group will visit *DURHAM* to assist in the development of the Civic and Regional Survey already commenced there by local workers. Durham is a city of unsurpassed historic interest, and the geography and natural features of the surrounding country, the urgent present-day problems of the coal field, and recent educational and social changes offer material of interest on all sides of the Survey.

IN August (probable dates 1st to 21st inclusive) a Group will follow up the studies made in the Shetland Islands last year by a visit to the *ORKNEY ISLANDS* making their headquarters at Kirkwall, and visiting many of the outlying areas. The well-marked character of the natural features, agriculture, history, and social life of the Orkneys will make this study of special value to the Institute, and to those taking part. The contrast with conditions in the Shetlands will be worked out so far as possible.

PROPOSALS are under discussion for a visit to *RUSSIA* during the month of August. There are at present certain difficulties in the way of such a visit, which would aim at being introductory to a number of detailed sociological studies in various parts of Russia. If these are overcome the visit will take place and will occupy nearly the whole of August.

IN September (probable dates 7th to 16th) a Group will visit *JERSEY* to follow up the studies commenced there in September last year under the direction of Dr. R. R. Marett. These studies will also link up with the work done at the Easter Vacation by a Group which has spent a few days in Jersey, going on for the greater part of the time to Guernsey. The co-operation of leading local specialists in this Meeting will again be a feature of importance.

ALL wishing to take part in these Meetings, or to have fuller information about them, should write as soon as possible to the Secretary, Institute of Sociology, Le Play House, 65 Belgrave Road, Westminster, S.W.1.

STUDY GROUP FOR SOCIAL WORKERS. This Group continues to meet regularly at Le Play House. Recent meetings have been devoted to a study of the effects of unemployment, illustrated by specific cases known to members of the Group. The next meeting takes place on Wednesday, 3rd May, at 6 p.m., at Le Play House. Miss Gwynne has been obliged for reasons of health to resign the position of Honorary Secretary, and Miss Muriel Wells, 48 Redcliffe Square, S.W., has kindly agreed to replace her for the rest of this session.

FAREWELLS.

THE death of SIR JOHN ARTHUR THOMSON which took place on 12th February, 1933, removes a member of the Institute who was also one of its best and closest friends. He originally came in contact with its work as a colleague of Sir Patrick Geddes and Mr. Victor Branford. His work in Aberdeen made it impossible for him to attend meetings; but he showed keen and increasing interest in the development of the Institute in recent years. Much of his own work was sociological in emphasis although biological in topic. This issue of the Review contains the result of his last service to the Institute—his review on Professor Hogben's recent book, *GENETIC PRINCIPLES IN MEDICINE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*.

THE RT. HON. J. M. ROBERTSON, who died on the 5th January, was an old member of the Sociological Society and contributor to the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*. He had recently fallen out of active touch with the Institute but had not lost his friendly and sympathetic attitude. He had a wide general interest in sociological studies, his vigorous application of anthropological concepts to religion being perhaps his best known contribution to these.

SIR BENJAMIN GOTT, who died in February, was interested in the Schools Personal Service Association and the Civic Education League—societies which were finally merged in the Institute.

FIRST ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

THE First Ordinary General Meeting of the newly Incorporated Institute of Sociology was held on Saturday, 25th February, 1933, at Le Play House, at 10.30 a.m.

THE President, Dr. R. R. Marett, took the Chair, and at the subsequent election of Honorary Officers accepted the Presidency for 1933.

Mr. C. H. Rigg and Mr. H. W. L. Loader were elected Hon. Treasurers and Mr. John Ross, C.A., Auditor.

APPOINTMENTS to the office of Vice-President were left in the hands of the Council as replies had not been received from all nominees, particularly those resident abroad.

THE following Ordinary Members of Council were elected :—

Mr. B. E. Astbury.
Miss C. V. Butler.
Mr. Geoffrey Davies.
Dr. Cecil H. Desch.
Mr. C. C. Fagg.
Dr. G. P. Gooch.
Mrs. Henry Holman.
Dr. P. Hopkins.
Miss M. M. Jeffery.
Mr. H. V. Lancaster.
Mr. G. L. Pepler.

Miss R. A. Pennethorne.
Miss Dorothea Price.
Mr. J. T. Rhodes.
Mr. G. Spiller.
Miss E. G. B. Thomas.
Mr. A. J. Waldegrave.
Mr. Dudley Walton.
Mr. R. Wellbye.
Mr. W. F. Westbrook.
Miss E. M. White.
Sir Francis Younghusband.

MR. WESTBROOK, the retiring Chairman of the Executive Committee, read his Annual Report, summing up the activities for the year 1932, and Mr. Farquharson then read the Finance Statement for 1932. These were fully considered by the meeting, the finance and administration of the Institute under the new constitution being dealt with at some length. It was generally agreed that the activities of the Institute must be properly maintained and extended and that an adequate staff, partly paid and partly voluntary, must be kept up for these purposes. It was formally resolved to refer all points raised in the discussion to the Council for their consideration and decision.

SOCIOLOGY AND REFORM.

ON Wednesday, 1st February, the first of the Monthly Discussion Meetings in 1933 was held at Le Play House. Mr. Reginald Wellbye read a paper upon SOCIOLOGY AND REFORM: A Discussion of the Relation which should exist between Sociological Science and the Demand for a new Social Order. The Chair was taken by Dr. C. H. Desch.

HERE follows the summary of the paper circulated before the meeting:—

HAS current sociology any help to offer those who seek to realise the vision of a better collective way of life?

IF not, there is need for a synoptic social study able to offer such guidance, and sociology should perform that function—re-defining, if necessary, its scope.

THE contemporary crisis in the development of knowledge, involving the abandonment by science of its indifference to human purposes, renders essential a sociology through which knowledge can effect contact with living.

SUCH new sociology should properly comprise social philosophy (cf. Prof. Urwick) and "social art" (cf. Dr. K. D. Har); and although it could claim to be a science only in the wider sense, it would not, on that account, be valueless for social engineering.

IT would neither umpire nor take sides in popular political and social controversies. Rather would it aim at a philosophical analysis of popular problems and their restatement in terms of greater reality, in expectation of being able thus to contribute to a clarification of the social situation, and to a unification and intensification of the popular will.

SIGNIFICANT for this point of view is recent "extra-mural," unlabelled sociological thought—cf. G. Heard, L. Hyde, Prof. Macmurray, H. I'A Fausset, C. Dawson, T. Burrow, etc., and some cultural anthropologists—which, using the psychological approach, has resolved popular problems into more fundamental difficulties, and is exposing the real obstacles to human co-operation.

SUCH thought already foreshadows certain findings of service to those in revolt against the existing order or important features therein, illustrative of the field open to its survey.

FINALLY, a new, more broadly conceived sociology, shaping the sum of knowledge to the service of living, might hope to lay bare, in an auto-dynamic, self-directive, self-rewarding quality resident in life itself and only obscured in the course of the development of human self-consciousness, a unifying principle of experience, replacing the no longer convincing theory of things in which the individual finds his significance only by reference to some external teleological factor.

IN that way the paralysing pessimism, scepticism, and consequent indecision characteristic of the modern temper might give way to that conviction of the inherent validity of life in all its varied facets without which the energy needed for the moulding of social circumstance nearer to the ideal cannot be generated.

THE following are selected from the written comments on Mr. Wellbye's summary received from members and friends who could not be present.

DR. R. R. MARETT, President of the Institute: I greatly regret that I cannot be present when Mr. Reginald Wellbye reads his paper, because a friendly discussion would be sure to bring out more points of agreement than of difference between us. Taking his summary, however, *in abstracto*, I find myself inclined to protest against the mixing up of the scientific and the practical interests; and I would maintain that, if there is a point at which the two must converge, it should be labelled the standpoint of Philosophy, not Science. If, then, Sociology is to retain its recognised place among the human sciences, it must avoid everything that is tendentious or confessional. This does not mean that the same man cannot, in his individual capacity, embrace the scientific interest and the philosophical. I myself have done so all my life, having been a Philosophy Tutor and an Anthropologist alternatively almost hour by hour of my working day. But, to judge by my own experience, it is of great advantage to realise consciously when you are shifting from one plane of thought to another. Scientific work can be kept quite objective and, so to speak, cool; and for comparative purposes I am sure that this is the only mood that will answer. If an Anthropologist, for instance, allows himself to think of endo-cannibalism as a horrid practice, which no doubt from a certain point of view it is, he can never hope to understand its meaning for the savage. One must be ready to play these tricks with oneself, dividing one's mind into water-tight compartments, so that like Hume one can say that "as a man I believe that the sun will rise to-morrow as usual, but as a philosopher I am content to regard it as an unproved assumption."

I AM, then, all for keeping Sociology apart from Social Reform, though of course the Social Reformer can go to Sociology for his evidence. All the evidence in the world, however, is less important for the reformer than the will and choice to introduce some new principle into human affairs. In short, a reformer works by faith, which is another thing from scientific knowledge and no doubt a better thing, but none the less different. In other words, whereas the man of Science *can* be said to "see" in his limited way, the reformer's "vision" is of the imaginative, and it is equally possible to say of him, as T. H. Green says of the revolutionary, that in the last resort he must be prepared to "go it blind" (the only piece of slang, I think, to be found in the works of that worthy philosopher).

PROF. JULIAN HUXLEY: Speaking as a biologist, I would like to draw a distinction between that part of evolutionary progress concerned with mastery over the *external* environment and that which is concerned with improvement of the *internal* environment of the species, e.g., in pre-human evolution, the chemical—and temperature—regulation of the blood of higher vertebrates. It appears to me that the chief task of sociology at the moment is to plan for progress in man's internal environment, as represented by social structure and atmosphere. This, I take it, is an amplification of the penultimate paragraph of your memorandum.

PROF. ERNEST BARKER: My difficulty on the whole subject is that I do not see how any "science" of social life can be other than an attempt to analyse and understand—an attempt which is terribly difficult. To go beyond analysis and understanding, into the region of "art" and advice—well, it is what Plato wanted, and what generous spirits will always want; but, alas, they will never be listened to by those who are "doing" things; and if they were, any scientific or "artistic" control of social life is a thing which, on the whole, I don't want. I like the multitudinous diversity of private and voluntary endeavour.

DR. J. S. MACKENZIE: I have long taken a great interest in sociological studies, though my approach to them has been largely from the ethical and speculative rather than from the purely scientific side. The great possibilities that are implicit in the nature of man stand in startling contrast with the failure and frustration which we so often find on the actual conditions of human existence; and there is no more urgent and, I think I may add, no more hopeful line of inquiry than the combined study of the actual conditions and the possible methods of improvement. The general method of approach that is indicated by Mr. Wellbye seems to me to promise good results; and I can but trust that it will be well received and will give rise to some helpful discussion. The mere concentration of attention on so important a subject can hardly fail to suggest possible methods of improvement and to stimulate efforts to render them effective. At any rate, I cannot doubt that you will have an interesting meeting and that it will help things forward.

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MR. CHRISTOPHER DAWSON : I should very much like to hear Mr. Wellbye's views, though I fear I should disagree very fundamentally with him. It seems to me that this mixing up of sociology, *i.e.*, the science of society, with philosophy is just what we have to fear most. Sociology cannot supply the answer to a purely philosophical problem like that of teleology and any attempt to use it in this way weakens it in its own essential functions.

DR. L. P. JACKS : The summary speaks of the "existing social order." Strictly speaking there is no such thing : existing society being characterised far more by disorder than by order, the present confusion of the world being only another name for this prevailing disorder of society.

THE change, which the paper suggests a new sociology could help in bringing about, is the change from an old unsatisfactory order of society to a new and better order. But life in any kind of social order would be an entirely novel experience to those who have lived in the disorderly society now existing, that is, to everybody. All the habits bred in them by ages of disorderly society would have to be broken and new ones acquired appropriate to social order. This change therefore would not be from an old order to a new one, but from disorder to order. This would be more difficult than the summary suggests.

I FEAR that the social order to which the new sociology might point would not have the least chance of success unless it were accompanied by prolonged *discipline* of all concerned directed to breaking their old habits of disorderly social conduct and replacing them by habits of order. And discipline is what everybody hates. I do not believe, either, that the new order, when announced by sociology, would automatically evoke the discipline needed to sustain it.

MISS DOROTHEA PRICE : I think the pessimism to-day is due to lack of understanding of our civilisation. Some would even say that we had no civilisation, and that civilisation has perished in our age as it perished with decadent empires before our time. We could look forward more hopefully if we understood our present stage. This knowing ourselves seems to be possible through Sociology.

MISS E. G. B. THOMAS : Much of Mr. Wellbye's paper, as it is in summary form, cannot be fairly considered without the explanation and amplification which he will give in the full paper. The meaning of phrases such as "restatement in terms of greater reality" is not clear in the summary, but would doubtless become clearer in the paper itself and should give rise to interesting discussion.

THE last two paragraphs of the summary seems to me the most significant—particularly in relation to the question of the contribution of sociology to education. Has Mr. Wellbye anything more definite to say about education—not the education of the sociologist, but of the ordinary citizen who is to live in a world governed directly or indirectly by sociologists? I presume he does not mean that every individual must have an intellectual grasp of the facts and principles of the sociology that is to "shape the sum of knowledge to the service of living"—but each individual must have some kind of grasp of the "unifying principle of experience" and "the conviction of the inherent validity of life in all its varied facets." It seems clear that the education of the future for *most people* must subordinate intellect to intuition and must endeavour to develop as fully as possible the direct intuitive knowledge of the nature of things which is at present suppressed and obscured by a vain attempt to develop intellect.

DR. M. D. EDER : There is, in my opinion, no contemporary crisis in the development of human knowledge nor indeed can science abandon its indifference to human purpose. It is nothing new even in the short history of modern scientific thought to find scientists distinguished in one field biased when approaching other fields of human knowledge, or sharing the superstitions common to their day. Newton in the 17th century, Cavendish in the 18th, Faraday and Huxley in the 19th, in the 20th certain living physicists and biologists (including combinations of these learnings) among whom I suspect are to be found the creators of Mr. Wellbye's "contemporary crisis." The application of science to human and indeed non-human interests is another affair. I agree with Mr. Wellbye that we need a collection of persons, informed by knowledge and gifted with vision—sociologists in a word—who shall clarify our social problems.

BUT these sociologists must not engage in any search for an "auto-dynamic, self-regarding, self-rewarding quality resident in life itself." This is to repeat, with a difference in its formula, the ways of all the religions and all the philosophies.

THERE is a fund of information, incomplete of course but sufficient for the object in view, as to the obstacles to helpful human co-operation. I can here but refer to Freud's "Civilisation and its discontents" and if I may be allowed to quote myself: "The first heroic discipline is a complete and full recognition of our unconscious destructive impulses; that accepted, to realise that it is not by way of repression nor by any control in obedience to a traditional morality that freedom lies."

It is significant to me at any rate that whilst Mr. Wellbye refers to some extra-muralists and to some cultural anthropologists who have used the psychologist approach he does not include those psychoanalysts who have advanced sociological formulations based upon psychoanalytic studies.

FREUD in especial, among others, Reich, Reik, and Roheim, and those who gave the lectures on "Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis" under the auspices of the Sociological Society in 1923.

If man's unconscious destructive impulse, manifested in multifarious various conscious ways, is the essential barrier to social harmony, it becomes the problem of sociologists to discover these manifestations and to work out the processes by which the energy now engaged directly or indirectly, autoplastically or alloplastically, in these destructive or violent impulses shall be resolved and canalised into channels that involve no cruelty to man unconscious or conscious, direct or substituted (*e.g.*, to other sentient organisms).

PROF. JOHANN SÖLCH (translated by Miss D. Harvey): That the present position of Sociology has little that is gratifying to offer is indeed not merely my personal opinion. This applies both to its scientific endeavours and its practical aims. In my opinion (but in all these things I speak only as a layman, and my scanty knowledge, moreover, is limited only to Germany, for, as you know, I am not a sociologist but a geographer) there are far too many theoretical considerations formulated and far too little observation material is collected. With us, one has not yet got beyond modest beginnings; perhaps I, as representative of an observational science, am particularly sensitive of this fact, just as I dislike all wordiness—that flourishes particularly luxuriantly also in philosophy. If sociology would zealously endeavour to collect the material of the facts that come under her consideration then she would immediately take on much greater practical significance in the direction of clarifying and influencing the social situation and thereby help human society to better understand and fulfil the purpose of life. Here anthropology, psychology, political economy, history and geography must be freely called to help. Unfortunately we are still very far from that goal; however, once the significance of a problem is recognised, it should be taken boldly in hand and even initial failure not allowed to act deterrently.

UNFORTUNATELY I have no close acquaintance with the works of Urwick and Har mentioned in your letter and am also unable at present to peruse them. Still less, unfortunately, can I come to London in the near future.

MR. D. CARADOG JONES: In the summary of the paper sent to me the question is raised as to whether current sociology has any help to offer those who seek to realise the vision of a better collective way of life. My answer to that would be, that one branch at least of sociological science, namely, that which is concerned with the collection and analysis of data relating to the lives of human beings who are grouped together for any purpose, may be contributing very materially towards the realisation of a new social order.

THE first step towards improvement is that we should know what the facts really are as to existing conditions, and it is the purpose of such investigations as I have in mind, not to provide superficial impressions, but to try to discover the underlying facts and the relations between them. Only so is it possible to make sure that reform shall be on the right lines.

MAY I add that I agree wholeheartedly with the point stressed in the paper, that sociology should be divorced from party-politics and prejudice? In so far as it fails to be single-minded in its devotion to the truth, it is not worthy to be called a science.

DR. A. E. GARVIE: (1) I regret that Sociology has been so much identified with the views of Comte and even Le Play, as I hold that the study of Society can be a science, a philosophy, and an art.

(2) As a science it is concerned with the observation, description, and correlation of social phenomena, but here its methods should not be assimilated to those of physical science, but rather to those of logic, aesthetics and ethics, the "normative" sciences, if science has any concern with norms, and not only facts, causes, laws.

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- (a) It must treat men as *agents*, and not merely as *products* of an impersonal social condition.
- (b) It must recognise that in human conduct in social relations there are standards, purposes, values.
- (3) HENCE the "normative" science must pass into a philosophy; it must include an estimate of the significance and the value of human society in relation to total reality.
- (4) It must therefore be concerned not only with laws of correlation, but also with principles of progress; it cannot escape the judgment of different religious ideals; while as science it must be strictly objective, when it becomes philosophy the personal equation must come in: a Buddhist, a Moslem, and a Christian cannot have the identical ideal.
- (5) HENCE sociology becomes an art, the practical application to the problems of society, of such standards, norms, principles, ideals.
- (6) WHILE we could not speak of a Christian sociology as a science, yet as a philosophy or an art it may apply the Christian's standards of judgment.
- (7) TODAY we have reached in economics and politics a *crisis* or turning-point of retrogression or progress; the accepted theories seem to me to have broken down absolutely, and to have brought society to an impasse; but the present situation is also a *crisis* in the sense of judgment; an acquisitive and competitive society has in the present consequences of its guiding principles condemned itself, and no National Government on the old lines can restore Humpty Dumpty after the great fall. Greed as motive and strife as methods in economics, and, stated in other terms, in politics—partisanship and nationalism—are under judgment.
- (8) HENCE there is an opportunity for sociology as science, philosophy and art to indicate another way, and I believe the guiding principles of that way must be service and co-operation.
- (9) THE Research Committee of the Christian Social Council, of which I am Chairman, is working on this problem of the better way.

MR. P. J. HUGHESDON: I don't clearly discern from the very short abstract what the author's line really is—his rejection of an "external teleological factor," I own, doesn't appeal to me, though possibly I misunderstand his point. In the circumstances the little that I can afford time to say may appear to you, even if true, irrelevant.

FIRST, then, I would suggest that in its main lines sociology isn't yet sufficiently developed for practical application. I should expect to find that only in respect of certain generalisations, mostly perhaps anthropological, and certain highly specialised investigations, can it afford much direct practical help.

SECONDLY, a further hindrance to practical application may be the wide difference of opinion among sociologists and psychologists; there is perhaps not much less disagreement among such on the nature of human nature than among metaphysicians on the nature of reality.

THIRDLY, such differences are exceptionally marked at present owing to the new knowledge or at least new conceptions put forward in recent years in psychology and also, though the contact here is less immediate, in biology. There is for instance the psychology of Freud, very elaborate and very revolutionary and having most important sociological bearings—is anyone able to say, even approximately, how much of this psychology will survive permanently?

FOURTHLY, assumed that there really is a great deal of sociological knowledge ripe for practical application, who is going to apply it? Most persons—statemen, industrialists and others—occupying important positions in the practical sphere would perhaps barely tolerate the idea that there is such a thing as a science of society. How then would they treat the suggestion that they might with advantage interest themselves therein and even submit to be informed and instructed in relation to their work by the exponents of that science?

REV. W. WARCUP: I am at a disadvantage in not being able to hear what is the "current sociology" which Mr. Wellbye has in mind. In my opinion, sufficient attention has not been given (even by this Institute) to the work of its distinguished Vice-President, the late Professor L. T. Hobhouse. I have yet to hear of a more scientific study of the facts about human society than that given in his "Morals and Evolution"; or a better evaluation of social institutions and discussion of the principles

of Social Philosophy than that contained in "Social Justice," "Social Development," etc. Surely no-one (unless perhaps Professor Westermarck, almost equally neglected) has so well combined the scientific and the theoretical (or philosophical) approach to the problems of Society. When due weight has been given to the very valuable work of Le Play School in bringing the sociologist out of the clouds on to *terra firma*, I cannot help feeling it a misfortune that so many members of this school should fail to recognise the value of the work of one who dealt, to an equal degree though in a different way, with social facts, although his most valuable work consists, perhaps, in his analysis of the facts for their underlying principles. His principle of Harmony (that our true good is found in the development of personality, which can only be realised fully in and through Society, and cannot be opposed to the Good of the Whole) sounds so simple when stated that our sociological Naamans prefer the Abana or Pharpar of some more abstruse philosopher. Yet how can effective social action be taken upon the basis of any theory which cannot be made clear to the popular mind? What fact is more patent than disharmony to-day?

DISHARMONY in the inner life—"complexes" and "repressions" and "neuroses." In the home—separations and divorces or "family jars." In the industrial life—strikes, etc. In the wider world—economic strife, wars, etc. Hobhouse shows how the application of the principle of Harmony, by which every personality would receive due consideration, would solve all social problems. Such differences in treatment as are to be made should be only such as can be justified by the Common Good: the social value of "personality" overrides all other considerations. Every man should be given the material goods, education, etc. which will enable him to perform the function in the community for which he is fitted, and to develop those personal qualities which are socially valuable. "Rights" and "liberties" are determined by the same principles. The ideal Society which Hobhouse visualises is a whole living by the harmonious growth of its parts. The "rights" of individuals in the State, and of "minorities" and "small nations" will be preserved in so far as they harmonise with the interests of the Whole (what we call "individuality" being recognised as something which, if rightly developed, enhances the value of a man to Society).

To apply this principle requires intelligence, but not half as much as that now required in order to patch up the damage done by the present—I had almost said "system," but nothing more clearly indicates the value of Hobhouse's principle than the fact that the most superficial survey of world affairs reveals a general state of Planlessness of which the "lay-out" of a modern city is but a symptom—the damage done by the present disharmony. Mr. H. G. Wells has done a good deal to show us how physical and social science can collaborate in the creation of a better world. Hobhouse himself says that it is on the possibility of controlling social forces by the aid of social science as perfectly as natural forces are controlled at present by the aid of physical science, that the permanent progress of mankind must depend. *Re* "the real obstacles to human co-operation": there is a great deal of co-operation already, or our civilisation could not exist even in its present imperfect form. Even successful competition depends upon co-operation. As the factory hand has replaced the craftsman, so the Company and the Combine have thrust out the individual trader. Even a strike or lock-out presupposes co-operation. What we need is the right kind of leader to induce us to take the next step. (? a combination of Mussolini and Selfridge and H. G. Wells—men with vision and organising ability plus strength.)

MR. GUSTAV SPILLER: The leading sociologists, I should say, have been singularly impressed with the vital importance of sociology providing a solid basis for social reforms. Auguste Comte, the founder of sociology, reasoned at full length that our social ills are primarily due to the absence of sound sociological foundations which alone can tell us what we can reasonably attempt. Emile Durkheim, his leading French successor, stated that his researches would leave him utterly disappointed if they were to satisfy only a speculative interest. Later writers have been no less emphatic. As Albion Small writes: "In general, political science finds out the best methods of legal control; political economy, the best means of ensuring material prosperity; sociology, the best means of promoting the development of human personality." Each of these sciences, he argues, "attempts to find out how to bring something to pass." Herbert Spencer certainly did not ignore our problem, whatever we may think of his solutions. Again, Hobhouse in his "Social Development" and other sociological works; Ellwood, in his "Psychology of Human Society"; Geddes and Branford in their respective contributions; and numerous other sociologists, have been deeply convinced that sociology has not only a theoretical but also a practical end. Indeed, some French sociologists, such as Professor Duprat, distinguish normal and abnormal social life, and on this basis seek to build up a social economy or normal society, normal being that which integrates and abnormal that which disintegrates society and humanity.

BUT what of results? In these brief remarks of mine there can be no question of discussing them. Suffice it to say that it appears to me an entirely correct contention that little can be expected of social reforms until we have a scientific basis for them. Sociologists also point out that the social reformer, like the sociologist and the man of science generally, should examine social problems impartially and thoroughly and not be dominated by political, economic, social, religious, and other prejudgments, which make solid progress an impossibility. Furthermore, sociologists as a rule discount as a whole the innate factor, and thus they are willing to give women, the working classes, peoples, and races a fair opportunity to develop to their full stature. Lastly, sociologists are fully aware of the limitless changes mankind has undergone and are therefore hopeful of all advanced and comprehensive social efforts so long as these are not hasty, crudely elaborated, and the outcome of unreasoning and narrow-based emotions. It is my belief that serious social reformers would considerably benefit by a perusal of the leading sociological works and that a fully developed sociological science—sure to come—will intensively promote far-reaching social reforms ushering in a new social order.

DR. JULIE MOSCHELES and DR. F. ULRICH: In order to realise the vision of a better collective way of life Sociology has to investigate the causes of existing frictions. It has to follow how and when these frictions began to come into existence, and whether they show by their distribution a special relation to certain places, folks, or works. Physics teaches that friction between two bodies varies with the greater or lesser smoothness of their surface and with the mutual pressure existing at the plane of contact. A crowding together increases the pressure, physical overcrowding, bad housing-conditions, as well as economic overcrowding, overproduction, unemployment. Pressure may be largely compensated by smoothness of surface, therefore by the goodwill of co-operation.

CO-OPERATION may be effected in a "horizontal" or "vertical" direction. Horizontal co-operation is the forming of unions by producers mostly of the same scale of the same commodity, whether these producers are railways, coal-mines, cotton-growers or any kinds of manufacturers, or Labour. Vertical co-operation is the forming of unions of all those interested in the production, transformation and consumption of a given commodity and of all that is required in this process. Vertical co-operation has so far been hardly developed. It would mean for instance the development of a common interest of the cotton-growers and their farm-hands, of the masters, employees and workmen in cotton spinning and weaving mills, and in all industries engaged in making cotton-goods marketable, of the merchants and of the buying public. It will be seen that horizontal co-operation is lessening friction between the individuals of one social class or of one economic group within a social class, whereas vertical co-operation would be lessening the friction between individuals of different social classes and economic groups. In the first case a lessening of general interior friction is accompanied by the concentration of the same friction along certain planes where it makes itself all the more felt. In the second case there may come about a real decrease of friction by the realisation of the interrelation of the interests of all individuals.

VERTICAL co-operation is older than horizontal co-operation, and it is found everywhere under conditions of economic isolation: where family, clan or tribe produce what they need and consume what they produce. Even where slavery exists, the goodwill between master and slave is generally better developed than between modern work-giver and work-taker. In the first case the interrelation of interests is understood, at least in as much as the slave represents a certain economic value to his master, and that while the master will try to keep him in good working condition, this is possible only under the condition of a certain prosperity of the master, which therefore lies in the interest of the slave. The lack of comprehension for the interrelation of interests between work-giver and work-taker on the one hand, between producer and consumer on the other, may be considered as one of the roots of the present crisis, which is much more a social than an economic one.

CO-OPERATION holds the balance between individualism and collectivism. Extreme individualism means angular fragments, friction on all sides. Extreme collectivism represents an amorphous state of society, a colloidal jelly incapable of assuming shape. Co-operation all round should be society crystallized, each molecule fitted to its place and to its neighbours, with interior planes of cleavage—representing a modified personal, family and national individualism, overruled by and in keeping with the shape of crystallized human society.

In view of a reform of social conditions Sociology has to study co-operation, its existing forms, the ways and means of its advancement and possible development, and it has to give largest publicity to the findings obtained by these investigations.

DR. C. J. BOND : I regard "the abandonment by Science of its (present) indifference to human purposes" as an important factor in recovery from the "world chaos" from which we are suffering today.

I THINK, however, it would be better to put the problem rather differently, and express the hope that scientific men and leaders in Science will give their help in applying scientific knowledge and the scientific spirit in an endeavour to bring about a better adjustment between civilised man and his social and general environment—in other words, in the solution of our present day problems.

ONE, perhaps the main factor, in bringing about the present state of affairs has been the fact that socialised man has (rightly) interfered with the action of natural selection under the old order, but has so far failed to establish any adequate system of artificial (i.e., human) control in its place. What is wanted, if civilisation is to be saved and progress ensured, is that modern man, individually and collectively, should realise the fact that he is being called upon to exercise increasing control over his own destiny, and that such control requires among other things the wise application of biological and genetic knowledge to human affairs and human life.

MR. F. J. RICHARDS : Frankly I cannot follow Mr. Wellbye's meaning, particularly its penultimate paragraph. A friend I consulted said people used to write like that 30 years ago; but I was not in England then, and the England I have come back to is curiously different from that in which I was born and bred, and I do not understand its change. In many ways it seems more old-fashioned and the "new sociology" strikes me as curiously antique, a rechauffé of miscellaneous academical tags ranging from Plato to Rousseau. Mr. H. G. Wells is a typical example of this archaistic tendency. I can't see how Mr. Wellbye's ideas apply to human life. Has Mr. Wellbye ever been in love, and has he been a Boy Scout? If so, he would know the human joy of service, and real key to human happiness, that it is better to give than to receive. That is the bedrock of human happiness, a practical code of hedonism, in one word, Love; the one and only panacea. I doubt whether Mr. Wellbye and his sympathisers would know what I mean for the new psychology degrades love with lust, and that Devil's gospel has made great headway since the war.

REV. J. C. PRINGLE (commenting on Dr. Marett's remarks) : Despite my life long affection and admiration for Dr. Marett I find myself in almost complete disagreement with him.

A FAITH which is to provide 100 per cent. sanction for "going it blind" in social reform requires an Infallible Authority which can say at any given moment, what, in fact, is the faith on any given question, even though it has to make the reservation that a different decision may be given tomorrow.

THERE is absolutely no "going it blind" here at all. The utmost resources of knowledge and intelligence are focused all the time.

IF that is found necessary by the only body which gives faith any such authority, we other outsiders may be pretty confident in assigning to faith an important but by no means despotic position and emphatically objecting to *going it blind*. This is of course the creed of Cole and Tawney. Cole has receded from it entirely; Tawney has greater reserves of bad temper than Cole and writes less. He may still hold it. Both borrowed it blind from Gustave Sorel, who himself entirely repudiated it. Cole climbed to notoriety by it and is in consequence now able to sell 50,000 copies of his reiterated recantations.

DR. MARETT is of course sure to be right somewhere. Let us look for the place or places.

QUITE as great as the danger from the concern and bad temper which Cole and Tawney mistook for faith, is the danger from *intellectualists* and purely clever people who tend to think a practical problem solved and *disposed of* by a clever article or even formula; more especially as the latter lends itself to embodiment in an Act of Parliament. The Epistle to the Hebrews, that beautiful and eloquent document, sets out Dr. Marett's view and its application very finely.

I SHOULD like perhaps to try to put it like this :

GATHER knowledge *indefatigably*. Use *all* the intelligence you can command *all the time*, but, without fail, carry along with you, all the art and poetry you can beg, borrow or steal, AND put yourself through a constant, if possible, daily discipline of case work. This discipline is considered absolutely indispensable by *lawyers and doctors* of all kinds; it is *at least* as indispensable for social reformers, sociologists and politicians.

THE upshot is this : ONLY BELIEVE that these poor sad things whose sometimes brave, but often feeble and mean, records and attitudes IS the test and touchstone and source of all your theorising, are ALSO, somewhere, somehow the source and touchstone and best of all the poetry and Art which make it worth while to go on.

THE following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting :

CAPT. HUME MENZIES thought Mr. Wellbye's attack on the academic sociologists too emphatic. Sociology is a new academic discipline in England and the academic workers so far have shown a broad outlook. Spencer's influence was responsible for a narrower type of sociology. It is usual to think of sociology as a science of facts which leave values to philosophy. Undoubtedly a philosophy of values can be of enormous value to the reformer. At the present day Freud's psychology has a wide-spread influence on sociologists, but Freud's work is merely a philosophy in disguise ; there should be room for both studies of fact and studies of value.

MR. C. C. FAGG endorsed the importance of the psychological approach. If it is asked whether sociology can become a science, attention should be given to the empirical sociologists—*i.e.*, statesmen, priests, press magnates, etc. who are at present running society and presumably understand society in an empirical way. A science of sociology should emerge in time from their findings. Psychology was quite barren until the time of Freud, his books give us the key but psycho-analysts themselves are not likely to contribute much of value to sociology as they are dealing with exceptional cases. Sociology is essentially a field science and can only be studied on that basis. The sociologist must go out and make actual observations of peoples—philosophic interpretations will arise from these.

MR. FARQUHARSON asked if anybody ever got his working scheme of values from philosophy ? Values and facts are inseparable. Philosophy can do no more than attempt a satisfactory explanation of values ascertained by more direct process.

PROF. STANLEY JEVONS mentioned the danger in using the term "value" which obviously has different meanings for different persons. Exact terminology is one of the first requirements of a science and must be attended to in sociology. He would regard sociology as a science dealing with the facts of social life in civilised countries as well as the institutions of tribe and feudal conditions and would distinguish it from social philosophy. At the same time we cannot judge whither sociology will lead us till much further study has been accomplished. In his own studies of modern English economic life he has been led to go behind the current explanations to the deeper sociological causes.

MR. RENNIE SMITH called attention to the close relations between sociology and education and sociology and politics. He asked—is it possible by developing sociology to arrive at a vital philosophy and illumine life and give it a meaning ? We cannot separate philosophy and sociology, values and facts go together. A practical difficulty in actual teaching is that for various reasons the present age with its controversial questions is neglected. History teaching tends to stop in the 19th century. An analysis of contemporary society should be attempted. In this connection the growth of fact finding bodies in relation to politics is of interest. Further, much knowledge already gathered is not being used—*e.g.*, reports on industrial conditions. The synthetic point of view is essential.

MR. SENIOR FOTHERGILL criticised sociology for its concentration on symptoms to the exclusion of sociological disease and for its neglect of experiment. Workers in other fields of science had made progress by hypothesis and experiment but sociological field work, though of value, was not experimental nor were the sociologically unscientific activities of statesmen and industrial magnates.

DR. SCOTT WILLIAMSON noted that the criticism of sociology was a hopeful sign but was often linked up with misconceptions of the nature of science. Both sociology and economics have been content to take past events and find in these prophetic indications. Both economists and sociologists are now discontented with their failure to reach results by this method. Little more, however, can be expected from the philosophers and psychologists. Unless values are discovered by science they will not be of much use in the future. The remedy for social discontent is obviously the adoption of the scientists method of experiment. The human being has not yet been studied experimentally. When he is it is discovered that past history has no relation to the present human being. The Institute should contain a group engaged in such experimental studies.

MR. CANNON suggested that before sociological problems can be solved it is necessary to discover a technique for stating them adequately. No science can work without adequate patterns. Further, phenomena fall into different classes—mechanical—organic—human, and this classification must be recognised as basic.

THE CHAIRMAN drew attention to the discussions which took place at the foundation of the Sociological Society nearly thirty years ago. The first year was devoted to discussion on the scope and meaning of sociology. The basic assumption was that the methods valid in established sciences should be applied to social phenomena. The belief was that sociology developed on these lines would be of immense practical value. Two views of sociology had been indicated in the discussion. One of these would regard it as the science of social phenomena, the other would make it a comprehensive science and indeed a philosophy of the sciences—attempting a complete synthesis. The second and larger scheme, whilst equally important, should, he thought, be kept distinct from the science of sociology.

MR. WELBYE, in replying to some of the points raised in the discussion, said his paper divided itself into two parts. The first part was devoted to the contention that sociology ought to recognise its responsibility to social discontent and the demand for a better social order, while the second was intended to furnish a few illustrations of how such a policy might work out.

THE contention implied no depreciation of the work being done in sociology. The point was that, as evidenced by the spate of sociological textbooks and monographs issuing from the United States and some continental countries, academic sociology did not go far enough, did not conceive of its province sufficiently broadly, and therefore needed rousing to the full importance of its rôle.

APROPPOS the second part, sociology was not being asked to furnish a philosophy of life. It could not give values; but it could point out where and how values are to be discovered.

It could, further, make clear to us the distortion which takes place in our perception of social situations, and consequently in our feelings, and help us to view our circumstances with a more serviceable degree of reality.

REGARDING the suggestion that sociology could only be scientific in proportion as it was experimental, it was difficult to see how experimental communities could be established, and even if set up how conditions could be adequately controlled—quite apart from the slowness of the process.

THE only kinds of experimentation open to sociology were in the spheres of psychology and social anthropology. In the latter direction very promising examples were represented by the work of Margaret Mead. To take one instance: this observer felt dubious as to the inborn character of the crisis of adolescence; to test the matter she studied a widely different culture, that of Samoa, and finding the crisis absent there was justified in concluding that it was only a cultural phenomenon. Such a demonstration, assuming it to be trustworthy, of the non-existence of a characteristic widely believed to be innate in human nature, was equivalent to an experiment.

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As to psychology, the help to be looked for in this quarter might seem slight in view of the conflicts still unresolved between the different schools. Despite the great debt under which Freud had laid the science, the Freudian explanation of conduct obviously could not be regarded as proven, while psycho-analysis had yet to meet its most rigorous criticism.

NEVERTHELESS, there was in existence a volume of psychological knowledge, much of it enshrined in popular wisdom and confirmed or explained by recent investigation, which, if sorted out and systematised, would carry us a long way towards that sounder understanding of human nature essential for progress.

In conclusion, it was urged that the complexity of the social situation was becoming so great as absolutely to necessitate a greater degree of reality in our perception of our circumstances than at present existed, in order successfully to solve our problems; and, further, that it should be the business of sociology to proclaim that truth to those who might seek its counsel in achieving a better order.

PROGRESS AS A SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORY.

ON Friday, 24th February, at the Goring Hotel, Ebury Street, S.W.1., Dr. R. R. Marett, President of the Institute, 1932, delivered his Presidential Address at the second Monthly Discussion Meeting this year. The summary prepared by Dr. Marett and circulated beforehand is printed here.

SOCIOLOGY belongs to the group of the biological sciences and as such shares their general interest in the problem of organic development. Evolution, however, which was taken over by Darwin from the Spencerian philosophy, means, or ought to mean, something broader than organic development, since Spencer was trying to formulate a law embracing both the organic and the inorganic. Thus as employed within the sphere of biology evolution can serve only as a regulative, as contrasted with a constitutive, category; being, in simpler language, too wide to promote explanation on strictly biological lines. In short, at the level of science, as opposed to that of philosophy, the biologist, and therefore, the sociologist as a kind of biologist, has no business to concern himself with evolution at all—at all events as the last word of a more or less materialistic philosophy.

PROGRESS, on the other hand, can mean something that is entirely relevant to the sociological point of view, and the only question is how far the sociologist is justified in claiming to impose a category so convenient for his own purposes on the biological sciences taken as a whole. Such a claim must rest on the indisputable fact that all science is of human construction, and achieves so-called objectivity by means of mental processes which man can at the same time study psychologically, that is, from the inside. Thus introspection proves the materialistic outlook of the physical sciences to be simply a method of formulating a surface-view of things as afforded by the senses, and more especially by those of touch and sight. The human sense-apparatus being remarkably uniform and constant, we thus get in the material aspect of the universe an epitome of its most communicable features, and hence an instrument for its exterior manipulation which proves very useful. But one can appreciate matter in its place without disparaging the spiritualities. These form the main interest of sociology, since it must seek its clues chiefly within the inner life of Man.

In particular, what general biology distinguishes as dominance can be construed in reference to human history as progress since here mind rather than body provides the test of superiority in the struggle for existence. Such progress in spirituality may be conceived in terms of the greatest self-realisation of the greatest number. The triple test of intellectual meaning, moral value, and metaphysical reality can be applied immanently and constitutively within the human sciences as within no other part of biology. Hence, since sciences, and their severally appropriate categories, must be arranged in a hierarchical order corresponding to their relative comprehensiveness, progress, as being evolution, and something more, is the higher and more fruitful conception; and the sociologist has the right to put his own interpretation on evolution, namely, as the progressive liberation of spirit.

TEN members and friends sent written comments on the summary which are printed here:

MR. F. S. MARVIN: Dr. Marett's address is an exceedingly just and comprehensive view of the subject, and I find myself in complete general agreement with it. Had I spoken, I should have only wished to lay a little more stress on the intellectual side of the extent of progress. The more I reflect on it, the more convinced I am that the development of science is the leading and most significant feature, bearing with it, as it does, the moral element of communion between minds. It is on this side that we have the clearest demonstration of progress.

DR. J. S. MACKENZIE: I can see from the summary that the general views that are set forth in it are such as I can very heartily agree with. With regard to the general idea of evolution, I think it is a little misleading to speak as if Darwin had derived his idea of evolution from the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Surely it was rather the other way about. Darwin was really the first to formulate in a definite way the general idea of organic evolution, though a somewhat slighter statement of it was made almost simultaneously by A. R. Wallace and there had been some hints of it by previous writers. Spencer's formulation of it as a general philosophical doctrine came somewhat later; and, in this general form, it had been to some extent anticipated by earlier writers. But this does not affect its importance as forming the basis for modern views of social progress.

BEFORE the biological idea of evolution was generally accepted, it was rather common for people to refer to the "good old times"; whereas now it is more usual to think of a "good time coming." But it is well to remember that evolution does not go on as a matter of course. At the lower levels of life it is largely dependent on the "struggle for existence." At the higher levels it depends rather on the *conscious effort* to improve the conditions of life. The late Sir Patrick Geddes, to whom Le Play House owes so much, may be said to have devoted almost the whole of his life to this effort. It is not an easy thing; but the general history of human life shows us that many things that were not easy have been accomplished. There is no reason to doubt that great improvements will continue to be made in the conditions of human life; and that it will become increasingly possible for everyone to participate in them.

MISS R. A. PENNETHORNE: This very interesting "ground plan" of an address seems to turn round the old discussion as to whether evolution depends upon "Natural Selection" or "Inspired taste"!

THE "Inner" Life of Man with its "intellectual meaning, moral value, and metaphysical reality" turns upon his *choice* of ideas (for social progress as for any other).

THE progressive liberation of the Spirit means its gradual evolution towards a *social* and *sociable* functioning, apart from his individual needs—hence a gradual sublimation of "choice" in all categories. See the recent articles in the PRAVDA on the need recognised now by a Soviet education for better preparation for *collective* life—i.e., for some social amenities and niceties in *Training* as apart from "teaching."

THUS we rise above "touch and sight" to selection in what we choose to touch and see, and what we prepare for future generations to touch and see—i.e., all great art, great buildings, great spectacles are sublimations through "taste" and "choice" and individual or inspirational. To study any "science" is a selective choice among man's opportunities, and to study social science is to choose the widest field for the application of ideas!

PROFESSOR J. J. FINDLAY: I have looked back to my little book on Sociology (1920) to see how far Dr. Marett's summary carries me beyond where I was then. (1) It helps to clarity of definition to accept the term PROGRESS as definitely attached to the *human* species only. I think Dr. Marett means this—but does he think that one could use the term in reference, say, to dogs or other domesticated creatures? I do not speak or think of progress in the dog, but only in man's adaptation of that species.

ELEVENTH line of 2nd paragraph—Why select touch and sight?

THIRD line of 3rd paragraph—Why "in the struggle for existence?" "He that saveth his life shall lose it."

NEXT sentence—Why the quantitative test of "the greatest number"—Is "number" a necessary category? At any rate not when we think of any portion of *time*. One or a few may make progress in self-realisation. If the crowd *do not* follow, what matter? The step in progress has been taken—who cares if I am as yet alone?—Is not this at least the idea of Progress in the Grammarian's Funeral?

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I DISTRUST the term "liberation," if it means here freedom *from* the body. For I see nothing to warrant me in assuming reality for a spiritual life that is not combined with a physical frame. I agree substantially (I think) with Dr. Marett's view of Progress, but should dissent if he points us to some spiritual goal of arrival somewhere where the world of sense is not. I can find no evidence, other than men's wishes, for *such* liberation.

MRS. C. S. HODSON : Modern Darwinians may venture to suggest that the limitations given in the paper to the realms of "Evolution" and "Biology" are not fundamental—in other words not actual in fact. While they are evidently introduced for clarity these limitations lead rapidly to a dualism—acceptable in certain philosophies, but fatal on the empirical plane to progress in sociology and biology (these it is maintained being two aspects of existence indissolubly interlocked, the former the upper stratum of the latter).

PARAGRAPH 2. Thus while Progress is admittedly a human conception this idea should properly be regarded as itself a product of Evolution. It is attained only by discovering the road (or laws) of evolution and by unrelenting and undeviating pursuit thereof. The reference to "spirituality" in the end of this section, again seems based on a restricted conception which though formerly fairly generally put forward, does not now appear acceptable: for although the term "Spirit" is avoided in Scientific discussion (doubtless to avoid trespass on grounds of Religious dogma) the phenomena so characterised form part of the nature of man and are no more cut off from evolutionary history than *e.g.*, language—unless, that is, we are driven to hold as valid the age-long dualistic conceptions of the orient.

IN regard to paragraph 3, the ethical as well as pragmatic advantages of the standpoint (outlined above) emerge—an evolutionist would postulate "spiritual" progress not as taking place in the direction of self-realisation, but rather in the development of the other regarding attitude; altruism, and the attachment of the affections to persons, and even *ideas* outside the self—which attitude can be traced in biological evolution). Possibly self-realisation is meant as the projection of the self in the common good?

MR. P. J. HUGHESDON : I would begin by querying the propriety of classing sociology as a biological science. The biological analogy no doubt is often suggestive but perhaps too often fallaciously and seductively so. And there are great differences between sociology and biology. For instance, is there anything really analogical in biology to tradition, linguistic and other, which is of such vast importance in sociology, constituting most of what we call civilisation?

NEXT, I should question whether "evolution" can ever rightly be treated as more than a regulative, a convenient working idea, whether it can stand for a single principle of universal scientific validity, still more whether it can be held to express a universal truth of metaphysics. I don't know much about the "Synthetic Philosophy," but only, I imagine, by means of some no doubt unconscious sophistry was Spencer able to present his evolutionary formula as a generalisation of universal validity.

NEXT, I should suggest that in respect of perhaps all the sciences it is necessary in some measure at least to look within as well as without. Biology deals with life and our knowledge of life as of mind, though not in the same degree, is obtained primarily from within. Again as regards physical science, apart from the fact that it has been built up largely through such internal processes as hypothesis—framing and mathematical discovery, the fundamental ideas dealt with, "energy" for instance, have to some extent come from within, though it may be arguable here that even if we have direct experience of energy, the experience has been so transformed, perhaps both psychologically and even physiologically, in any case so intellectualised, as to be often misleading. But of course one looks within in the case of sociology much more than even in that of biology. This, I should say, is partly because mind can be much more fully revealed than life by such introspection, partly because in the case of societies as compared with organisms we are dealing with entities of whose whole course of normal and natural existence we have no such knowledge as we have in the case of organisms and therefore, in respect of future development, and, in part, of many contemporary aspects of social life and structure and functioning, we have to rely on ideas of mind, personal and social, largely obtained from within. Among such would-be ideas of progress and if such ideas seem to be sound and helpful, we should certainly make use of them. One may perhaps appropriately recall here Aristotle's illuminating comment on the sophists' distinction of nature and convention that the true nature of a thing was revealed less in its origin than in its normal and especially its culminating development. And similarly any idea that helps us to understand what are the normal or

at any rate most normal lines of social development should be further helpful in enabling us to understand better what is the true nature of society. "Progress" may well be such an idea.

IN reading the synopsis of Dr. Marett's paper I had the feeling that to comment on it adequately would necessitate adventuring into very deep waters and dealing with fundamental conceptions. However that may be, I must restrict myself to the above remarks and finish by expressing my regret that I cannot be present and hear the paper itself.

REV. J. C. PRINGLE : Dr. Marett carries me completely through paragraphs 1 and 2. In paragraph 3 I am more at sea.

WHY is struggle for existence introduced at all? In the spiritual sphere it is valid to die, be crushed in the struggle for existence, if one does it beautifully—in fact, it is almost always more beautiful and "higher" ethically, than to survive.

IT may have been a blunder, but it was, was it not, higher ethically to die for Prince Charlie than to survive on the good rations and adequate ammunition "found" by the Duke of Cumberland.

THE 47 Ronin story made modern Japan, and the whole point of it is that they did not survive.

BUT is Dr. Marett rather thinking of the survival of *ideas*. In that case I suppose the Spartans survived triumphantly at Thermopylae, as Nelson at Trafalgar. (I know my examples are childish).

GREATEST self-realisation of greatest number is of course very attractive, but *what kind of self* are these numerous animals realising? Does greatest here = highest, noblest or just most? Then we should measure it by the number of attendances at cinemas, number of cigarettes smoked, greatest number of miles covered in motor cars, etc.

PROGRESS, greatest numbers, struggle for existence, dominance, all seem to me incompatible with and irrelevant to that idea of the Good and Beautiful in the super-heavenly places to which Dr. Marett taught us to direct our longing eyes in 1894-5. It seems to be integral to it to have no shadow of turning, to be always equally beautiful whether seen by one or one billion. Our apprehension of it may change. *It* is always there and always the same for any who have eyes to see; or again, is it simply temperamental? Dr. Marett must get to a *Yes* about Progress somehow, for he has a forward lunging soul. People like me cannot bear progress, because we have shrinking souls. We long to say with Keats "The voice I hear this selfsame night was heard in ancient days by emperor or clown,"—or words to that effect.

THUS 4th dynasty Egyptian stuff seems grander, stronger, truer, more competent than any after; and Odysseus the one being who understood it all.

DOES Dr. Marett mean that we love what we suppose to be the best and most beautiful *more*, and *more* of us love it, than ever before? I could imagine *that* to be progress, but why should we suppose that in fact we love them any more than good Athenians did? Why as much? Asquith's speeches in the war were poor things compared to Thucydides, Grey's even more so. Can we *touch* the Hebrew Prophets or Paul? Or there again do we beautify it all ourselves and read it into them, and, if so, how do we know that?

NOW I believe you will say "that is all perfectly irrelevant: nobody ever suggested that we progress as *individuals*." Our contention is that Society in the U.K. in 1933 A.D. is better than it was in Athens in 430 B.C., and for the reasons given by Dr. Marett."

WELL, I retort, it oscillates, rises and sags—we think we detect *peaks*, but who would pick 1933 as one of them???? 1800 seems to me better than to-day. Values, stabilities, objectives, personalities have all faded, gone thin, banal, have nothing to them.

MR. K. E. BARLOW : Our conception of Evolution has two modes, a biological and a sociological.

THE biological application of the conception of "Evolution" has represented an attempt at explanation in a field of scientific thought.

THE sociological application of the conception "Evolution" has arisen from the biological by analogy. This has rendered it (in fact) a confusion rather than a definition. The use of it as a category tends to cause a bending of experience so that this may conform to interpretations of experience—this in act as well as thought. The conception of "Evolution" in its sociological application purports none the less to describe a process which must happen. The proof that this process does occur however is derived from opinion and not from fact.

THE introduction of a category of progress seems to me to be prejudging the character of events even more decisively.

POTENTIAL Order however, is manifest in the living of both individuals and peoples. The task of sociology will eventually be to comprehend that order. Such comprehension depends not merely upon observation but upon actualisation of the potential. The past of sociology in this actualisation must be experiment.

IN this sense I agree with Dr. Marett that sociology must seek its clues chiefly within the inner Life of Man.

MR. DUDLEY WALTON : I take it that by " progress " is meant the tendency of human beings in society to develop definite forms of integration and organisation, arising out of experience, necessarily different from the immediately preceding form, and one more adapted to those changes which the preceding form has encouraged and imposed. Such a concept of social progress is not only regulative but also constitutive.

WITH regard to the experience of mankind being an epitome of the most communicable features of the Cosmos, it seems to me that the nature and extent and quality of these communicable features depend rather upon the capacity of the human being to perceive and apprehend than upon any inherent and ultimate quality of the universe in possessing features which are communicable to mankind. Every animal according to its nature has a similar epitome, but the sum of all such experiences cannot exhaust the universe or our concept of it. In this sense self-realisation becomes man's reaction to the immediately environmental part of the Cosmos which man can perceive and apprehend, and the Cosmos must be regarded as an environment of infinite possibilities of further and more complete experience, this being so even if the word " progress " does not connote any real change or movement in regard to time and space. A finite experience of a part of an infinite environment must have a quality of infiniteness.

As a corollary it seems convenient to postulate " life " as an entity of the same order of being as matter and energy, linked with materialistic concepts through the study of biology, and with what may be called immaterialistic concepts through the study of psychology.

M. C. LINARD DE GUERTECHIN : Biology has for its object the study of organic beings, Sociology is interested especially in man. If it is desired to give the name " evolution " to purely organic beings, the term " Progress " may be applied to the development of man, a development which we cannot study relying exclusively on biological premises. In the hierarchy of terrestrial creatures, man places himself on the highest level. Made up of matter and of spirit he shows in his sense life the characteristics of the animal kingdom but his spiritual character is predominant. Biology is not able to extend to this spiritual life. The spiritual life of man being closely bound up with his sense life, influences that in such a fashion that biology cannot solve all the problems raised by this sense life in constant touch with spirit.

IN the course of a long and vigorous discussion MR. WARCUP suggested that progress depends upon how far we are able to control ethical forces to the same extent as we now control natural forces. MISS NANCIE SHARPE raised questions about the use in Sociology of such terms as " mind " and " soul." MR. FARQUHARSON and MR. WALDEGRAVE pointed out that neighbourliness tends to disappear as society becomes larger and more complex and asked if this were implied in progress. MR. FAGG suggested that a criterion of progress might be growth towards omnipotence and omniscience but it remained to be seen whether this is synonymous with charity or love. DR. DESCH said that the study of society is much more than the study of the individuals who compose society and suggested that ethics and sociology be dealt with as two separate things. MR. GEOFFREY DAVIES threw doubts upon the theory of evolution as taught in schools and thought that " recent progress " might be leading society to disaster. THE PRESIDENT answered all the questions and points raised with great sympathy and good humour, laying emphasis on his view of sociology as human science in its most comprehensive form. MR. WALDEGRAVE expressed the thanks of the meeting to the President with unanimous and warm approval.

TOWARDS A NATIONAL PLAN.

THE 3rd Monthly Discussion Meeting was held at Le Play House, on Tuesday, March 28th, when a paper, illustrated by lantern slides, was read by Mr. Geoffery Clark. The paper, entitled "Towards a National Plan, the Urban and Rural Antithesis," is given in full in another part of this issue. A summary here follows :—

ENGLAND to-day is a land where 80 per cent. of the population live in urban areas. This has made the urban outlook the dominating influence. Nevertheless there is an increasing knowledge of rural England and a growing desire to preserve it from itself becoming urbanised.

To achieve this it is essential to have a national plan which will look at the country as a whole. In undertaking the organisation of the plan due consideration must be given to the difference in outlook of the two conflicting ways of life, the town way and the country way. The country and its folk have evolved slowly during the age long struggle with nature. They are part of the rural picture. The townsman, on the other hand, is cut off from contact with natural forces, and tends to live intellectually. His idea is to supplant nature. To do this he will stop at nothing, and it is idle to frustrate him. Within the plan he must be given full scope in areas classed as urban. Beyond these areas the rural philosophy and economy would be dominant, not only for the sake of amenity, but to provide the essential ballast in the national system. Throughout "history" the townsfolk succumbed to the sedentary nature of their life, and the more virile stock from the hills have descended upon the helpless inhabitants, and ruled them, only themselves to fall a prey to the weaknesses inherent in the urban condition. A plan should take account of this by keeping the countryside open and thus providing the essential antidote.

EDUCATION of public opinion is a necessary side of national planning and full advantage should be taken of the survey system in schools to enlighten the coming generation. With no public opinion to back it up the plan would fail in its purpose. In fact, now that the mediæval system has finally broken down before the machine civilisation, real education is the most vital necessity. Without it democracy is bound to fail.

THE following contributions from absent members were read after the paper :—

CAPTAIN ARTHUR ST. JOHN : On invitation I venture the following remarks, at the risk of their appearing to be impertinent in two senses of the word :

FOR how far ahead is it proposed to plan ? One difficulty which suggests itself to me is the fact that we do not know what the world will be like in another 50 years, or 30, or 20, or even 10 years. Perhaps all civilisations have been unjust, but our present variety is not only very obviously unjust, but even ridiculous in its economic working. It is apparently doomed, and though we cannot say how long the doom will take to fulfil itself, there is surely no doubt that, unless drastic changes are made in its economic arrangements, the end is certain to come in time, and perhaps in a very short time. We have, therefore, some ground for hoping that a not very distant, but very different future lies before us. And as we do not know what that future will be like, it is difficult to see how to plan for it.

AND yet, no doubt, planning of some kind there must be. If you want to build only one house, you first make a plan. So perhaps for a number of houses a plan is even more necessary : and I presume that the matter in hand is mainly one of providing suitable homes suitably placed with regard to work and recreation.

THE summary circulated seems to divide us all into two distinct classes—country folk and townsmen. But surely a large proportion of that 80 per cent. living in "urban areas" can hardly be called real townsmen. Nor are they countrymen any longer as far as their present situation indicates. Might we not say that a majority of our population now is made up of people who are neither true country folk nor true townsmen.

WHAT we might become under just conditions one cannot say. And I think we should always bear in mind that present conditions are largely the result of ages of injustice, what I beg leave to call ages of transition from primitive, innocent fraternity

destined after many wanderings in the wilderness to end in the discovery of mature fraternity, called the Kingdom of God or the Co-operative Commonwealth. During these ages of injustice there have always been some people who "counted" more than others, who esteemed themselves above their fellows. That is the essence of injustice. For by "justice" I mean a full life for all, according to each one's capacity for living, contributed to by the work of all who are able to contribute. This long-drawn-out injustice has now resulted, as I say, in a vast swarm of people most of whom belong properly neither to town nor to country. As the song says, "They dunno where they are." I am one of these. As a member of a soldier's family my first two years (so I was credibly informed) were spent in India. Since then I never had the same home place for more than a few years at a time up to nearly fourteen years ago; since when I have lived in a neighbourhood which is certainly not town, and, if country, is country much spoiled.

Now, suppose that, by a sudden access of reasonableness or forced by the necessities of the situation, we suddenly took to organising our economic affairs on the full-life-for-all basis. What would happen? Would this "justice," as I have called it, abolish the "urban and rural antithesis" by bestowing on all the blessings of both ways of life, thus also doing away by transformation with the large nondescript mass in which, because I belong to it, I am so interested? Or would it emphasise the antithesis and divide the population into clear-cut bodies of peasants or yeomen on the one side and thoroughgoing townsmen on the other? Who can tell?

Is it possible that we have a clue or a hint in the great extension of the convenient bus, added to suburban railways and tramways whereby people are enabled to sleep at some distance both from their place of work and from their place of entertainment? Suppose this led to people settling in villages grouped round central spots in which were theatre-opera-concert and meeting halls, as well as markets, perhaps, and factories, colleges, and possibly cathedrals; what would you call the people who lived in such groups? Would they be country folk or townfolk—or a bit of both? Would they, think you, tend to live intellectually and to stop at nothing to supplant nature? Would their outlook be national or world-wide? Would such villages, grouped round economic, educational and art centres, be more attractive to our present country or town dwellers? Or would they attract both—or neither?

PERHAPS they would best suit our nondescripts, while a proportion of die-hards would prefer secluded villages on the one hand and nice compact cities and towns on the other. But I feel sure that our Londons and Manchesters, New Yorks, Berlins and Paris would be greatly changed.

BUT all this is speculation. My point is that we do not know the sort of future we have to plan for. We do know that every one needs a reasonable amount of space, air and light, a well built dwelling, good occupation and recreation in suitable places. They need these now, not some day in the future. And I suggest that the task of to-day is to try to secure these with as little far-ahead planning as may be.

SOME planning of course there must be. But justice comes first, and beauty and all reasonable amenities will follow. "Seek ye first . . ."

WHAT are the implications of all this? I don't know. But it just occurs to me that at present, for instance, we have to build—or ought to build—a number of cheap little dwellings for families with very small incomes. Let them be built; but do not let us plan under the persuasion that the conditions which necessitate them will always obtain.

I do not quite understand the reference to "history" and planning to keep the countryside open and untainted. So far as the great cities have dominated the world outside them and exacted tribute, as have the lesser towns with their countryside; banks and great financial houses proving more effective than robber castles. The world crisis now offers a great opportunity to abandon the age-long conflict for friendly co-operation; but successful planning can only come after the co-operative spirit has asserted itself.

THE REV. J. C. PRINGLE: This plan appears to me attractive, and desirable: I feel we should support all possible means for its accomplishment; the more so that at present it resides wholly in the minds of sociologists, and has not, I believe, taken the most embryonic inchoation anywhere else.

EVEN so, even in England I believe it to be conceivably possible and I think Mr. Clark is right to entrust it to the teachers, including all who teach, but especially all elementaries. At present practically no professional teacher teaches in the country for any

reason under heaven except to get a post in a town. I want to see Mr. Clark create an obstinate relentless push in the teachers' training colleges in favour of a "we are going to be rural teachers" slogan. He will be aided by the craving of teachers to-day for *cars* (not for rural amenities).

NEXT he must attack the *clergy* under instruction of all churches and create a group sworn never to serve in a town.

ALONG with that he will create his rural way of life which at present does not see an inch beyond dressing up "posh" and jumping on a bus bound for a town, or cursing with bitter tears the lack or remoteness of things and services you need; or things and services you want. This latter may be called the rural philosophy of to-day.

As all Le Playites know, despite a certain measure of restlessness and day dreaming about effort, man will never undertake or persevere in the reliable urge of humanity to get the chores of each day as they arise done with the minimum exertion possible—every day the thrill goes out of the doings of these, and the sense of irksome toil gains in his consciousness. Everyday the craving for a contrivance, generally a slave (? a wife), to do it for him becomes more insistent. (See Kipling's exquisite rendering in "When Alan lay a dreaming . . .") The obstacles to the establishment of a country outlook and point of view, are as Mr. Clark points out staggering—many of them, so far as we can see, at present irremovable. Others should be modifiable by an educational campaign. The *summum bonum* to-day for nearly everybody is the *purchase of pleasure*. It is not the pursuit of pleasure. Hedonism is a fallacy which is dissipated by the first glimmering of psychology. We purchase pleasure because we lose status and poise in reference to our neighbours if we don't. It is a relentless tyranny. Since the 170,000 elementary school teachers in England and Wales are just as much the slaves of this vogue as anybody else, Mr. Clark has an uphill journey, but there is no inherent reason why he should not win, and I, for one, devoutly hope he will.

It is very different when we come to *needed goods and services*. The wife of an agricultural labourer who, though efficient, does not get constant work and of course gets no dole, who lives 4 miles from anywhere, and, none too strong herself, has 3 or 4 children not robust but clever, who is good and longs to have everything *just so* finds it extremely hard to see any advantage enjoyed by country life. Lack of gas for cooking and electric light add enormously to the chores. The chief incidents outside the daily round are *medical* and doctors, nurses' hospitals, and chemists are past praying for, next thing to non-existent so far as she is concerned.

THE other big thing outside the daily chores is education. If one of the children is at all bright the parents begin to think of some kind of further education, but only to realise that *that also is out of reach*.

THE purchase of pleasure for oneself is the vogue, but, in an age of that vogue, the fond mother desires to purchase conventional pleasure for her offspring. That of course means a day at the seaside and money to spend there. The sociologist must be forgiven for laughing at this point, and he is right. It is laughable, but (a) it is true, and (b) it is tragic.

Now with Mr. Clark let us reconstruct.

Doctors and chemists !!

THE lore of the country folk and the "simples" are far more potent to create and conserve good health.

Education.—Not all the schools in the world can teach what one acre let alone 20,000 acres can teach the younger endowed with sight, hearing, smell, and touch.

Pleasure. Compare the infinite boredom and utter banality of a conventional sea front with the fresh breezes, growing things and creatures, the hill sides and the downs.

Ambition. The gross and cruel injustices of present-day arrangements certainly load the dice against the enterprising lad and girl who stays in the country, but Mr. Clark will help us here too. From an ambition expressed in scales of wages and benefits, he must switch them over to an ambition to see how much sustenance they can get out of a holding of 3 to 30 acres and set the cultivation of that before them as the goal of all their endeavour; *NOT* observe, the cash they can wring out of it to spend on the purchase of pleasure.

DR. C. B. FAWCETT : 1. "URBAN area" is obviously used as equivalent to the legal term urban districts (of all types). In fact it is nearer the truth to say that 90 per cent. of our population live under urban conditions during their working lives.

2. So far as the summary goes it seems to me that Mr. Clark's view of relations of town and country relates to an economic and social stage in our civilisation which belongs to the past rather than to the future—but it would need a whole paper to state this fairly.
3. THE view that country-folk, and hill-folk in particular, are more virile than townsfolk again ignores recent changes. Since 1860-80 when the public health movement got going the towns of this country have ceased to be "consumers of men" and a similar change has occurred, or is occurring, later in other lands. THE experience of the late War, and such studies as those of Dr. Mackenzie in HIGHLANDS AND ISLES of Scotland, and of others in "Congested Districts" of Ireland, all tend to show that under modern conditions the townsfolk are no less virile than rural populations.

BUT again it is impossible to make more than a suggestion in a note.

4. IN what sense is rural civilisation national? The peasant everywhere is "local"—"localised over the ears" as H. G. Wells puts it—but this is not by any means equivalent to being "national." Surely the aggressive "nationalisms" and "economic nationalisms" of the present are rather urban and industrial in origin.
5. I AGREE emphatically (a) that nation-wide, and worldwide, planning is needed, and (b) that the possibility and success of such planning demands education, including education for survey and for service, as its essential condition.

IN the discussion which followed DR. H. S. JEVONS pointed out the tendency at present evident towards mechanising agriculture. In America even market gardening is experiencing this change. If by rural life we mean something dependent on traditional agriculture, rural life will certainly disappear soon. He also suggested that there is room for local planning of small industries. MR. GUY KEELING asked what is to happen to the population that we can no longer employ during the next ten to fifteen years? Planning must include provision for migration on a large scale. MR. F. J. RICHARDS said that his experience in India led him to place the highest value upon rural life, and he looked upon over-urbanisation as a cause of the fall of nations. DR. DESCH doubted whether we are ready for rural planning in detail as yet. He mentioned the urgent problems arising from the shift of industry from North to South in this country. DR. MONTAGUE DIXON said that in his experience agricultural labourers now show a different and urbanised outlook on their work. The Central Schools bring country children under urban influence at an early age. MISS MOSS thought that it is too early to judge the influence of the Central Schools. Undoubtedly they have prevented the development of some promising rural schools. MR. LE PATOUREL showed that mediæval history with its largely local character has a bearing upon modern planning. The county is a very old regional unit. In Guernsey he had noted a rapid increase of urbanisation and the growth of a commercial spirit in connection with the tourist industry.

AFTER these and other speakers had contributed, MR. CLARK replied, emphasising the necessity for preserving the spirit underlying our old rural civilisation. That, he thought, and not the presence or absence of mechanisation is the important thing. We are not planning to maintain a *status quo*, we are planning for a growing future. Education must be our chief weapon.

ANNUAL CONFERENCE. The Annual Conference was held this year on Friday and Saturday, 24th and 25th February. Dr. Marett's Presidential Address and the Ordinary General Meeting (of which reports are given elsewhere) were arranged to fit in.

ON Saturday morning at 11.15 a.m. the chief discussion—on HOME AND COMMUNITY—took place, with the President in the Chair. The subject had been chosen because of its probable selection as the theme of the next Meeting of the International Conference on Social Work in 1936. Captain Arthur St. John, Mr. P. J. Hughesdon, and Dr. W. Daley sent written comments on the summary circulated in advance. The discussion was opened by Mr. B. E. Astbury; Miss Swaisland, Mrs. Hodson, Mr. Waldegrave, Miss de Ternant, Mrs. Westbrook, Dr. Desch, Mrs. Schapiro, Miss Hunnybun, and Dr. Vaughan Cornish were among those who took part.

FOLLOWING lunch at Stewart's Restaurant, Victoria, a visit was paid to the London Museum, Lancaster House. Miss Cruso met the party and acted as Conductor and Demonstrator, sketching the history of London, and later the history of costume. After an interval for tea, the party went on to the Courtauld Institute of Art, Portman Square, and saw there the arrangements for students, the library, and the collection of pictures, and some interesting features of the house itself.

THE Conference concluded on Saturday evening with a Reception at the Goring Hotel. Here in pleasant surroundings members listened to a series of part-songs in German and English sung by a group of the London Singkreis under the leadership of Miss Collingham.

EDUCATIONAL CIRCLE.

AT the meeting on November 16th, Prof. C. H. Desch, F.R.S., gave an address on "The Place of Science in a General Education," a summary of which appears elsewhere in this issue. In the discussion Dr. Hayward suggested that a list should be drawn up of the minimum number of things that should be seen by everybody, and started it with a live amoeba under a microscope, the satellites of Jupiter and the rings of Saturn, and a spectrum. Mr. F. J. Gould remarked that Science has not fulfilled its purpose until it has been joined to beauty. Science has not ended until it has reached social life; and its service is to abolish poverty (economics) and to make beauty the supreme thing in life. All teachers should know all sciences in outline.

ON January 12th, Miss Helen Cooke, author of the Class Books of World History (Oxford University Press), spoke on "Education in relation to World Civilisation," and a summary of her paper also appears in this issue. In the discussion that followed different speakers emphasised the following points: each individual was a symbol of the world and had no meaning except in relation to society; the increased number of voters and of people having banking accounts; the importance of the right use of leisure; the master power of economics; adaptation to the increased power of production.

AT the meeting on March 8th, Mr. I. O. Evans, author of "The Junior Outline of History," spoke on "The Place of Outdoor Activities in the successive stages of Education." He gave a history of the movements connected with outdoor activities, and showed that at every stage the work of the professional has been supplemented and revived by the amateur, the "outsider." A summary of his address will appear in the next issue of the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*.

MR. GOULD said the object should be finally to get the *sense of the country* without artificially rushing about to study it. Education should be such that when young people went into the country they got into touch with something they had learnt at school. Human geography and literature should also be taught in connection with the country. Mr. Aldworth disagreed with compulsory education at the age of five. He thought the law should be more elastic, and parents should have more freedom with regard to the age when their children started school.

ANYONE interested in Education considered synthetically is welcome at the meetings, and will receive notices of them if an address is sent to Miss E. M. White, at Le Play House.

GRITH FYRD CAMPS.

THE scheme for the establishment of Grith Fyrd (Peace Army) camps in England, organised by the Order of Woodcraft Chivalry, is a contribution to the solution of Industrial and Educational Problems of the present day. As an experiment in the constructive use of the increasing leisure, largely resulting from economic conditions, it aims not only at being an Unemployment scheme, but also at filling needs which would exist even if there were no unemployment. At present, only one camp has been formed, at Godshill, near Fordingbridge, Hants., on the north-western edge of the New Forest. This was started in March 1933, when six experienced campers went under canvas. They immediately built huts and shelters and within a fortnight were joined by six other recruits. The number soon increased to 25. It is now intended to arrange for 50 men per camp and to establish a chain of camps throughout the country.

BUILDING of sleeping and living shelters from timber felled near the site at Godshill was followed by cultivation of the land for vegetables, etc., and in this connection a local society has been formed whereby advantages can be taken of a scheme organised by the Friends' Allotment Committee. In addition, pigs, goats and poultry are kept. A washing place has been made by damming a near-by stream, and roads, paths and bridges have been constructed. Recreation has been provided for by cricket and football teams, and discussions, singing and Morris dancing are important features. A Camp Council consisting of every member in Camp is in being and a Trade Union Sub-Committee advises on suggested schemes of work that might be undertaken by the men as volunteers.

THE scheme is primarily educational and seeks to provide "an environment in which those with leisure can live a worth-while life, even if precluded from earning a living." The key-note is "self-help" and after the equipment has been provided the establishment, running and support of the camps is carried out entirely by the men themselves. Those eligible receive Unemployment Benefit and Transitional Payment from the Ministry of Labour, and any man securing a post while in camp is able to leave at once. The camp is open at present to young unmarried men of all classes from 18-25 years of age.

THE period of service is 18 months, divided into three stages. The first period is occupied in learning camp construction, cultivation of the land, and provision for social life and recreation. In the second period, short camping expeditions about the country are taken by small groups on foot. They see England from both good and bad aspects "and learn at first hand more of what a citizen should know about his country and its problems." The last period is designed to give scope to self-expression through voluntary Social Service, such as warden work, regional survey, clearing and improving the country defaced by the results of industry; running holiday camps for children and others and similar activities, which being definitely uneconomic provide no competition against wage-earners, but serve to put into practice "the desire for service that they may have acquired."

As Arthur R. Cobb says in his pamphlet: "They believe their scheme capable of gradual, but sufficiently rapid extension to affect great numbers within a few years, so that it may afford some measure of relief to the whole of the system which is now so clearly suffering from ill-health," and "that by regarding Unemployment as leisure, an opportunity to do what is needed, and *not* as a disaster, it can crown the paradoxes (of this present age) and render them paradoxes no more."

LE PLAY HOUSE LIBRARY: RECENT ADDITIONS.

Blumenthal (Albert)	SMALL-TOWN STUFF	1932
Ewer (Bernard C.)	SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY	1929
Graff (William L.)	LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGES	1932
Gamble (William)	PENROSE'S ANNUAL	1933
Glover (Edward)	COMMON PROBLEMS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ANTHROPOLOGY: DRUG RITUAL AND ADDICTION	1932
" "	MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF NORMALITY	1932
Heard (Gerald)	THIS SURPRISING WORLD	1932
" "	SOCIAL SUBSTANCE OF RELIGION	1931
Marett (R. R.)	FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION	1932
Webb (S. & B.)	METHODS OF SOCIAL STUDY	1932
Worthington (George E.)	MEN'S MISDEMEANANTS DIVISION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF PHILADELPHIA	1932
League of Nations	REORGANISATION OF EDUCATION IN CHINA	1932

GIFT FROM THE POSITIVIST LIBRARY, CHURCH OF HUMANITY.

Barthery (P. J.)	SCIENCE DE L'HOMME. I.-II.	1808
Bichat (F.-X.)	LA VIE ET LA MORT	1866
Bridges (J. H.)	DISCOURSES ON POSITIVE RELIGION	1891
" "	ILLUSTRATIONS OF POSITIVISM	1915
Comte (Auguste)	CIRCULAIRES ANNUELLES	1886
" "	MON TESTAMENT	1896
" "	SYNTHÈSE SUBJECTIVE	1856
" "	SUR L'OEUVRE ET SUR LA VIE	1860
" "	GÉOMÉTRIE ANALYTIQUE	1843
" "	APPEAL TO CONSERVATIVES	1889
" "	POLITIQUE POSITIVE, I.-IV.	1851
" "	POLITIQUE POSITIVE: APPENDICE	1854
" "	PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE, I.-VI.	1864
" "	D'ASTRONOMIE POPULAIRE	1844
Condorcet (M. J.)	ÉLOGES, I.-V.	1799
Congreve (Richard)	INDIA	1859
Cotton (Sir Henry)	NEW INDIA	1907
Fontenelle (B.)	BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE	1869
Geddes (Emily)	THE SEVEN SCIENCES	1913
Gould, (F. J.)	AUGUSTE COMTE	1920
Goethe (J. W. von)	WERKE. I.-II.	1845
Hutton (Henry Dix)	EARLY ESSAYS OF COMTE	
" "	AUGUSTE COMTE	1889
Ingram (John K.)	HUMAN NATURE AND MORALS	1901
" "	THE FINAL TRANSITION	1905
" "	SONNETS AND OTHER POEMS	1900
" "	PRACTICAL MORALS	1904
Jones (H. Gordon)	THE POSITIVIST CALENDAR	1929
Laffitte (Pierre)	LA CIVILISATION CHINOISE	1861
" "	COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE PREMIÈRE	1889
Mill (John Stuart)	AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM	1865
" "	LETTRES DE COMTE	1877
Manzoni (Alessandro)	I PROMESSI SPOSI	1876
Mignet (F. A.)	HISTOIRE DE LA RÉVOLUTION, I.-II.	
Sabatier (Paul)	FRANCE TO-DAY	1913
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